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ABSTRACT 
Within the industrial relations literature there has been a growth in 
publications that utilise the concept of 'managerial strategy'. 
Many writers use the concept as a simple shorthand description of 
managerial actions and decisions; other writers use it for solely 
normative purposes. However, a significant nimiber of writers claim that 
the concept can be used to effectively explain industrial relations activity 
and arrangements, and also as a way of redressing problems inherent in 
traditional theoretical approaches to industrial relations. 
This thesis examines these claims and also seeks to contribute to several 
debates concerning the concept of 'managerial strategy' that are raised in 
the industrial relations literature. 
The conclusions drawn in this thesis are primarily based on a study of 
the progress of a managerial strategy developed in the NSW South West 
Region of Telecom Australia, and of industrial relations problems that 
emerged in the Narrandera office of the organisation. It is concluded that 
the concept of 'managerial strategy' does facilitate the generation of 
useful explanations of industrial relations activity, and that it does help 
to redress the inadequacies of traditional approaches. 
In addition to investigating the concept of managerial strategy, this thesis 
briefly discusses a number of other issues. In particular, it examines the 
ability of consultative management approaches to improve industrial 
relations, the industrial relations of redundancy, and the dynamics of 
industrial relations in rural commimities. 
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
Hiis thesis is concerned with managerial strategy and industrial 
relations. More particularly, it is about the way the concept of 
'managerial strategy* has been, and can be, used in the study of 
industrial relations. The examination will be based on an analysis 
of the relevant industrial relations literature and an empirical 
study of industrial relations activity and the progress and impact 
of a management strategy within Telecom Australia. 
As will be discussed, within the industrial relations literature 
there has been a growth in the number of publications that 
concentrate on managerial strategy. Many of these articles use 
the concept in an imcritical way as a shorthand method of 
describing managerial actions and decisions. Ihese approaches 
rarely define the concept and do not consider, in any depth, its 
theoretical implications. Rather, it appears to be assimied that its 
definition is obvious and its implications improblematic. Other 
articles use the concept normatively as a way of improving 
organisational effectiveness and efficiency. It is argued that 
managers should move away firom reactive approaches towards 
industrial relations and adopt proactive approaches that focus on 
the development of industrial relations strategies and the 
incorporation of industrial relations into corporate decision 
making. Such approaches, it is implied, will improve the ability of 
managers to deal with the dynamics of industrial relations over 
the longer term. 
However, not all writers adopt a purely descriptive or normative 
approach. Many are investigating the concept in more depth and 
are intent on using it as a way of explaining industrial relations 
activity and arrangements. Further, they are trying to use 
'managerial strategy' to address problems associated with 
orthodox industrial relations approaches and the classic labour 
process statements of writers such as Braverman. These 
traditional approaches, it is claimed, are unable to explain 
contemporary developments in industrial relations because of 
inherent weaknesses in the theories themselves. Because they 
concentrate on industrial relations institutions, orthodox 
approaches are seen to be too static in nature. The classic labour 
process approaches, on the other hand, are thought to be too 
determinist. They portray development as progressing down an 
inevitable and somewhat predictable track which, it is claimed, is 
not in accord with actual events. 'Managerial strategy', it is 
argued, can rectify these problems by including a dynamic 
element in the theories: the decisions and choices of managers. 
Management actions, it is claimed, are not strictly determined by 
external factors, nor the institutions within which they work. The 
decisions and choices they make can have a profound effect on 
industrial relations and, as a result, can be used to explain 
diversity in industrial relations structures and processes. 
This thesis seeks to examine these claims. That is, the primary 
aim of the thesis is to enable a judgment to be made about the 
efficacy of 'managerial strategy' as an explanatory concept in 
Industrial relations. In doing this, it will help to determine 
whether or not the concept can be successfully used to address 
the inadequacies of orthodox industrial relations and labour 
process theories. 
The thesis also raises, addresses and attempts to contribute to 
several debates about the concept of 'managerial strategy' which 
are raised in the industrial relations literature. It will discuss the 
way the concept has been defined, what activity it is seen as 
embracing, and the conceptual problems raised. In this regard, 
the thesis will investigate issues such as whether a course of 
managerial action needs to be intentional, planned in detail, 
coherent and implemented to be deemed a managerial strategy: if 
in discussing managerial strategy management should be treated 
as a homogeneous group or as composed of groups or coalitions 
with sometimes conflicting perspectives and goals; and whether 
the concept of 'managerial strategy' leads to excessively 
voluntarist explanations of industrial relations activity. With 
respect to this last issue, because the empirical research in this 
thesis relates to activity in Telecom Australia, it will consider the 
constraints on managerial strategy which may be associated with 
the organisation's public ownership. That is, it will consider the 
nature and impact of the political context within which 
organisations such as Telecom operate. 
Beyond definitional issues, this thesis will consider the 
relationship between managerial strategies and industrial 
relations. It will investigate the impact that managerial strategies 
may have upon industrial relations. It will also briefly consider 
the extent to which industrial relations is a consideration in the 
development of managerial strategies and the ways industrial 
relations may affect the strategy implementation process. 
As a way of examining the concept of 'managerial strategy', the 
thesis will use the concept to provide an explanation for 
industrial relations problems which developed in the Narrandera 
office of Telecom Australia. These problems, it is argued, relate to 
broader changes in Telecom Australia and, in particular, to a 
specific managerial strategy developed at the regional level of the 
organisation. 
Since coming to power in 1983, the Federal Labour Government 
has initiated a series of reforms into government business 
enterprises such as Telecom Australia. The reforms were designed 
to improve the efficiency and accountability of the organisations, 
and were an integral part of the Gk)vemment's micro-economic 
reform agenda and its moves to overhaul Australian public sector 
administration. The reforms were aimed to make management 
more responsible for the performance of therr organisations and 
to increase accountability to the public. They led to the creation 
of new corporate structures within Telecom and eventually to the 
opening up of the telecommimications industry to competition. 
In responding to the reforms, Telecom management implemented 
a range of initiatives aimed at improving the competitive position 
of the company. In the South West Region of the Countiy 
Division, management responded by formulating a strategy that 
invoh^ed the amalgamation and, therefore, rationalisation of 
Telecom districts. In the Riverina area of NSW this involved the 
amalgamation of two long standing districts: the Wagga Wagga 
district and the Narrandera district. The amalgamation strategy 
was underpinned by regional management's belief that it would 
enable a rationalisation of management and clerical positions; 
therefore increasing efficiency and cutting costs. 
It wiU be argued that the strategy led to an increase in industrial 
relations problems within the Narrandera Telecom office. 
During the mid to late 1980s, industrial relations within Telecom 
generally was far more consensual than it was in the early 1980s. 
The early 1980s were marked by a poor relationship between 
Telecom management and unions. Changes, such as the 
introduction of new technology, frequently lead to significant and 
protracted industrial disputes. Many of these disputes had wider 
industrial relations consequences and attracted intervention from 
the Ftaser Liberal Government. Since the election of the Labor 
Party, the level of disputation has declined and the relationship 
between Telecom management and unions has improved at both 
national and local levels. This was despite a quickening in the 
pace of change associated with the Government's GBE reform 
agenda, broader micro-economic and labour market reforms and 
the introduction of major technological innovations. 
Events at the Narrandera office provide an exception to this 
improving relationship between management and unions. Before 
the amalgamation of the Narrandera and Wagga Wagga offices, 
relations between management and employees at Narrandera 
were excellent. High levels of trust existed and employees only 
undertook industrial action in response to national calls from the 
unions - and then only on rare occasions. However, in the period 
leading up to and following the amalgamation of the Narrandera 
and Wagga Wagga offices relations at Narrandera soured. Several 
industrial disputes arose from within the office and employees 
and managers increasingly came to view each other with 
suspicion. 
It is these industrial relations problems and regional 
management's amalgamation strategy that are the main focus of 
this thesis. The objective is to establish whether the development 
and implementation of the amalgamation strategy can be used to 
adequately explain the Narrandera experience. 
In investigating industrial relations at Narrandera, the thesis also 
provides a tentative and cursory examination of the nature or 
dynamics of industrial relations in rural communities. ̂  
^ Because it is not tbe coitral concern of the study an extensive examination of relevant literature on rural industrial 
relations in rural communities has not been undertaken. In any case, literature searches revealed that the issue had not 
been examined in dqjth in the industrial relations literatme. Some work has been done on industrial relations in 
company towns and mining communities but no analysis of rural commtmities has taken place. As a result, all analysis 
of the issue is based {Hirely on m^irical data. The issue is raised and investigated simply because it was seen to be a 
potentially important factor which may have a bearing on events at Narrandera and. therefore, of the role played by 
managerial strategy. 
There is a strong belief amongst Telecom managers and 
employees that industrial relations within rural commimities is 
less conOictual than is the case in urban areas. Rural based 
employees, it is claimed, are less willing than their urban 
colleagues to engage in industrial action: they rarely start 
industrial disputes and frequently refuse to become involved in 
national union campaigns. In this thesis the reasons put forward 
for the supposed rural industrial relations harmony are 
described. Factors discussed include the weak nature of the rural 
labour market; the quality of rural life; and the notion that social 
interaction in rural towns is more close knit. 
In the concluding chapter of the thesis, a brief analysis of this 
claim is made based on the Narrandera experience. The 
conclusions are tentative: fcir more research is needed. 
Nevertheless, it does appear that the Narrandera experience does 
not support a view that industrial relations is less problematic in 
the bush than it is in the city. In fact, as will be described, to 
some extent the industrial action was exacerbated because it did 
take place within a small rural commimity. Many rural townships 
throughout Australia are in decline. Emplo5nnent prospects are 
continually contracting as the size of town economies shrink and 
as the population steadily dribbles away to larger rural and urban 
centres. As a result, people remaining within the commimities 
believe that the very existence of their towns is under threat. Any 
initiatives that are likely to reduce opportunities further are, 
therefore, fought against vigorously. 
The Narrandera community is a prime example of this problem. 
The town reached its population peak in the first half of this 
century, but has been in decline ever since. By the 1980s the sole 
remaining large employers were government organisations such 
as Telecom. With the emergence of reform processes in the public 
sector, employment in government organisations in Narrandera 
has now begim to decline rapidly as well. This has led to 
suspicion and negative reactions firom commimity members 
towards any new initiatives aimed at reducing the operating costs 
of public sector organisations. As will be described, the 
amalgamation strategy was seen in this light. It was perceived to 
be a real threat to the town and drew a strong negative response. 
The community came out in support of the local Telecom 
employees and to a fair degree pressured them to react as 
strongly as possible. 
Turning to the structure of the thesis, in Chapter 2 the industrial 
relations literature that addresses the concept of 'managerial 
strategy' is reviewed. The chapter begins with a brief examination 
of why the concept has been increasingly used in discussions of 
industrial relations activity. Definitional issues are examined, a 
stance taken on a number of the issues and a definition of the 
concept for the thesis is adopted. The discussion then 
investigates the link between corporate level strategy and 
industrial relations and the influence of public ownership on 
managerial strategy and industrial relations. Finally, a nimiber of 
the issues discussed are identified as being subjects for empirical 
research in the thesis. 
Chapter 3 provides an overview of the history of Telecom 
Australia from its vesting in 1975 until the early 1980s. Major 
events during that period and the character of industrial relations 
are described. The chapter also describes in detail the reform 
process initiated by the Labor Government. In this respect. 
Chapter 3 concentrates upon the Government's 1977 'Guidelines 
for Statutory Authorities and Government Business Enterprises' 
and the 1988 Statement on the Conmiunications Industry. The 
information for this chapter was gathered from a range of 
government publications and from the significant body of 
research on public sector reform. The chapter is designed to act 
as a background to developments at Narrandera. It helps to 
provide an understanding of events by providing a description of 
the history of Telecom and the recent extensive reform process. 
The aim of Chapter 4 is to present a picture of industrial relations 
generally within Telecom against which industrial relations 
activity at Narrandera can be compared. The intention is not to 
provide a detailed description of industrial relations throughout 
the organisation, but simply to provide an impression of the 
Industrial relations climate at Telecom. The period involved is 
from the mid 1980s imtil late 1990. Data for this chapter was 
derived from an examination of Industrial Relations Commission 
decisions and from in-depth interviews of 22 Telecom managers, 
supervisors and imion representatives. The interviews were 
undertaken in 1990 and took place at Telecom's regional head 
office at Burwood, the district ofiftce at WoUongong and the 
district ofiice at Wagga Wagga. The analysis of transcripts was 
aimed to provide a picture of industrial relations at the formalised 
national level. The interviews were designed to develop a picture 
of local or workplace level industrial relations. 
The focus of the study is narrowed in Chapter 5 to an 
examination of events in the Riverina region of Telecom where the 
Narrandera office is located. The chapter describes the progress of 
regional management's strategy to amalgamate the Narrandera 
and Wagga Wagga districts and also examines the effect this 
strategy had upon industrial relations within the Narrandera 
office. In this regard, the chapter enables a further examination of 
local level industrial relations. More importantly, it facilitates an 
analysis of the concept of 'managerial strategy' in Chapter 6. 
Data for Chapter 5 was partly drawn from the local Narrandera 
newspaper, and Telecom annual reports. Most of the data was 
drawn from a series of in-depth interviews conducted in late 1990 
and early 1991. The interviews were of 25 managers, supervisors, 
clerical staff and union delegates at Telecom's Burwood, Wagga 
Wagga and Narrandera offices. The interviews were designed to 
provide a clear picture of events within the Riverina region, and 
the Narrandera office in particular. 
In Chapter 6 the empirical data discussed in Chapter 5 is 
examined from the perspective offered by the concept of 
'managerial strategy' as it is defined in Chapter 2. The objective of 
this chapter is threefold. First, it provides an explanation of the 
events and developments at Narrandera which were a 
consequence of the amalgamation strategy. Second, it provides 
insights into the concept of 'managerial strategy'. In this respect, 
it addresses some of the debates discussed in Chapter 2 and also 
raises several other issues which shed further light on the 
concept of 'managerial strategy' and its use as an explanation of 
industrial relations activity. Leading on from one and two, the 
chapter enables an overall judgment to be made about the power 
of 'managerial strategy' as a concept which can be used to explain 
industrial relations. While it is not seen as totally adequate, it is 
argued that an examination of events using 'managerial strategy' 
as an explanatory concept does facilitate understanding and the 
generation of useful explanations. 
In the final chapter a judgment is made about the ability of the 
concept of 'managerial strategy' to address the inadequacies of 
orthodox industrial relations and labour process theories. It is 
argued that the efficacy of both theories is improved substantially 
by including the concept because it provides for 'choice' as a 
dynamic element in the theories. However, it is argued that both 
labour process and orthodox Industrial relations theory could be 
improved further- by investigating not only the strategies of 
managers, but also the strategies of other groups involved in the 
industrial relationship. The chapter and thesis is concluded with 
a brief discussion of a number of other issues which it is felt 
require further investigation. In particular, the ability of 
consultative management strategies to improve industrial 
relations and aid the implementation of change in organisations; 
the industrial relations of redundancy; and the dynamics of 
industrial relations in rural communities. 
CHAPTER 2 - LITERATURE REVIEW: MANAGERIAL STRATEGY AND 
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
INTRODUCTION 
As Stated In the introduction, in this chapter the managerial 
strategy and industrial relations literature will be examined. The 
review will investigate theoretical issues claimed by writers to be 
important to any study of the interrelationship between 
managerial strategy and industrial relations. A specific objective 
of the chapter is to highlight issues that will be examined 
empirically as part of the study of managerial strategy and 
industrial relations in Telecom Australia-Riverina. 
MANAGERIAL STRATEGY AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
In the last decade a body of literature has developed that 
considers the role of managerial strategies in industrial relations. 
Broadly this literature can be argued to have developed from two 
fields: orthodox industrial relations approaches^ and labour 
process theory (Bray and Taylor 1986). 
In the orthodox literature the development appears to be related 
to dramatic economic changes faced in modem market based 
economies over the last two decades. Writers point out (eg. 
Kochan, Mckersie, and CappeUi 1984, Kinnie, 1985, Cappelli, 
McKersie, 1987, Bramble 1989) that in recent decades significant 
economic downturns coupled with an intensification of market 
9 . • 
This literature is gmerally undeipinned pluralist assumptions and has been primarily 
concerned with the institutions of industrial relations. 
competition have taken place in many advanced economies. The 
changed economic conditions, it is inferred, have led to 
reductions in trade union membership, and increased proactivity 
and initiative on the part of management in industrial relations. 
These changes, especially the increased role of management, 
appear to have prompted researchers to take a much greater 
interest in the activities of management in industrial relations. As 
a result, in recent years an increasing body of research has 
focused on the role of management in industrial relations (eg.. 
Bray and Taylor 1986, Gospel and Uttler 1983, Knights and 
Willmott 1986). The growing concentration on managerial strategy 
reflects this increase in interest (Whitaker 1986). 
Further, in the light of the economic and industrial relations 
changes, it has been increasingly argued that traditional 
approaches to industrial relations no longer provide adequate 
explanations of industrial relations activity (eg. Kochan, McKersie, 
and Cappelli 1984, Gospel 1983, and Seglow 1983). It is argued 
that the concern with institutions in the traditional systems and 
pluralist based literature promotes a static approach that cannot 
adequately explain significant changes and developments. 
'Managerial strategy' is now claimed as a concept that can redress 
this inadequacy because it embraces processes that are dynamic 
and variable. It is, as a result, being used by some writers (eg. 
Kochan et al.) as a way of adjusting the traditional approaches so 
that they ofiFer more powerful explanations of current industrial 
relations developments. 
Finally, at a more normative level, increasing emphasis is being 
placed on managerial strategy by writers who, it appears, wish to 
persuade practising managers to take a more strategic approach 
to industrial relations as a way of coping with recent economic 
and industrial relations changes. These writers stress the, 
generally, reactive nature of industrial relations management and 
the extent to which industrial relations is divorced from broader 
corporate considerations (Miller, 1987; Purcell, 1983). 
In the labour process literature the increased interest appears to 
be related to an inability on the part of classic statements of 
labour process theory (eg. those of Braverman, 1974; Edwards, 
1979; and Friedman, 1977) to describe or explain adequately the 
diverse ways in which the labour process in modem capitalist 
enterprises has varied over time. Contemporary writers (eg., 
Uttier and Salaman 1982, Storey 1985, Knights and Willmott 
1990) argue that the classic statements tend to identify inevitable 
trends, stages or limited alternative control strategies as almost 
immutable characteristics of capitalist development. However, 
they claim that the highly diverse developments in modem 
capitalist organisations undermine determinist conclusions. It 
now tends to be argued that the reality of modem work 
organisation implies that no general conclusion can be made 
concerning the direction of change or stmcture of the labour 
process. 
Thus, it is claimed that Braverman's apparent emphasis upon an 
inevitable trend towards the degradation of work is far too one 
directional. Writers have provided empirical evidence to show that 
management has at various times upgraded work as means of 
gaining control. In a similar way, Edwards' identification of 
discrete stages in the development of the capitalist labour process 
has been shown to over-simplify the complexity of labour process 
development. Further, Friedman's classification of control 
strategies into either "Direct Control" or "Responsible Autonomy" 
typologies is claimed to be, on the basis of empirical evidence, far 
too restrictive (Littler and Salaman 1982, Storey 1985, Knights 
and Willmott 1990). 
As a response to these problems, many contemporary writers 
have started to investigate the role of management in structuring 
the labour process. In doing so, some now identify managerial 
strategies as possible explanations for this diversity and are using 
the concept in their argimients. They claim that the way the 
labour process is structured in a particular organisation can be 
explained, at least partially, by the strategies adopted by 
managers (Morgan and Hooper, 1987). As Littler (1990 p50) 
states: 
If there is no iron law that determines the nature of the labour 
process, then perhaps it is possible to understand events and 
processes in terms of a range of managerial strategies. 
In addition to the above, in both the orthodox and labour process 
literature an underlying reason for the development of the 
concept of 'managerial strategy' is that it embraces the idea of 
'choice*. That is, in adopting the notion of 'managerial strategy', 
labour process and orthodox writers imply that management has 
an ability to choose a particular course of action. In other words, 
the idea that environmental factors directly determine industrial 
relations action and outcomes is rejected. Managers are given a 
vital role in choosing strategies to deal with environmental 
change. It is the idea that managers have a role to play in 
choosing possible strategies of action that is being used to explain 
diversity and change in modem capitalist organisations. In the 
labour process literature it is this ability to choose that is 
portrayed as the reason why the capitalist labour processes can 
vary (eg.. Littler 1990, Friedman 1990). In the orthodox literature 
writers portray 'choice' as the needed dynamic element missing in 
systems and institutional approaches (eg., Kochan et al. 1984). 
DEFINITIONAL ISSUES 
A significant number of writers using the concept of 'managerial 
strategy' have done so in a highly unproblematic way. Many do 
not clearly define what they mean by 'managerial strategy', nor do 
they explicitly discuss the theoretical implications associated with 
the concept. It appears to be assumed that the meanings and 
implications are clear in the terms and can be treated in a largely 
commonsensical way. 
Other writers appear to be waiy of commonsense assumptions 
and endeavour to provide a clear impression of the meaning and 
implications of the concept. 
In this regard, the orthodox writers tend to portray 'managerial 
strategy' as concerned with medium to long term plans and 
policies developed and initiated by corporate management. The 
impression given is that managerial strategies are directed toward 
the attainment of specified corporate, business or industrial 
relations objectives that are related to corporate viability or profit 
(Thurley and Wood 1983). 
The labour process literature generally appears to portray 
•managerial strategy' as embracing those techniques, methods, 
and approaches, used by management to control the activities of 
employees involved in the production of goods and services 
(Armstrong 1986). In Marxist terms, labour process theorists 
identify the objective of managerial strategies as being 
ftmdamentally concerned with the conversion of labour power 
(the capacity to work) into labour (effort actually expended) in 
ways that ensure capital accumulation or surplus (Lazonick 
1990). 
A significant number of writers have attempted to go beyond 
general definitions, and have attempted to clarify more explicitly 
what the concept of 'managerial strategy' embraces and implies 
(eg., Thurley and Wood 1983, Uttler 1990, Child 1985). In doing 
so, they have raised a number of problematic issues. 
PLANNING, INTENTION, AND COHERENCE 
In both labour process and orthodox approaches the question of 
whether or not the concept of 'managerial strategy' must imply 
conscious planning, intention, and coherence on the part of 
management is frequently raised. 
Writers who seek to persuade practitioners to adopt a more 
strategic stance, or who are intent on exposing the reactive 
nature of industrial relations management, claim, unsurprisingly, 
that managerial strategy must involve planning, intentionality, 
and coherence. This is the case because it is a perceived lack of 
planning, intention and coherence in management which they are 
trying to address (eg.. Marsh and Gillies 1983, Purcell 1983, 
MiUer 1987). 
Some writers who are more concerned with the theoretical utility 
of the concept have also claimed that the term implies planning, 
intention and coherence. Rose and Jones (1985, p87), for 
example, claim that the use by labour process theorists of the 
notion of 'managerial strategy' to explain managerial activity 
ignores the extent to which: 
managerial approaches to the change of ux)rk processes and 
industrial relations lack the characteristic of a detailed plan of 
campaign implied by the term 'strategy'. 
As a result. Rose and Jones appear to oppose the use of 
'managerial strategy* as an explanatory variable (Thompson 
1990). 
Many writers do not take such a hard line. For example. Child 
(1985) rejects Rose and Jones's claim by arguing that it is far too 
restrictive. For Child (1985, p i 10) the notion of 'managerial 
strategy need not imply strict coherence, it need only: 
reflect a consciousness of certain general objectives which are the 
normal conditions for organisational surutuaL 
Craig Littler (1990, p51) makes a similar point when he claims 
that: 
Choices have to be made within a set of constraints and tf these 
choices foR within a certain pattern, we are entitled to talk about 
'managerial strategy'. 
Child and Littler were writing from a labour process perspective, 
but a nimiber of orthodox writers also reject a rigid approach. For 
example, Kochan et al. (1984, p22) argue that 'strategy': 
may appear only indirectly, and may not even be the result of a 
consciously articulated and preconceived plan. 
Further, Thurley and Wood (1983, pl97) avoid an excessively 
rigid definition by talking about strategy in terms of: 
a consistent approach over time which is intended to yield results 
in the medium and long term for a specific problem. 
IMPLEMENTATION 
A number of writers are critical of the assumption in some 
treatments that strategy intentions and outcomes can be 
collapsed (eg., Thurley and Wood 1983). In particular, writers are 
critical of the inference that successful implementation can be 
assumed when discussing the intentions of managerial strategy 
or that outcomes automatically reflect managerial intentions. In 
other words, the claim is that an improblematic link between 
implementation and management intentions cannot be taken for 
granted. Writers stress factors such as worker resistance, 
informal practices, and managerial rivalry, as being potential 
barriers between the intentions of managerial strategy and 
successful implementation (eg., Batstone, Femer and Terry 1984). 
For some, the problems of strategy intention and implementation 
raise questions about the usefulness of the concept of 'managerial 
strategy*. For example, Thurley and Wood (1983) ask whether the 
fact that many strategies are not implemented without negotiated 
modifications means that only deals, not strategies, exist. In a 
similar vein. Rose and Jones (1985) appear to use this problem as 
another reason to reject 'managerial strategy' as an explanatory 
concept. 
Other writers while acknowledging the problem reject it as a 
reason to claim that managerial strategies don't exist. For 
example, Storey (1985, p203) argues that it is unlikely that: 
a coherent nujlti-faceted strategy wiR be implemented 
unproblemoticaRy, But dtffictilties of tnnplementation seem a 
peculiar reason for denying the existence of strategy. 
DIVISIONS IN MANAGEBIENT 
Another issue raised by the definitional ambiguity of the term 
'managerial strategy' concerns the extent to which it is possible to 
talk about management as a coherent group. A significant 
number of writers point out that management does not 
necessarily act in a unified manner (eg., Armstrong 1986, 
Teulings 1986, Child 1985). Management, it is claimed, may be 
firactured in a number of ways and different management groups 
may have different objectives that may, in varying degrees, 
conflict. In this regard, writers identify cleavages between senior 
and Junior management, line and staff management (Brewster & 
Richbell 1983), between different professional groups in 
management (Armstrong 1986), corporate and branch level 
management (Edwards 1987), and between different managerial 
functions in organisations (Hopper et al. 1986). 
Managerial conflicts are one important explanation for problems 
in the planning, coherence, and implementation of managerial 
strategy. Further, such conflict questions the efiBcacy of 
discussing "a" managerial strategy towards industrial relations. 
For a few writers, such as Rose and Jones, managerial factions 
imdoubtedly add support to their argument that the concept is 
far too problematic. However, it appears that most writers think 
that despite divisions in management the concept is still useful 
(e.g. Child, 1985). 
The above issues emphasise the danger involved in using the 
notion of 'managerial strategy' in a simplistic way. The dangers 
are all the more important given that managerial actions will 
often face resistance from unions and the workforce. That is, the 
coherence, etc., of a strategy and its potential to be implemented 
wiU be significantiy affected by the way unions and workers react 
(eg.. Child 1985, Batstone et al. 1984, Femer 1985). 
The responses by writers to these issues vary. For example. Rose 
and Jones seek to jettison the notion of management strategy. 
Buchanan (1986) appears to concur by suggesting that, perhaps, 
managerial choice does not exist. 
On the other hand, Littier (1990) implies that regardless of 
coherence, etc. 'managerial strategy' is a valid notion because it 
provides a useful approach to modelling processes within 
organisations. 
Other writers (eg., Batstone et al. 1984, Child 1985, Friedman 
1990) seek to get round the issue by claiming that despite the 
problems of incoherence and division, etc. management does, to a 
significant degree, formulate and successfully implement 
strategies. For example, Batstone, et al. (1984) argue that 
managerial strategy will, at some stage or level, be planned, 
intentional, coherent, and implemented. They acknowledge that 
there are many factors related to the "complexities of situations" 
which may imdermine strategies. Nevertheless, they argue that: 
The dijgiculties in pinning down strategies are not sufficient 
grounds, .. for adopting the opposite course: of seeing aR 
management action as blind 'muddling'through' without any 
coherence. Evidence abounds to suggest that management is to a 
high degree 'proactive', rather than reactive, constantly making 
planned conscious choices and carrying them through. (p5) 
For writers such as Batstone, et al. the problem is not so much 
whether or not intentionalily and division, etc. exist but how 
strategies can be identified. They claim that the solution to this 
problem is not to reject the concept of 'managerial strategy' but to 
engage in detailed research (Batstone et al. 1984). 
Further, it is inferred by a significant number of writers that the 
concept of management strategy has validity because 
management decisions take place within a context that tends to 
shape the choices managers can make (eg. Littler 1990, 
Thompson 1990, Child 1985, Kochan et al. 1984). That is, it is 
argued that the problems of incoherence, division, and resistance 
are constrained within boimds by contextual factors that 
influence the direction of choice and aid the implementation of 
managerial strategy. In this regard, writers identify a variety of 
different factors. For example. Labour Process writers tend to 
highlight the imperatives of capitalism, for instance the need for 
accumulation, that are seen to influence strategy through factors 
such as properly rights (Morgan and Hooper 1987), financial 
controls (Hopper et al. 1986), the techniques of dominant 
professional groups (Armstrong 1986), and broader influences 
such as the state of product and labour markets (Child 1985). 
Orthodox approaches, while rarely talking in terms of the 
"imperatives of capitalism", also claim that choice is constrained 
by factors such as the nature of product and labour markets as 
well as political, social, technological, and organisational 
conditions (eg., Thurley and Wood 1985, Batstone et al. 1984). 
In making this claim, writers acknowledge that whfle 
environmental factors don't directly determine industrial relations 
activity, they are far from irrelevant. To identify managers as 
always being able to choose, plan, and implement coherently any 
strategy they thought relevant would be to adopt a degree of 
volimtarism that all writers on managerial strategy and industrial 
relations appear to eschew. As Hiurley and Wood (1983 p2) state: 
The study of strategy wiR be of little concern to those who see 
economic laws as sovereign, deterniinirig the cowse of 
organisationcd life in such a way that management has no choice, 
so that both its ol^ectvues and the best way of pwsuing them are 
given: managers cannot, and, hence, do not, have the kind of 
autonomy which the term strategy conveys. The idea of strategy, 
however, does seem to imply an external force or forces which one 
must anticipate and try to come to terms with; strategic thinking 
arises from the need to cope with such pressures, not because they 
can be ignored. Lack of autonomy and strategic thinking are not 
then mjutuaJlly exclusive. To argue otherwise is to make a very 
common mistake of associating choice with freedom, and treating 
its opposite as determinism. 
As a starting point for this thesis, and taking into account the 
above issues, 'managerial strategy' is defined here as any 
intentional course of action undertaken by any managerial 
group that is aimed at achieving certain preconceived goal/s. 
In adopting this definition, the following positions on the issues 
discussed above are tentatively adopted. 
First, the most important criteria defining a managerial strategy 
is intentionality. That is, a particular course of action can only be 
portrayed as a managerial strategy if there was an intention on 
the part of a manager or managers to achieve some preconceived 
goal. If a given action is not preceded by such an intention, it 
cannot be characterised as part of a managerial strategy. 
The notion of intentionality is important because, as mentioned 
earlier, the concept of 'managerial strategy' introduces 'choice' 
into explanations of industrial relations. 
Following on from this, to give the notion of 'choice' validity, 
intentionality on the part of management must be accepted. If 
managers do not, at least at some stage, intend certain things to 
happen, then it is not really appropriate to argue that they can 
make choices. In such a situation, it may be more valid to argue 
that their actions are directly determined by environmental 
factors. 
Second, highlighting the importance of intentionality does in no 
way imply that managerial strategies need be planned in detail 
and coherent. Managerial strategies may be hurriedly or loosely 
conceived, and they may not be particularly coherent. To argue 
that the concept of 'managerial strategy' can only embrace 
carefully planned and coherent management actions would seem 
to be a far too rigorous requirement. Careful planning may be an 
often striven for ideal but it is at least intuitively obvious that very 
little himian activity makes that grade. To insist that 'managerial 
strategy' must embrace such an ideal would surely reduce the 
concept to a mere empirical curiosity. Further, what constitutes 
coherence is highly dependent on an observer's or actor's point of 
view. What is coherent to one person is likely to be an irrational 
mish mash to someone else. In other words, coherence tends to 
be a highly subjective phenomenon. 
Third, the definition should in no way be seen as implying that 
managerial actions need to be fully implemented in order to 
qualify for the titie of 'managerial strategy'. As Storey infers, to 
deny a given course of managerial action the title of 'strategy' 
because it was not successfully implemented is a rather limiting 
criterion. As stated above, the important criterion is not 
implementation but intention. A course of managerial actions is a 
strategy tf at its outset it was intended to achieve a preconceived 
goal. Whether or not it will be fully implemented in the manner 
intended, and whether or not all actions go as planned, will be 
highly dependent upon a variety of factors best summarised by 
Batstone et al.'s., 'complexities of the situation'. In taking this 
stance, it is accepted that managerial strategies and outcomes 
cannot be automatically linked, but this does not mean that the 
concept has no utility. 
Fourth, 'managerial groups' are included in the above definition 
because it is accepted that treating management as a 
homogeneous group ignores the ways in which management is 
firactured. 'Managerial strategy' refers to the strategies of a 
particular individual or group of managers. Different management 
groups may have different strategies which may be intended to 
achieve different outcomes and, thus, possibly result in conflict 
within management. While this factionalism is important, it 
should not be seen as a reason to reject the concept of 
'managerial strategy'. It may be problematic to discuss an all 
embraciag organisation wide managerial strategy, but it is argued 
here that the concept can be applied to particular management 
groups. 
Fifth, the problem with adopting highly flexible criteria is that the 
concept of 'managerial strategy' may end up embracing too much. 
In other words, given the above criteria it is, perhaps, fair to ask 
whether or not there is any sort of management activity which 
cannot be labelled a 'management strategy'. The definition 
adopted in this thesis is intended to address this problem by 
limiting the concept of 'managerial strategy' to a course of 
managerial actions aimed at achieving certain preconceived goals. 
That is, a one off management decision does not constitute a 
managerial strategy. A management strategy involves a series of 
decisions or choices all aimed at the same preconceived goal. 
Finally, though not clearly spelled out in the definition, it is 
accepted here that the degree of incoherence and irrationality, the 
problems facing implementation, and the extent of managerial 
factionalism are constrained by external factors. That is, 
managerial strategies are seen to be constrained by a potentially 
large variety of external factors such as the imperatives of 
capitalism, the profit motive, etc. While it is accepted that the 
concept of 'managerial strategy' provides for choice and, hence, 
avoids extreme determinism, it is also accepted that constraints 
exist. Managers are not completely firee agents. Determinism is to 
be avoided but so is extreme volimtarism. 
On this point, the success of attempts in the literature to achieve 
a balance between determinism and voluntarism is questionable. 
The acceptance in the literature of the constraining role of the 
environment probably reflects a need in most industrial relations 
writers to avoid reducing explanations of strategy to purely 
psychological or subjective factors. However, in seeking to avoid 
excessively voluntarist explanations of managerial strategy, 
writers have ignored the extent to which managers can affect the 
environment. In other words, in most of the literature the strong 
impression is given that the direction of influence between the 
environment and organisations is only one way. Yet, as has been 
argued by a significant nimiber of organisational theory writers, 
managers and their strategies can and do influence the 
environment (Clegg and Dimkerley 1987). This can be understood 
in two ways. First, it has been argued that management can, to 
an extent, select the environment within which they must operate 
by, for example, making choices about entry into new product 
markets. Second, where they have the power, managers may be 
able to manipulate their envirormient by, for example, lobbying 
governments or threatening to withdraw capital (Child 1972). 
It would be incorrect to argue that all the literature on managerial 
strategy and industrial relations ignores the impact of 
management strategy on environmental factors. For example, the 
discussion of circuits of capital (Morgan and Hooper 1987), and 
dialectical analysis and totality (Storey 1985, Bray 1986) in some 
labour process writing implies a two way interaction. Further, 
Batstone et al. (1984) fleetingly acknowledge it in their treatment 
of the telecommunications industry in Britain. However, most of 
the literature does not appear to consider the issue. This is 
unfortunate for it is, at least, intuitively obvious that coq)orate 
management's ability to influence environmental factors can have 
implications for industrial relations. 
CORPORIATE STRATEGY AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
Moving away from definitional problems, a frequently addressed 
area in the literature concerns the relationship between corporate 
level strategies and industrial relations. In both orthodox and 
labour process approaches the extent of interaction between 
corporate strategy and industrial relations activity has been 
identified as an important research topic (Thurley and Wood 
1983, Uttler 1990). 
In this regard, there appears to be agreement amongst orthodox 
writers that corporate strategies can significantly influence 
industrial relations in organisations. For example, Purcell and 
Ahlstrand (1989) argue that corporate strategies can influence 
industrial relations through the determination of management 
style, personnel resources, collective bargaining levels, and 
financial control systems. 
There appears to be less agreement about the extent to which 
industrial relations issues effect corporate strategies. Purcell and 
Ahlstand (1989) cite nimierous studies of organisations in 
Western Europe, the United States, and England where it is was 
foimd that the influence of personnel and employee relations 
issues upon corporate strategy formulation was low. They argue 
that their own research supports this conclusion, though there is 
strong evidence to suggest that industrial relations issues are 
taken into account at the implementation stage of corporate 
strategy considerations. 
Other writers appear to argue that, while other issues may be 
equally or more important, industrial relations issues are 
considered in the formulation of management strategy. In this 
regard. Kochan, et al. (1984) and Seglow, (1983) and Thurley and 
Wood (1983) argue that industrial relations and corporate 
strategies are interdependent or interactive. 
Another perspective is given by Batstone, et al. (1984, p284) who 
argue that even if corporate policies and strategies don't explicitly 
address industrial relations issues they: 
are likely to cany built in asswnptions about labour relations, and 
decisions on such strategic issues as pricing, marketing, 
investment, product range, technology and so on may imply, or 
amount to, labour strategies. 
Labour process writers address the relationship between 
corporate policy and industrial relations from a somewhat 
different angle. Early treatments of the labour process tended to 
identify the control of labour at the point of production as the 
central method of generating surplus value or profits (Littier and 
Salaman 1982). By implication this meant that industrial 
relations must be a vital corporate management concern. 
However, this emphasis upon the labour process has been heavily 
criticised in recent years (in addition to Littler and Salaman see, 
for example, Morgan and Hooper, 1987). 
It is claimed that profits can be generated away firom the arena of 
production in areas such as commodity and currency speculation 
as well as asset stripping and credit manipulation (Littler and 
Salaman 1982). Further, it has been argued that realization of 
surplus value is equally, if not more, important than its 
production. As Littler and Salaman (1982, p257) state: 
Su/pius vahte has to be produced bub also realized in the market 
What this implies is that the realization of surplus value (ie., 
finding markets, selling in those markets, and making a profit) may 
be more crucial than the production of surplus value for certain 
firms, certain industries or during certain periods. 
Contemporary labour process writers appear to have accepted 
this criticism but have reacted to it in various ways. For example, 
Friedman (1990) acknowledges that strategies towards product 
markets, etc. are important and can have a significant impact 
upon the labour process. However, he argues that labour process 
theory emphasises strategies of control over labour because the 
main objective of the approach is to explain industrial relations 
and work organisation. Further, he makes the point that labour 
control strategies will undoubtedly constrain and influence the 
outcomes of managerial strategies directed at marketing, finance, 
etc. 
Thompson (1990) also claims that managerial strategies may be 
formulated with little explicit consideration of labour in mind. Yet, 
in terms similar to Batstone et al. (1984) above, he argues that 
there are often taken for granted cissumptions about labour and 
the role of managers built into these strategies. 
Other labour process writers, such as Morgan and Hooper (1987), 
argue that managerial strategies directed at the labour process 
must be portrayed as part of a wider context. They claim, that 
capitalism can be broken into three "circuits" of capital: 
industrial, commercial, and banking. It is argued that 
management's strategies toward labour are directed at the 
industrial circuits, but other strategies may relate to either the 
banking or commercial circuits. All circuits are seen to 
interrelate, and none is portrayed as fundamentally more 
important than another. Finally, though not exhaustively. Littler 
(1990) argues that the centrality of the labour process is variable. 
He implies that under certain circimistances labour strategies will 
be primary, but imder others they will not. Littler discuses a 
range of factors that will influence the primacy of the labour 
process such as technology, the state of the labour market, 
competition, industrial conflict, and comparative efftciency. 
The argument put forward by writers such as Batstone et al. 
(1984) and Thompson (1990) is intuitively appealing. It does seem 
at least logical to expect, especially in Australia, that explicit or 
not all corporate strategies will include assimiptions about the 
nature of labour and industrial relations. In nations where labour 
problems have a high profile and where there is a well-organised 
labour movement, it is perhaps possible to expect that managerial 
strategies will include labour as a consideration. In countries 
where the labour movement is not strong, for example. South 
East Asian nations, it is perhaps possible to expect that labour 
will not be explicitly considered. However, the very absence of a 
well-organised labour movement undoubtedly affects the 
assimiptions that underpin strategies in those nations. In fact, it 
could be argued that some South East Asian coimtries are 
targeted as production sites by organisations because the labour 
movement is undeveloped or weak. 
Despite the above highly tentative assertions it is clear that the 
strength of the interrelationship between management strategy 
and industrial relations cannot be determined without empirical 
investigation. In this regard, it is dangerous to make any solid 
theoretical generalisations. Therefore it is, perhaps, safest to 
argue that Uttler's (1990) 'it all depends' approach is the most 
valid. 
PUBLIC OWNERSHIP MANAGERIAL STRATEGY AND INDUSTRIAL 
RELATIONS. 
Telecom Australia is. at present, a publicly owned corporation. 
Given this, it would seem important to investigate the treatment 
given in the literature to the impact that public ownership has 
upon the relationship between managerial strategy and industrial 
relations. 
While this issue has not been widely researched, it has been 
investigated in detail by a small nimiber of writers (Batstone et al. 
1984, Femer 1985, Macdonald 1986, Cousins 1986). In this 
regard, perhaps the most detailed treatment was imdertaken by 
Batstone et al. (1984) who investigated managerial strategy and 
industrial relations in the postal and telecommimications 
industry in the United Kingdom. An important strand of Batstone 
et al.'s study was concerned with the impact that public 
ownership has upon the relationship between managerial strategy 
and industrial relations. 
Batstone et al. (1984) point out that both the orthodox and labour 
process approaches have tended to underplay the significance of 
public ownership. However, public ownership, Batstone et al. 
argue, does have an important impact upon managerial strategy 
and industrial relations. In brief, they claim that in publicly 
owned organisations political pressures imposed by the 
government, rather than the pursuit of profit, drives managerial 
strategy. These politically influenced strategies, they claim, wiU 
shape the character of industrial relations within public 
organisations. This means the pursuit of profit or the imperatives 
of capitalism will not necessarily be a dominant influence upon 
strategy and industrial relations in public owned organisations. 
Rather, broader political and social goals, as defined by the 
government of the day, may be dominant. Batstone et al. point 
out that these 'political contingencies' may at various times 
impose on public sector management pressures very similar to, 
and just as strong as, those in the private arena. For example, 
they point out that imder the pressure of government, 
management strategy in public sector organisations may be 
strongly directed towards the reduction of labour costs, 
improvements in efficiency and the containment of unions. 
However, at other times the 'political contingency' may direct 
strategy away from a concern with cost reduction and efficiency 
and more towards other goals such as employment creation or 
industrial democracy. Thus, in summary Batstone et al. argue 
that public ownership is an important factor because it provides a 
situation where political intervention into the link between 
managerial strategy and industrial relations is an ever present 
element. 
Femer (1985) investigated the impact of public ownership on 
managerial strategy and industrial relations in British Rail. His 
findings are in accord with Batstone et al. in that he claims: 
„that nationalised industries face political contingencies that alter 
the calculus according to which management strategy is 
formulate±„.However, tt is not enough to see political constraints 
as a 'static', constant element in the strategy formulation process. 
The fact of political intervention may be a constant for public sector 
management, but its form and content are subject to change and 
development. (p67) 
While Batstone et al. and Femer acknowledge labour process 
theory, their work can best be classified as contributions to the 
orthodox approach. Macdonald (1986) and Cousins (1986), on the 
other hand, address the issue of public ownership and its effect 
upon managerial strategy and industrial relations from a clearly 
labour process perspective. 
Macdonald (1986) argues that while labour process theory is 
"explicitly concerned" with management in the private sector it is 
also applicable to the public sector because: 
..the JundameritoZ monofiferial problem of the conversion of labour 
power into labour in the face of endemic and resilient workforce 
resistance stiR remains for most employing organisations. Even in 
those public sector organisations for which the profit motive is 
totaRy irrelevant, the problem persists for management to ensure 
that sufficient labour effort is forthcoming to enable the 
organisation to satisfy its political superiors (p49). 
As the above quote suggests, Macdonald does not claim that there 
is no difference between the public and private sector. As with 
Batstone, et al. and Femer, he suggests that objectives in the 
public sector are set by the political system rather than the profit 
motive. However, Macdonald does not draw the distinction as 
sharply as Batstone et al. and Femer. He argues that there are 
"more similarities between government and non-govemment 
employment than is often recognised." (Macdonald 1986, p49) 
Cousins (1986) argues that while the labour process in the 
private and public sectors are similar, a different 'criterion of 
rationality' exists in each. Drawing on the work of writers such as 
O'Conner (1973), Habermas (1976), and Offe (1976), Cousins 
argues that management action in the private sector is governed 
by a capitalist rationality (ie. profit maximisation). However, in 
the public sector, despite the post war emphasis upon cost 
efficiency and productivity, non-market criteria such as political, 
interest group, and budgetary demands govern managerial 
activity. 
A common theme in the above articles relates to the direction that 
the political imperative or demands have taken in recent decades. 
In all the public sector organisations studied it was found that 
management have been put under pressure from government to 
adopt a more "commercial" approach to operations. That is, the 
organisations were forced to adopt more market based strategies 
than had previously existed. Cost reduction and efficiency, rather 
than public service and equity, became the dominant objective. 
This new approach the writers argue had significant 
consequences upon managerial strategies towards industrial 
relations. In general terms, it appears to be argued that 
commercialism has been associated with far more aggressive, un-
compromising approaches to industrial relations. For example, 
according to Batstone et al. (1984) the British 
telecommunications industry had been dominated by a "sharing 
of control" through agreements, joint negotiation, and 
consultation with the unions. However, with the push towards 
commercialism the old consensus was rejected. Notions of 
fairness, and mutual trust were replaced by competition, ability 
to pay, individual merit and direct communication between 
management and employees (Batstone, et al. 1984, pl61). 
There are a number of explanations put forward for the link 
between increasing commercialism and aggressive managerial 
strategies towards industrial relations. Some writers appear to 
infer an almost technical link between commercialism and 
aggressive strategies (Pendleton 1988). That is, it is inferred that 
in order to reduce costs and increase efficiency management has 
no option but to adopt a more aggressive stance towards 
industrial relations and unions. Other writers, such as Femer 
(1985), seem to argue that the aggressive stance is forced upon 
management by government as part of the overall commercial 
philosophy. That is, governments pushing for a more commercial 
approach tend also to be hostile towards unions. 
The contention that managerial strategy and industrial relations 
has a different character in the public sector because of the 
political decisions of governments makes intuitive sense. Further, 
the empirical data collected by the above writers appears to add 
considerable support to the argimient. All the writers portray the 
political decisions of governments as a contextual factor or 
contingency which can influence the direction and character of 
managerial strategy and industrial relations in the public sector. 
However, in making this claim there is an obvious risk that 
writers may go too far and portray the political contingency in an 
excessively determinist light. It is important to remember that the 
notion of 'managerial strategy' implies that managers can choose 
the ways in which they react to government directions. 
In this regard, Batstone et al. (1984) and Femer (1985) appear to 
avoid overplaying the role of the political contingency. Choice is 
highlighted in the argimients of Batstone et al. and Femer. In 
addition, Femer explicitly raises as a danger the issue of giving 
the political contingency too much influence when he states in 
the conclusion to his article: 
A further point is that it is necessary to avoid deterministic 
explanations of management strategy „..The constraining effect of 
external factors does not rule out managerial choice of strategy. 
(p67) 
Macdonald (1986) and Cousins (1986) are not so forthright about 
the role of choice. They seem to be more determinist in their 
articles. They appear to imply that the movement towards 
commercialism is almost an inevitable development within 
capitalism. 
CONCLUSION 
This review has considered a number of issues that have been 
identified in the literature as important to any consideration of 
the role of managerial strategy in industrial relations. The 
positions taken by the various writers in the field have been 
discussed, tentatively assessed and a stance on most of the 
issues has been put forward. 
Theoretical argument can only go so far, conclusions about many 
of the issues can only be made by undertaking detailed empirical 
investigation. In the following chapters of this thesis many of the 
above issues will be empirically examined through an 
investigation of managerial strategy and industrial relations in 
Telecom Australia- Riverina Region. In particular, as stated in the 
previous chapter, the thesis will concentrate upon the impacts of 
a managerial decision to restructure operations within the 
Telecom- Riverina Region and more specifically the consequences 
of the strategy in the Narrandera Telecom office. In examining the 
restructuring strategy, the thesis will be primarily concerned with 
examining the efficacy of the concept of 'managerial strategy' as a 
way of explaining industrial relations activity. Nevertheless, in 
doing this it will also seek to shed light on the foUowing issues: 
managerial factionalism; the contextual factors that affect the 
course of managerial strategy; the ways in which management 
strategies affect industrial relations; the extent to which 
industrial relations is considered in strategy f o r m u l a t i o n ^ ; the 
^ In this respect, this thesis will not explicitly address the extent to which corporate level strategy formulation takes into 
account industrial relations issues. Rather, it examines the importance of industrial relations issues in the foraiulation of 
a Telecom regional level management strategv that took place in response to pressures to increase efficiencv and 
impact of industrial relations on the progress of strategy 
implementation; the role of the political contingency; and the 
impact of pressures to commercialise public sector organisations. 
productivity imposed by corporate and divisional management 
CHAPTER 3 - HISTORY OF TELECOM AND DESCRIPTION OF RECENT 
REFORMS 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides a selective summaiy of the histoiy of 
Telecom Australia since the organisation was established in 1975. 
The aim of the chapter is to provide a background to the events 
that have occurred in the Riverina region of Telecom over the past 
3 years. Significant events in the organisation's histoiy during the 
period 1975 to the early 80s are described as is the general 
character of industrial relations in Telecom during that period. 
The second half of the chapter seeks to describe a series of 
reforms introduced into Telecom by the Labor Government since 
it came to power in March 1983. The reforms are part of a 
broader package of changes introduced into the public sector, 
which are in turn an important facet of the Labor Government's 
micro-economic reform agenda for the Australian economy. The 
reforms at Telecom have resulted in a series of structural and 
operational changes that are important to an understanding of 
events in the Riverina. 
HISTORY OF TELECOM AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN THE LATE 
1970s AND EARLY 1980S 
During the period following the federation of Australia and up 
until the establishment of Telecom in 1975, telecommunication 
services in Australia were provided by the Post Master General's 
Department (PMG). The PMG was a department of the Federal 
Government and provided both telecommunication and postal 
services for the Commonwealth. 
Telecom was established by the Whitlam Labor Government on 1 
July 1975. The vesting of Telecom followed a commission of 
inquiry presided over by an ex-general manager of GSR, Sir 
James Vernon. The Vernon inquiry had reconmiended to the 
Whitlam Government that the PMG not be run as a department of 
the state but be broken up and established as two corporations 
outside the public service bureaucracy. It was recorrmiended that 
the two corporations be required to meet financial objectives and 
have complete responsibility for the determination of wages and 
conditions of employment (Report of the Conmiission of Inquiry 
into the Australian Post Office, 1974). 
According to Reinecke and Schultz (1983), the creation of Telecom 
was resisted by senior management from the postal side of the 
PMG and was bitterly opposed by professional engineers'^ 
throughout the orgeinisation who saw their power under threat. In 
fact, the professional engineers carried their opposition right-up 
through the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission to the High 
Court. However, they were defeated: a great many people 
supported the formation of the organisation and great 
expectations were held for its future. 
^ Professional engineers being dominant in managerial positions throughout the organisation. 
In December 1975 the Fraser Government was elected to power. 
As a consequence, the removal of the government controls 
recommended by Vernon did not occur. Instead, the FYaser 
Government adopted a highly interventionist role as evidenced by 
the following quote from Reinecke and Schultz (1983): 
The government certainly exercised a strangltr^ hand in the years 
of the late 1970s and early 1980s, interfering in everything from 
the purchase of property, industrial relations, staff numbers, policy 
decisions about changes to the network, to restructuring loans 
without consultation and declining contracts. The cabinet, under 
the leadership of Molcobn Fraser, has tended to act as a superior 
board, passing Judgement and reserving the right of veto on 
decisions made by senior management and the board of the 
commission itself. (p45-46) 
The extent to which the Fraser Government intervened in the 
management of Telecom was such that some managers felt they 
had more freedom when they were part of a government 
department. This was particularly the case, evidently, once the 
Fraser Government had establishment the Department of 
Commimications (Reinecke & Schultz, 1983). 
The Fraser Government's control over Telecom management's 
discretion was particularly acute in the area of industrial 
relations. E)ven though the responsibility for industrial relations 
had been taken from the Public Service Board and handed over to 
management, they apparently had little real discretion. For 
example, in the late 70s an attempt by Telecom management to 
provide a commercial incentive to its staff by offering them 
cheaper phone call rates was overruled by the then Minister for 
Communications, Tony Staley. In addition, on a number of 
occasions the Liberal Government demanded that management 
reduce the organisation's personnel. This form of intervention 
reached its peak when Sir Philip Lynch's "razor gang" was formed 
to cut nimibers in the public sector. The Fraser Government's 
interventionist stance is further exemplified by its adoption of an 
aggressive stance towards worker militancy. The Government 
established and used the Commonwealth Employee's 
Employment Provisions Act against ATEA members (Reinecke and 
Schultz, 1983). 
However, the most telling example of the Fraser Government's 
interventionist approach to industrial relations was the 
establishment of a coordination committee chaired by the 
Department of Industrial Relations. The coordination committee's 
role was to control industrial relations within the various 
departments, statutory authorities and government business 
enterprises in order to avoid adverse flow-ons throughout the 
public sector. The committee's powers were significant and gave 
them a virtual right of veto over any agreements reached between 
Telecom management and employees (Interview with DIR officer 
Nov 1991; Reinecke and Schultz, 1983). 
In addition to restricting management discretion, the Fraser 
Government placed severe restrictions on Telecom's accessibility 
to financial resources. Under the new charter senior management 
was required to generate at least half the organisation's capital 
needs internally. The Fraser Government progressively increased 
this requirement to a high of 79 per cent in 1978-79. At the same 
time, severe restrictions were placed on senior management's 
ability to borrow funds for capital expansions. In 1981, without 
consulting Telecom management, the Fraser Government 
increased the interest rates on the companies long term loans 
from the negotiated 7% to 10%. This increased the interest bill by 
$58 miUion in 1981/82 and by $133 miUion in 1982/83. The 
consequence of these increasing financial restriction was an 
increase in the price of telephone calls in 1981, despite a 
corporate objective to reduce the real cost of telecommimication 
services (Reineke and Schultz, 1983). 
In accordance with the Fraser Government's orientation, senior 
management within Telecom adopted an aggressive and 
centralised approach towards decision making and industrial 
relations (MuUer, 1980; Williams, 1986). Muller argues that 
before the creation of Telecom Australia, industrial relations in 
the telecommimications arm of the PMG was predominantiy 
peaceful: 
Prior to 1975, and under the aegis of the Public Service Board, the 
organisation and the unions were insulated from industrial 
relations in the private sector. The role of the Board in the 
forrnidation of industrial relations policy promoted collaboration 
between management and union officials in satisjying their mutual 
interests. Both acknowledged that the enterprise, as a public 
service, had certain responsibilities towards the general community 
and to its employees. (Muller 1980, pi 10) 
Muller argues that in the PMG days management adopted a 
paternalistic style that fitted within a 'Human Relations School' 
framework. That is, team work was portrayed by management as 
essential and industrial conflict was argued to be an aberration or 
deviation from the norm. 
With the vesting of Telecom, senior management centralised 
decision making and adopted a more aggressive strategy that 
stressed consumer satisfaction and cost minimisation (Muller,B. 
1980, Williams,C. 1986). Policy functions were centralised to the 
Melbourne head ofi&ce and divided into seven departments: 
accounting, engineering, industrial relations, personnel, research, 
information systems, and customer services. The rest of the 
organisation was divided into districts within which all the day to 
day operational functions were controlled by a district manager. 
Management increased their control over the lower levels of the 
organisation by standardising and formalising management 
practices and introducing efficiency and cost targets. Non-
managerial employees imder the new approach were required to 
"accept increased workloads, less discretion, lower employment 
levels, and technological change" (Muller 1980, pi 12). 
According to Reinecke and Schultz, Muller, and Williams, the 
consequences of all these developments were a significant drop in 
staif morale, a radicalisation of the trade unions and a 
significantly changed pattern of industrial relations. 
As stated above, the restriction placed on Telecom management's 
ability to acquire financial resources led to an increase in phone 
charges to the consumer. This led to a media assault on the 
organisation that reduced the status of Telecom workers in the 
commimity generally and within small towns in particular. This 
evidently contributed to the reduction in staff morale. Morale was 
reduced even ftirtiier when senior management opted to defend 
the company against attack by qmetiy lobbying the Government 
rather than publicly addressing criticisms (Reinecke and Schultz, 
1983). 
Prior to the changes unions in Telecom were conservative and had 
only a small role to play in the organisation. Management 
expected unions to have a limited welfare role and they were 
recognised by management only because it was a requirement 
under the arbitration system. Unions tended to comply with this 
expectation by adopting narrow "legitimate" goals, moderate 
political outiooks, and reljring upon tribunals when pursuing 
demands. (MuUer, 1980). 
In the face of the Ftaser Government's interventionist approach 
and with the adoption of the new aggressive management strategy 
the unions in Telecom started to develop a more militant stance. 
The Australian Telecommunications Employee's Association 
(ATEA) in particular, rejected management's right to define staff 
interests and began to demand an equal say in the decision 
making process (Muller,B. 1980). In the 1960s the Postal and 
Telecommimications Technicians Association, as the ATEA was 
then called, was a very conservative body. By the late 70s and 
early 80s it had been transformed into one of the most influential 
unions in the coimtiy (Williams 1986). The ATEA came to have a 
significant effect upon industrial relations in Australia: it helped 
to bring down the wage indexation system in 1981; it aided the 
introduction of a shorter working week; and successfiiUy pushed 
for a national inquiry into technological change. Other unions 
within the organisation were also transformed. For example, the 
Australian Telephonists and Professional Officers Association was 
traditionally a part time association dominated by supervisors. 
However, during the 70s it set out to organise rank and file 
telephonists and experienced a massive increase in membership 
(Reinecke and Schultz, 1983). 
MuUer (1980) and WiUiams (1986) argue that the major eff'ect of 
the new managerial strategy and union orientation was a 
transformation in industrial relations. Prior to 1975 the PMG was 
a department of the state, and the determination of pay and 
conditions was controlled by the employing body for all 
government departments, the Public Service Board. The control 
and policies exercised by the Board insulated the organisation 
firom private sector industrial relations and promoted a 
collaborative relationship between management and unions with 
only a few exceptions, such as the Redfem Mail Exchange dispute 
in the late 1960s (MuUer, 1980). In the period 1975 to 1978 
industrial conflict increased considerably. It was manifested in an 
increase in stoppages and a dramatic increase in the number of 
people involved in disputes (Muller,B. 1980). Further, the 
frequency of bans increased dramatically. Quoting MuUer: 
Between 1975 and 1978 there has been an average of twenty 
disputes a year involving some form of industrial action, typically 
black bans. On the basis of data covering the period the period 
May 1975 to the end of 1978, bans averaged slightly over ten 
weeks duration. Indeed, there was no time during that period 
when at least one ban was not in force. (MuUer 1980, p 109) 
In addition to the increase in disputation, MuUer (1980) and 
Williams (1986) claim that the changes had significant effects 
upon the attitudes of the workforce toward Telecom management. 
MuUer, argues that workers came to distrust Telecom 
management and this was reflected in a reduced willingness on 
the part of workers to accept management's right to make 
decisions. Further, aU workers in Telecom began to see a 
divergence of interests between themselves and management: 
management being seen to develop a narrow concern for 
efficiency at the expense of the needs of workers and broader 
society. WiUiams (1986) argues that the changes were associated 
with an iacrease in union soUdarity. This, she impUes, 
underpinned the increased willingness of Telecom workers, 
specificaUy ATEA members, to strike. 
A useful example of the new pattern of industrial relations and 
the unions new influence is the 1981 pay dispute involving the 
ATEA. In that year the ATEA, after twelve months of negotiating 
with Telecom management and twelve days of industrial action 
that severely disrupted the telephone network, won a significant 
pay increase. Telecom management agreed to the increase on the 
basis of work value but hoped for a productivity trade off. 
However, the agreement was outside the indexation guidelines 
and the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission refused to ratify 
the agreement. In doing so, the then President of the 
Commission, Sir John Moore, indicated that the company should 
honour the agreement. Following Moore's suggestion, the Fraser 
cabinet was forced to approve the agreement in order to avert 
continued industrial action by the ATEA The consequence of this 
was the collapse of wage indexation and the resignation of the 
managing director of Telecom, Jack Curtis (Williams, 1986). 
The new militant approach adopted by Telecom unions and the 
more conflictual pattern of industrial relations should not be 
understood as being solely a consequence of the Fraser 
Government's policies and management's new aggressive 
industrial relations strategy. Other factors such as a decline in 
the Australian economy undoubtedly played an important part. In 
addition, a factor of particular importance in Telecom Australia 
was the introduction by management of new telecommunications 
technology. 
Throughout the 1970s and 80s Telecom management introduced 
a significant amoimt of new technology that had a considerable 
effect upon the number and nature of Jobs in the organisation. 
The impact of new technology was particularly felt by telephonists 
and must be seen as an important imperative behind their rising 
militancy. The introduction of computerised exchanges and 
docketless operations led, according to Reinecke and Schultz 
(1983), to a significant reduction in the number of telephonists 
employed and to the deskilling of those who remained. In country 
towns and centres the progressive replacement of manual 
exchanges with automatic ones took away from the telephonists 
involved a significant role they enjoyed in the life of small towns. 
The ATPOA reacted against this threat by conducting a series of 
advertising campaigns on country radio stations that pushed 
forward the message that telephonists were vital to country 
towns: they acted as the conmiunity receptionists and as an 
emergency service. The ATPOA's campaigns met with some 
success in that they managed to force Telecom to temporarily 
retain many manual exchanges. 
A further example of the attitudes and reactions of telephonists to 
new technology is clearly described by Reinecke and Schultz 
(1983) who discuss the impact of a new computerised exchange 
called the IOC in Sydney: 
The telephonists hated it. Going from the dilapidated but homely 
GPO, with its plugs and cords, to IOC, with its artificial lights and 
computer terminals, was a shock, quite apart from the change in 
the nature of the work. 
During a technicians" wage dispute in 1978, the IOC exchange 
broke dowru As is accepted practice when such computer failures 
occur, the 300 telephonists trooped across Pitt Street to the GPO to 
put the colls through with the old plug and cord gear which is still 
used as a backstop. 
When the operators got out of the building, they decided that they 
would not return until certain concessions were obtained, and 
facilities improved. It was a spontaneous response to intolerable 
working conditions. After several weeks out of the new exchange, 
Telecom relented: improvements were made in lighting, the chairs 
were recovered with fabric, and telephonists no longer had to ask a 
monitor before taking a toilet break. 
For telephonists to apply blackballs and hold out for improvements 
was utterly unheard of (pi47) 
The work of ATEA members was also affected by technology. The 
move towards electronic exchanges threatened to make the skills 
and Jobs of many technicians redimdant. The ATEA reacted to 
this threat in a number of ways. In 1978 the Union embarked on 
a dispute which brought the national network to a halt. While the 
dispute was predominantly concerned with staff structures, its 
actual settlement included an agreement from Telecom 
management to discuss with the union all plans for new 
technology prior to implementation. Following the 1978 dispute. 
the Union began to push for the establishment of a national 
inquiry into the potential impact of technological change in the 
broader community. The Fraser Government eventually agreed to 
this proposal and set up the Committee to Investigate the Impact 
of Technological Change. The president of the ATEA, Bill 
Mansfield, was appointed to the committee as the union 
movement's representative. While the final report did not 
particularly satisfy anyone, the ATEA had at least put the issue of 
new technology on the Australian communities' policy agenda 
(Reinecke and Schultz, 1983). 
The increased militancy of the imions in Telecom and the 
worsening of industrial relations can be argued to have had in 
their turn an effect on the policies of the Fraser Government. The 
Fraser Government set up a committee to inquire into private 
sector participation in telecommunications, called the Davidson 
Inquiry. The terms of reference were specific and to the point. 
They were required to investigate: 
(a)the extent to which the private sector could be widely involved in 
the provision of existing or proposed telecommunications services in 
Australia either alone, in competition with or in conjwiction with the 
Australian Telecommunications Commission; 
(b) what consequential changes may be necessary in the statutory 
Junctions, duties, financial objectives and monopoly provisions of 
the Commission: and 
(c) the effectiveness of the Conumssion's operational policies and 
organisational arrangements (Report of the Committee of Inquiry 
into Telecommimications Services in Australia, Vol 1, 1982, pi). 
The Committee was given one year to report. It took submissions 
from a significant number of parties including Telecom 
management and the ATEA. Given the terms of reference the 
ATEA saw the Davidson committee as a real threat. They 
predicted that many Jobs would be lost if the private sector was 
allowed to enter the industry. They also argued that the standard 
of Australia's telephone services would be negatively affected 
(Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Telecommunications 
Services in Australia, Vol 2, 1982). 
In October 1982 the Davidson report was presented to the 
Minister for Conmiunications. Amongst the many changes 
recoromended by Davidson, Telecom was to retain its monopoly 
over the local telephone network, but most of its profitable 
operations were to be opened up to competition. In addition, the 
organisation was to be fragmented by the establishment of a 
private terminal equipment supplier. Of importance to the ATEA 
was the recommendation that installation be undertaken in 
fiiture not by Telecom technicians (all members of the ATEA) but 
by anyone who simply had prior experience in the installation of 
telecommimications equipment^ (Report of the Corrmiittee of 
Inquiry into Telecommunications Services, Australia, 1982). 
^The Davidson inquiiy whilst ignoring most of the ATEA's submissions did adopt at least one of them: in line with its 
private sector orientation it recommended that the govermnent control over Telecom via the coordination committee be 
abolished 
The Davidson report was soon over-taken by events. In March 
1983 the Ffaser Liberal Government was defeated and the Hawke 
Labor Government came to power. However, it could be argued 
that the committee set an agenda for change. As described below, 
the Hawke government implemented a wide range of reforms that 
have and are having a profound effect on Telecom. 
G B E REFORM AND TELECOM AUSTRALIA 
Since coming to power, the Labor Government has introduced a 
range of reform initiatives into Australian government business 
enterprises (GBEs), including Telecom Australia. The changes 
taking place are an integral part of broader public sector reform 
strategies (Evans,G. 1988), which are intended to create efficient 
output oriented activities rather than the input and control 
orientation of traditional processes (Keating,M. 1989; Radbone, I. 
1988; Sinclair,A. 1989). 
As stated in the introduction, the reforms form an important facet 
of the Labor Government's micro-economic reform agenda for the 
Australian economy. An understanding of their development is 
important to any description of industrial relations in government 
business enterprises. 
During the early to mid 1980s, the Australian economy went into 
a serious decline. There was a deterioration in the terms of trade 
and the balance of payments. The value of the Australian dollar 
depreciated and the size of the external debt increased 
Significantly. In response to this crisis, the Government, unions 
and peak employer bodies agreed that the Australian economy 
needed to be restructured in a way that would lead to increases in 
exports and reductions in imports. The way to achieve this, it was 
decided, was to make Australian industry more productive and, 
therefore, more internationally competitive (NLCC, 1988). 
It was agreed that a greater emphasis needed to be placed on 
micro-economic initiatives aimed at increasing the internal 
efficiency of Australian firms. Microeconomic reform, it was 
argued, had the potential to increase the mobility of resources, 
lower costs, encourage investment, increase efficiency and 
flexibility and, therefore, improve the international 
competitiveness of Australian industry. Public sector reform 
aimed at improving efficiency, flexibility and productivity was 
identified as vital to this process CW îllis, R. 1988). 
The public sector reform process introduced by the Hawke 
Government, and similar developments overseas (Nethercote,J.R. 
1989; CarroU,J.L. 1986; ILXD, 1991; Wiltshire,K 1990), have been 
discussed by writers under three broad headings: "new-
managerialism" in public or civil services; "commercialism" in 
GBEs; and "privatisation" in some public service areas and many 
GBEs. 
"New-managerialism" is used by writers to refer to the adoption in 
the public or civil service of managerial practices and 
orientations that are claimed to induce economic efficiency and 
effectiveness. As stated earlier, public service organisations are 
moving away from the traditional model, which stressed 
ministerial control, formal bureaucracy, and policy 
administration, towards a more performance or results oriented 
approach modelled on private sector practices (Sinclair,A. 1989; 
Emy,H. Hughes,O. 1988; Keating,M. 1989, Yeatman,A 1990a). 
The actual practices that are adopted include initiatives such as 
the devolution of managerial responsibilities, personnel 
reductions, specification of clear objectives, development of 
performance indicators, and program budgeting (Blackwell,R. 
Lloyd, P. 1989; Keating,M. 1989; Sinclair, A. 1989; Considme,M. 
1988). 
"Commercialism" is a term adopted in the British literature (eg 
Batstone, et al. 1984, Femer,A. 1985, 1989). It is used to refer to 
reforms that are intended to make GBEs, and the industries 
within which they are located, operate more efficiently and more 
in accord with the way they would operate if they were exposed to 
the pressures of the market (Batstone, E. et al. 1984). As with 
new-managerialism, the actual mechanics of commercialism vary 
but include initiatives such as management devolution; an 
emphasis upon budgetary planning and cost cutting; personnel 
reductions; attempts to create a more competitive ethos or 
culture; and the opening up of the GBE's industry to greater 
market competition (Batstone, et al. 1984; Femer, A. 1989, 1988). 
"Privatisation" generally refers to the process of selling all or a 
substantial part of a government business enterprise or public 
service area. Overseas, particularly in the United Kingdom, there 
has been a very significant move towards privatisation. In 
Australia a strong trend towards privatisation has also begun to 
develop (Wiltshire. K. 1990). As with new-managerialism and 
commercialism, privatisation is generally portrayed as a way of 
improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the organisations 
concerned. 
A common thread in the British literature on public sector reform 
is that the push for increased efficiency was accompanied by 
aggressive and conflictual management strategies. These 
strategies it is argued were a result of pressure from the Thatcher 
Government. With respect to GBEs it is claimed that the Thatcher 
Government used them as a symbol of its resolve to curb the 
power of the unions and reduce the size of the public sector. 
Thus, GEE management was put under continual pressure to 
introduce commercialism aggressively and to do so even in the 
face of intense union and workforce resistance (Batstone et al. 
1984, Femer, A. 1985, Pendleton. A. 1988). 
The push for efficiency in Australia has not been accompanied by 
pressure from the Labor Government for the adoption of 
aggressive industrial relations strategies. Rather, the 
Government, using the Accord as a foundation, has attempted to 
ensure that change in the public sector, and, indeed, micro-
economic reform throughout the whole economy, is introduced 
through processes of consultation between unions and 
management rather than confrontation. According to the Labor 
Government, with respect to reform: 
A cooperative approach is the only sensible way to go. The 
altematiue may appear a sunpler and perhaps quicker approach, 
but, in fact, the reverse wiR be the case. 
An advesarial approach wiR not bring about the Jimdamental 
changes in workforce and management attitudes required for long 
term improvement in productivity and competitiveness, or for 
continuing acceptance of new technology and other change. In fact, 
it wUl result in more entrenched and antagonistic attitudes and 
greater resistance to change. (Willis, R 1988 p4) 
It is in this light that the efficiency reforms, described below, 
must be understood. While the Thatcher Government may have 
used public sector reform as a symbol of its resolve to break 
unionism, the Hawke Labor Government, it can be claimed, was 
more inclined to use the public sector as a symbol of its resolve to 
engender consensus in industrial relations. This is clearly a very 
different approach to that adopted by the Fraser Government 
described earlier. 
The reform process in the Australian Public sector was put on the 
agenda by a series of Royal Commissions, Committees of Inquiry 
and Reviews in the 1970s and early 1980s. In the Commonwealth 
arena the major reviews were imdertaken by the Royal 
Commission on Australian Government Administration known 
as the Coombs Royal Commission in 1974-76 and the Review of 
Commonwealth Administration: the Reid Review in 1982-83. 
Actual changes were introduced into the Public sector by the 
Labor Government in 1984. EMdently, the Labor Government 
took into account the recommendations of the Coombs and Reid 
reports. But the actual changes it introduced were based on a 
document produced by members of the Parliamentary Labor 
Party, when it was in opposition, called- Labor and the Quality 
of Government and a December 1983 paper called Reforming 
the Australian Public Service: A Statement of the 
Government's Intentions. 
The reforms in the Australian public sector are intended to shift 
the emphasis away from the traditional bureaucratic control 
orientation and in this regard have three broad objectives. 
First, according to many writers, the most important aim of the 
reforms is to create an administration which is more efficient and 
capable of effectively and creatively meeting its goals without 
wasting or misusing human and financial resources (Wilenski, 
1986). These reforms are informed by theories and management 
practices developed in the private sector (Keating, M. 1989; 
Yeatman,A. 1987, 1990a, 1990b; Considine,M. 1988; Painter,M. 
1987) and can be seen as an attempt to restructure the public 
sector along more "commercial" or market-driven lines. 
Second, a more democratic administration in which the major 
policy decisions and the allocations of resources are made by 
ministers as the elected representatives of the people; and (since 
ministers cannot take or supervise all decisions) a more 
representative and diverse bureaucracy whose decisions are more 
open to public influence, public scrutiny and to appeal (Keating, 
1989). 
Third, a more equitable administration that is Just and fair in 
dealing with its own employees and applicants for employment, 
and with individual citizens and groups relying on the services it 
provides. With respect to government employees, the Labor 
Government argued that: 
public administration will be wore efficient if it is based on more 
open and democratic systems of organisation and management 
than those which have tradttionaUy prevailed in public services. A 
more participatvue approach to management will improve decision 
making by ensuring full opportunities for the staff who will be 
Greeted to make their views known and to have them properly 
considered. An administration more responsive to the needs of staff 
wUl ergoy improved morale and performance, while at the same 
time enriching the working lives of men and women who are part of 
the Governments workforce. (Hawke, R.J.L. 1984, p34) 
In the Labor and Quality of Government paper and in the Labor 
Government's December 1983 statement, reforms to GBEs were 
foreshadowed. 
Towards the end of 1984 a report prepared by Professor Hugh 
Stretton for the Minister of Finance called Directing the 
Australian Public Sector - A Consultant Paper on the Design 
and Direction of Commonwealth Business Enterprises was 
released. Stretton proposed that GBE reform take place with the 
general intention of making public business management more 
enterprising and inventive, efficient and accountable. 
Stretton's proposals were followed by a policy discussion paper in 
1986 and by the release in 1987 of the Policy Guidelines for 
Commonwealth Statutory Authorities and Government 
Business Enterprises. The Policy Guidelines were followed by the 
1988 Economic statement which included reforms directed at all 
statutory authorities and GBEs as well as measures specifically 
targeted at the telecommunications industry. 
The stated aims of the guidelines were, to quote them, to: 
provide incentive, enhance efficiency and improve public 
accountability. It is intended that these objectives be achieved 
through a package which combines removal of unnecessary central 
controls which detract from enterprise performance with greater 
emphasis on bottom line performance. Government attention will be 
focussed on strategic issues which are properly a matter for 
MinisterUjdresporisibiltty, (Waish^P. 1987,pl) 
As the above statement indicates, the Government was seeking to 
improve GBE efficiency by devolving a significant amount of the 
responsibility for decision making away from direct government 
control towards managers within the GBEs. In doing this, 
however, the Government still wished to keep the GBEs 
accountable to the public. 
In simimary, the method set out in the guidelines to achieve the 
reforms had four components. 
First, the amount of direct government control over the day to day 
operations of GBEs was reduced by the Guidelines. The 
Guidelines stated that "priority will be given to the removal of 
those controls that most clearly detract from an enterprise's 
commercial performance" (Walsh,P. 1987, p21). Further, they 
allowed GBE management to identify the controls which if 
abolished would best aid cost reduction and profitability. 
Second, contained within the guidelines was a requirement that 
GBEs prepare strategic corporate plans. The plans must be 
prepared every three years and cover such things as broad 
financial objectives and operational targets. A provision in the 
guidelines is that the responsible Minister may suggest to GBE 
management that they reconsider the corporate plans if he or she 
feels that they could better reflect government policies. 
Third, GBEs are required to reach agreement with the responsible 
Minister on financial performance objectives or targets. In most 
cases, financial targets must be developed annually and will 
generally take the form of "a specified rate of return on the 
enterprise's assets, funds employed or capital" (Walsh,P. 1987, 
p21). 
Fourth, the Guidelines required GBEs to report annually on their 
financial performance as measured against the targets. As stated 
in the guidelines: 
Annual reports of enterprises wUl give account of peiformance 
against previously established goals, including financial and 
operational targets, together with assessments of the cost of 
meeting 'community service obligations' and observing residual 
non-commercial central controls which adversely affect their 
profitability, (Walsh,P. 1987, p22) 
The May 1988 Economic Statement built on the Guidelines. It 
included reforms that created new corporate structures, clarified 
and added to the Government's strategic oversight role and 
further relaxed day to day government controls including those 
relating to industrial relations. 
As part of the May statement, Gareth Evans, the Minister for 
Transport and Communications, released a statement that was 
specifically related to the telecommimications industry. 
The statement provided for a major restructuring of the regulatory 
environment of the telecorrmiunications industry. It provided for a 
continuation of Telecom's monopoly over the basic telephone 
network, but opened the industry up to competition in value 
added services and, to an extent, network terminal equipment. 
The statement, also provided for the establishment of an 
independent regulator (AUSTEL) that would provide technical 
regulation, protect Telecom's monopoly, protect the competitors 
from unfair practice, protect consumers and promote efficiency. 
Further, the statement, in line with the Policy Guidelines for 
Commonwealth Statutory Authorities and Government 
Business Enterprises, provided for a reduction in direct 
government involvement in the operation of Telecom. This was to 
be achieved in a number of ways. 
The statement provided for the revision of Telecom's corporate 
and financial structures. This included the conversion of 25% of 
Commonwealth loans to equity and replacement of the rest with 
private sector borrowings, the revaluation of assets, and the 
exposure of Telecom to all taxes. 
Major strategic controls were modified: Loan Council processes 
were changed to allow for more flexibility, longer term capital 
expenditure and market borrowings; a Telecom superannuation 
scheme was set up; the authority for setting executive 
remuneration was devolved to the Telecom Board (in consultation 
with the Remuneration Tribimal); and industrial relations 
controls were relaxed. The changes in industrial relations controls 
were set out as follows: 
Industrial relations co-ordination arrangements have applied since 
1948. The enterprises are required to consult with the Department 
of Industrial Relations on a wide spectrum of industrial relations 
issues from mcgor wages and conditions matters to initiatives on 
occupational health and safety and industrial democracy. The 
Department can oppose initiatives and proposals which it believes 
do not accord with government policy. The consideration of these 
matters inevitably involves greater delays than if the enterprises 
could settle them without the requirement to consult, and has also 
been criticised for diminishing the negotiating status of GBE 
managers. The Government has decided that: 
1. The present industrial relations coordination 
arrangements will be substantially altered by devolving to the 
enterprises greatly increased responsibility and autonomy to 
develop wages and employment conditions proposals. 
2. Standard guidelines on government wages 
and industrial relations policy wUl be established by the Minister 
for Industrial Relations in consultation with the enterprises and the 
Minister for Transport and Communications. Enterprises wtil be 
free to manage their industrial relations within the scope of these 
broad guidelines without being required to refer matters to the 
Department of Industrial Relations. (Evans, G. 1988, p 218-219) 
The industrial relations guidelines were progressively developed 
following the May statement. They allowed for a significant 
reduction in the need for Telecom to gain clearance from the 
Department of Industrial Relations before making decisions on 
industrial relations matters. Telecom management is now, 
theoretically, free to manage industrial relations as it wishes 
within the scope of the guidelines. Management is only required 
to consult with the Department of Industrial Relations in 
situations where they or the Department thinks there may be a 
breach of the guidelines (Interview DIR Officer, 1991). 
The 1988 Statement also provided for the removal of many day to 
day controls, including the necessity for Telecom management to 
obtain ministerial approval to enter into contracts, obtain 
individual borrowings, and make investments, and establish 
subsidiaries and joint ventures. 
Finally, the statement provided for new planning and 
accountability mechanisms. Telecom must now provide the 
Minister for Transport and Communications with a strategic 
corporate plan every three years and agree with the Minister on 
financial targets. Further, they must include in annual reports an 
account of performance against the financial targets and against 
comparable telecommunications companies (Evans, G. 1988, p 
218-219). 
The reforms were put in place by three pieces of legislation: the 
Telecomimimications Amendment Act 1988, the Australian 
Telecommunications Corporation Act 1989, and the 
Telecommunications Act 1989 (DTOC Annual Report 1988-89). 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has described developments in Telecom Australia 
since it was vested in 1975. It is clear that since its inception the 
organisation has been under increasing pressure to change and 
reform along more commercial lines. Under the Fraser Liberal 
Government this culminated in 1982 with the Davidson report, 
which recommended that Telecom be exposed to competition. 
With the election of the Labor Government in 1983 the pressure 
has been kept up with the introduction of a broad ranging set of 
reforms aimed at improving the efficiency and accountability of 
the organisation. 
Since the introduction of the reforms outlined in this chapter, the 
change process has continued in Telecom. In December 1989 the 
Department of Transport and Communications commenced a 
review of ownership and structural relationships among the 
telecommunications carriers. This review culminated in November 
1990 with an announcement by the Minister for Transport and 
Communications, Kim Beazley, and the Prime Minister of further 
significant reforms. The announcement foreshadowed, amongst 
other things, the establishment of a private sector competitor, 
which took place around the end of 1991; the merger of OTC and 
Telecom; the sale of AUSSAT; the end of Telecom's first phone 
monopoly on 30 June 1991; and the enhancement of AUSTEL's 
role as an independent regulator (Financial Review, 9 Nov 1990). 
In the first half of this chapter industrial relations during the 
1970s and early 1980s was described. It was argued that as a 
result of the intervenionist action on the part of the Fraser 
Government and the aggressive strategies adopted by 
management, industrial relations became highly conflictual. The 
reform process under the Labor Government, however, has been 
associated with pressure for a more consensus based or 
consultative approach to industrial relations. 
In the next chapter an impression of the climate of industrial 
relations within Telecom since the early 1980s and during the 
period of reform is provided. This, to a limited extent, provides an 
insight into the success of the Labor Government's desire for 
more consensus based industrial relations. More importantly for 
this thesis, the next chapter provides further context for the 
discussions in chapters 5, 6 and 7. 
CHAPTER 4 - OVERVIEW OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN TELECOM 
SINCE THE EARLY 1980S 
INTRODUCTION 
MuUer (1980), Reinecke and Schultz (1983), and WiUiams (1986) 
paint a picture of increasing militancy amongst Telecom unions 
and, hence, a fairly conflictual industrial relations climate in 
Telecom during the late 1970s and early 1980s. Unfortunately, 
since the early 1980s there has not been any further detailed 
investigations of industrial relations in Telecom. Given the 
significant changes that have occurred in the organisation the 
findings of any such wide-ranging study would be exceedingly 
interesting. However, it is not the objective of this thesis to 
undertake a broad analysis of industrial relations across the 
organisation. Rather, an impression of the general climate of 
industrial relations within the organisation is provided below and 
serves as a necessary background to the discussion in later 
chapters, which concentrates on activity in the Riverina region. 
This chapter provides a broad view of industrial relations in the 
organisation against which the events at Narrandera can be 
compared. The discussion describes industrial relations in 
Telecom by examining Industrial Relations Commission decisions 
on issues brought before it by Telecom management and imions, 
and transcript of interviews of managers, supervisors and union 
representatives collected by the author in February, March and 
April 1990. In general terms, the decisions and interviews reveal 
that industrial relations within the organisation has been less 
conflict ridden in recent years. In addition, it appears that 
management has moved away from aggressive industrial relations 
strategies towards strategies imderpinned by communication and 
consultation. 
TELECOM DECISIONS 
An examination of 90 decisions handed down by the Australian 
Industrial Relations Commission during the period 1984 to 1990 
does not reveal any disputes as divisive as those that occurred in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s. In addition, the decisions reveal 
that the major agenda in the company has been one of reform. 
Cases brought before the Commission were diverse with claims 
for allowances of various types and, since 1987, proceedings 
imder Restructuring and Efficiency and Structural Efficiency 
principles being dominant. 
New technology was, unsurprisingly, a frequent imderpinning to 
many issues brought before the Commission. However, unlike the 
late 1970s and early 1980s, when the introduction of new 
technology led to a nimiber of disputes between Telecom 
management and Telecom unions, there does not appear to have 
been any conflicts resulting in major time losses or network shut 
downs. In the 1980s it appears that most attempts by Telecom to 
introduce new technology were not rejected by Telecom unions; 
rather, they have been met with claims for increased wages and 
allowances. 
For example, the 1980s saw the introduction of optical fibre 
technology which has been described as one of the most 
revolutionary developments since the transistor (Telephone 
Engineer and Management, 15 February 1985). An examination 
of IRC decisions (AIRC, 6/8/85) reveals that the introduction of 
optical fibre meant a signijacant change in the work of lines staff, 
covered by the APTU, and technicians, covered by the ATEA. 
However, despite a ban on optical fibre imposed by the APTU, the 
imions appeared to accept "that technological change is part and 
parcel of Telecom's operations" (AIRC, 6/8/85, p2). It appears 
that the main objective of the unions was not to stop the 
introduction of optical fibre, but to obtain increases in 
remimeration for those workers who were required to install and 
service it. Thus, the APTU sought and obtained an Optical Fibre 
Cable Allowance in 1985 and the ATEA sought (but later agreed 
to not pursue) a similar allowance. 
Similar developments occurred with the introduction by Telecom 
in the mid 1980s of new computerised systems, such as 
LEOPARD testing equipment, the Subscriber Line Test Access 
Network (SULTAN), and the AXE Electronic Computer Exchanges. 
LEOPARD, SULTAN and AXE represent major technological 
changes but they were not rejected by the unions. Rather the 
ATEA sought and gained an allowance for using the 
LEOPARD/SULTAN testing equipment while the ATPOA sought 
the creation of a new classification for its members using 
LEOPARD and SULTAN (AIRC, 25/11/85). 
Another significant technological change introduced by Telecom 
involved replacement of old telegram equipment with new 
computerised systems (AIRC, 9/5/85). This innovation meant 
significant changes for the workers concerned. Quoting the 
Telecom advocate who appeared in the case, Mr Douglas: 
„.there is no designation which wiR not require more and different 
skills in the new system. For example, if a cwrent telegraphist is 
successjvl in obtaining a Job in the new system, he or she will stiR 
be required to prepare and receive telegrams and public telex 
traffic as is currently the case; but that person will perform the 
functions on a visual display terminai requiring knowledge of the 
varied formats involved.,rather than is currently the case on 
teleprinters which require certain manipulative and tape reading 
skills only. Similarly, while a telegraphist currently performs a 
good deal of the junctions of the proposed message bureau 
operator, she only performs the range in the after-hours period 
when the standard of service is not as high as that which is 
required during the day. This means in essence the telegraphist 
has more time to get the Job right, removed from the pressures and 
variables and Junctions which normal business hours traffic can 
present. Another example of the net addition of skUl is the 
phonogram operator VDU who receives telegrams from subscribers 
and inputs them directly into the TRESS system by means of a 
VDU, They use only a relatively smaR number of formats; that is, 
they handle a very limited range of traffic, whereas a message 
bureau operator wUl be a multifunctuonal designation in the very 
true sense of the word, (MRC, 9/5/85, p2j 
As with fibre optics, LEOPARD, SULTAN and AXE computerised 
systems, the unions involved; TTSOA, ATPOA, PSA, and UPCT, 
appeared to accept that the introduction of new message bureau 
technology was necessary. 
In the decision the Commission made orders relating to the 
creation of a new award, classifications, remuneration, hours to 
be worked by employees, and coverage. The orders were accepted 
by most of the imions (AIRC, 14/2/86)^. 
Thus, the cases reveal that technological change in Telecom 
during the 1980s was largely an agreed process between 
management and imions. The push by Telecom management and 
the Labor Government towards a more commercial approach is 
also reflected in the IRC Telecom decisions. The restructuring and 
structural efficiency cases dominate in this regard and are 
described below. However, not all cases heard by the Commission 
that were concerned with moves towards commercialism were 
associated with national wage case proceedings. 
For example, in 1985 the Commission heard a case involving 
Telecom and the ACOA that related to a decision by Telecom to 
shift its sales force away from a traditionally "passive order taking 
role to one of active selling" (AIRC, 24/1/85, pi). By 'active 
selling' Telecom management meant that officers at various levels 
would initiate sales by calling prospective customers either over 
the phone or by outside calls. In seeking to develop a more active 
^The hours and coverage issues were appealed by the UPCT, which had been excluded as a party to the award in the 
original proceedings. The UPCTs appeal was reieaed bv the Full Bench. 
sales force, Telecom also sought to change the method of payment 
away from the tradition clerical salary scales to one related to 
performance. Telecom claimed that a move to performance related 
pay was essential to the success of the move from passive to 
active selling. 
These changes the ACOA claimed and Telecom acknowledged, 
meant a significant change in the nature of the work for those 
employees concerned. Quoting Peter Robson, the ACOA advocate 
at that time: 
So here you have a situotioTX where previously selling and 
marketing work in Telecom was being done by clerks, who never 
had a car, never used to get out, they used to do it as a part time 
Job in the main although some of them did it in a more Jidl-time 
way, but certainly they had oR the normal sort of trappings of the 
public service security of position and tenure. Now Telecom have 
proposed, and subject to there being proper systems ACOA have 
agreed, that we have targets being used for such sacrosanct things 
as increments and tenure. Soit is in our view, a very new way of 
operation. iAlRC, 24/1/85, p2) 
The case put forward to the Commission by the parties was for 
the establishment of new sales, accounts and consultant 
classifications, which would be associated with different base 
level salary scales comprising a bench-mark rate and 
accompanied by several incremental advances. Performance pay 
was based on a 'product points system' and was described to the 
Commission in the following terms: 
..that achievement by a sales representative of 80 of target, (ie, 
points earned by selling products compared with "points value" or 
target allocated at the beginning of each twelve-month period) wûl 
ensure tenure in the business sales force; 90 achievement will 
create entitlement to annual incremental advancement within the 
scale proposed; and achievement at levels of 110 and above of 
target, calculated on a quarterly basis, wUl be rewarded with an 
incentive payment equivalent to accelerated incremental 
advancement, payable for duration (sic) of the next succeeding 
quarter. (AIRC, 24/1/85. p2J 
The Commission was also advised that the new arrangements 
would lead to changes in conditions of employment such as 
overtime, ordinary hours of work, allowances, and the calculation 
of recreation leave, long service leave and superannuation. The 
parties indicated that the changes, and in particular the incentive 
system, would be implemented over a two year period. Further, it 
was submitted that employees who did not achieve the 80 target 
would not be retrenched, rather they would be redeployed 
elsewhere in the Telecom workforce^. 
This case provides a useful insight into the shift towards a more 
"commercially" oriented perspective. However, the shift is best 
•J 
The differences between the parties related to the actual salary to be paid to the classifications concerned, allowances 
and travelling time. These issues were settled by arbitration. 
reflected in Telecom cases heard as part of national wage case 
increases and, in particular, those governed by the Restructuring 
and Efficiency Principle (REP) and the Structural Efficiency 
Principle (SEP)8. 
In Telecom the principles set by the IRC, both under the 
Restructuring and Efficiency Principle and the Structural 
Efficiency Principle, were strongly embraced and formed part of 
the general push towards commercialism and greater efficiency 
within the organisation. 
g 
° The emphasis in wage fixation in Australia since the early 1980s has been upon attempts to make Australian woric 
organisation and award structures more efficient and therefore to help industry to become more internationally 
competitive. This orientation has been pushed by the Labour government and its Accord partner the ACTU, as well as by 
major employer associations(NLCC, 1988). The Commission enshrined the new orientation in its national wage case 
decision of 10 March 1987. It established a two-tier approach to fixmg wages and introduced a principle that parties had 
to meet in order to gain increases in the second tier. The Restracturing and Efficienqr Principle allowed for a set 4 % 
increase in rates of pay and improvements in employment conditions, if employers and unions could convince the 
Commission that they had implemented measures which would lead to increases m efficiency and productivity. The 
emphasis in the principle was upon achieving these goals by increasing flexibility at the enterprise or woikplace level 
(NLCC, 1988). 
Whilst the experience with the Restmcturing and Efficiency Principle was seen as constractive, the Government and all 
major parties recognised that they needed to build on the changes akeady achieved. In August 1988 the Australian 
Conciliation and Aibitration Commission handed down its 1988 National Wage Case Decision. The decision reinforced 
the importance of stracmral change and labour market reform by building on the steps taken under the two tier system 
and hastening the speed of labour market refomi. (Commonwealth Sutsnission to the Review of the Stractuial Efficiency 
Principle, Februaiy-May 1989) The central feature of the August 1988 Decision was the establishment of the Structural 
Efficiency Principle which focused on award restracturing. The Commission determined that anployees would be 
granted two wage increases (3% no later than 1 September 1988, and $10 per week no eariier than six months after the 
first increase) if their union gave a formal undertaking to positively cooperate in a fundamental overhaul of the awards 
which covered the employees work. The new Principle highlighted a number of areas which could be considered by the 
parties to awards (Deeiy & Plowman, 1991). 
In August 1989 the Commission amended the Struaural Efficiency Principle by providing for stractoral efficiency 
adjustments if the parties could satisfy the Commission that they had co-operated positively in a fundameaital review of 
awards and were implementing measures to improve the efficiency as well as providing workers with more satisfying 
jobs (Commonwealth Submission to the National Wage Case, Dec 1990-Feb 1991). 
Following reports by the Government and other parties, during the December 1990-February 1991 National Wage Case 
the Industrial Relations Commission established the April 1991 Stractural Efficiency Principle. In order to gain a 2.5% 
increase, parties were required to satisfy the Commission that they had, amongst other things, begun to examine whether 
work classifications, patterns and arrangements were aH)ropriate; that consultative mechanism were to be set up; and 
that the 1989 Stractural Efficiency Principle had been substantially implemented,(Commonwealth Submission to the 
Review of Wage Fixing Principles, Sept 1991) 
Claims for a 4% second tier increase under the 1987 
Restructuring and Efficiency Principle led, for employees covered 
by the ATEA, to the introduction of new technology such as a new 
generation main distributing frame; improvements in staff 
functional and geographic mobility; increased training; the 
dropping of demarcation barriers between technical and lines 
groups for the installation and maintenance work on 
underground repeater/regenerators; and numerous changes to 
maintenance arrangements and procedures (AIRC, 4/9/87a). 
For employees covered by the APTU the Restructuring and 
Efficiency Principle led, amongst other things, to changes in 
technology, work and managerial practices, and demarcation 
barriers. For example, field based training was agreed to, as was 
the introduction of keyboard and screen based equipment, and 
the dropping of the technical-lines demarcation in underground 
repeater/regenerators. Further, it was agreed that, in addition to 
improved functional and geographic mobility, staff would if 
required by management work at "any level below their nominal 
or acting designations" (AIRC, 4/9/87b). 
Perhaps the most significant changes arising from the March 
1987 national wage case concerned the clerical areas of Telecom 
and involved the integration of over fifty classifications into one 
single structure containing six levels (AIRC, 17/12/87). 
Associated with this rationalisation were a large number of 
initiatives aimed at improving the efficiency and flexibility of the 
clerical workforce. Amongst other things, clerical integration 
established Telecom management's right to recruit above the base 
level; removed qualification barriers; created classification 
standards; and revised incremental review processes. 
The integration exercise also involved an agreement to undertake 
a redesign of Jobs and work organisation. The redesign process 
was to be premised on a set of objectives involving the efficient 
and effective meeting of customer's needs through, where 
possible, the decentralisation and devolution of decision making, 
the broadening and enhancement of Jobs, and the development of 
Jobs which would enable control by employees over complete 
pieces of work using a variety of skills. It was agreed that changes 
in the design of Jobs and the organisation of work would be 
worked out and implemented through a Joint process involving 
management, staff and unions at branch or section level. 
Multi-skilling was also identified as a vital part of the integration 
process and was to be achieved via "a combination of flexibility in 
task allocation across positions. Job rotation and training 
programs and the design of multi-functional Jobs" (AIRC, 
17/12/87, Appendix Paperl, p5). As with Job redesign and work 
organisation changes, the objective of multi-skilling was identified 
as: 
„greater Jlexibility in the allocation of resources and better 
servicing of customers through a more broadly skilled workforce. 
From a staff perspective, benefits include better career 
opportunities for staff currently restricted by Job specialisation 
(AIRC, Yl lVl l^ l , Appendix Paper 1, p5). 
Similarly, multi-functional Job designs and Job rotation were to be 
the responsibility of local management. The importance of multi-
skilling was highlighted in the agreements by making the 
development of a flexible, multiskilled workforce a performance 
criterion for managers. Backing up all these proposed changes 
was an agreement to ensure the appropriate deployment of 
resources for training. 
Beyond the integration package the clerical restructuring and 
efficiency case established agreements on issues such as staff 
geographical mobility, assessment processes, demarcation issues, 
the use of contract staff, managing personnel reductions, and 
organisational culture initiatives. With regard to personnel 
reduction, it was identified in the decision that staff reductions 
would have to take place in order to meet the effects of changes in 
demand for telecommunications services and the Government's 
May 1987 Economic Statement. However, senior management 
stated, in a docimient issued to state managers and heads of 
departments within Telecom and included as an exhibit in the 
decision, that: 
It is not intended that redundancy will be used as a means of 
achieving the reductions. The policy is to limit, and where 
necessary cease, recruitment and to take advantage of wastage 
and wastage opportunities, redeployment of staff, reduction in 
overtime and where necessary cessation of fixed-term staff. 
Redeployment may mean change of physical location and/or 
change of duties. It could also include the performance of work 
normoRy performed by another designation group. This may 
necessitate salary maintenance. Relocation wiR be arranged with 
existing conditions of service. Retraining may be necessary in some 
situations and this should be arranged as soon as redeployees are 
identified (AIRC, YJIVll^l Appendix Paper 2 p2). 
Further, reductions were to take place with staff being fully 
informed of developments and volunteers for re-deployment being 
sought first: 
The staff concerned and their staff assocvatvons wiR need to be well 
informed of the specific redeployments identfied and the individual 
reasons for those redeployments as early as practicable. They wUl 
also need to be aware of the necessity for and benefits of 
redeployment, eg. 
ongoing viability of the organisation and the ability to 
continue to provide Jobs to existing staff; 
improved career prospects and skiU development. 
Staff must be made aware of their conditions of service and 
basicaUy that there wUl be no financial disadvantage. Volunteers 
for redeployment should be sought in the first instance. The work 
priority areas, where redeployees wiR be placed, must also be 
clearly identified together with the numbers and skills required. 
(Staff must not be moved any more than necessary, and decisions 
relating to areas for reduction and priority areas must be definite 
and not changed). States must take a common sense approach in 
achieving staff redeployment and the staff reductions. Movement 
involving change of domicile should be avoided as far as possible. 
(AIRC, Y71VIIAppendix Paper 2 p2) 
The organisational ciilture initiatives involved staff in the Telecom 
Information Systems area and included a performance 
development and review scheme, productivity, motivation and 
reward initiatives, and bottom line management techniques. On 
bottom line management the following was agreed: 
Telecom's resources planning and monitoring processes have 
traditionally been detailed in nature with emphasis spread over a 
wide range of physical targets, commercial targets, productivity 
and manpower targets and expenditure items. This process is 
changing, however, to a more macro based bottom line approach 
whereby only a few key parameters and a short list of corporate 
imperatives which must be met during the year within prescribed 
macro resource levels, are provided. Managers, wUl therefore, have 
greater autonomy and flexibility in the allocation of the macro 
resources along with an increased degree of accountability. 
The introduction of a Bottom Line Management approach is seen as 
a key element in efforts to improve and consolidate performance, 
productivity and profitability in the current business environment It 
is considered that the introduction of this Jundarnentcd business 
practice within Telecom wUl lead to improved efficiency and 
productivity by replacing comparatively rigid finaxxciol junctional 
and hierarchical structures and practices, with a simpler approach 
which provides for both accountability and much more flexibility 
than previously in meeting business opportunities. Because the 
nature of the concept makes it most difficult to quantify in advance 
the likely efficiency and productivity benefits which would result 
from its appUcatioru it is not possible to provide any meaningfijl 
estimate of likely gains or savings at this early stage. Nevertheless, 
it can be said with confidence, that Bottom Line Management is an 
important and fundamental business practice whose application 
within Telecom wUl lead to improved efficiency and productivity. 
(AIRC, Y11VIIAppendix Paper 8 p2) 
Clearly the Restructuring and Efficiency Principle aided the 
introduction of significant changes within Telecom. The structural 
efficiency principles led to further significant changes within the 
organisation. 
For employees covered by the APTU a major restructuring of 
classffications was implemented through the SEP process. The 
nineteen classifications that originally existed were reduced to six 
broadbanded classifications which meant a significant move 
towards multi-skilling and the addition of supervisory 
responsibilities for some classifications. It was predicted that the 
broadbanding would lead to a reduction in demarcations between 
classifications and encourage employees to become more involved 
in their own skill development (AIRC, 31/5/89). 
In the clerical areas discussion under the SEP built on changes 
introduced through the clerical integration exercise. The job 
reclassification and redesign processes continued, and initiatives 
such as performance review mechanisms, profit sharing 
arrangements, and provision for the modernisation of awards 
were introduced (AIRC, 23/4/1990). 
Under the SEP, changes were also introduced to the management 
classifications within the organisation. In August 1990 the 
Commission certified an agreement under section 115 of the IR 
Act between the APEA, the POA, and Telecom. The agreement 
provided for wage increases in return for a restructuring of the 
executive classifications within the organisation. The 
restructuring led to: 
..significant changes in the executive structure, tncluding a 
reduction in the number of executive designations and in due 
course in the number of executives..The restructuring also provides 
for the elimination of award coverage of some senior executive 
positions. (AIRC 30/8/90) 
In summary, both the REP and SEP processes led to considerable 
changes within Telecom, all of which were designed to increase 
the efficiency of the organisation. Quoting Mr Commissioner 
Lewin in a decision of June 1990: 
The Australian Telecommunications Corporation employs around 
80000 employees. The restructuring of the work classifications 
across the depth and breadth of such a large and functionally 
diverse organisation is a significant task. On the material before 
me a great deal has been achieved. Following this decision and 
other decisions affecting other awards and work areas the 
classification of the work of the 80000 employees wûl have been 
drastically changed. The number of designations of work wUl have 
reduced from 470 to J 50, and the number of salary points from 
1900 to 600. 
The classification of work within these new structures leads to a 
much flatter overcdl wage and salary structure. In particular the 
new structures establish skiR related career paths which provide 
incentive for workers to participate in skUl formation, eliminate 
impediments to multiskilUng, broaden the range of tasks which a 
worker may be required to perform and ensure that workir^ 
patterns and arrangements enhance flexibility and the efficiency of 
the industry. 
In relation to the restructuring of work within Telecom progress has 
been made in a number of important areas which wUl also 
contribute to the efficient conduct of the enterprise. These include 
the development of skills audits and training programmes to fit the 
new career paths, flexible working arrangements including 
broadening the span of working hours for professional grades, the 
elimination of certain appeal rights and variations to higher duty 
working arrangements. Significant progress has been made toward 
a work performance oriented human resources strategy. (AIRC, 
7/6/90) 
Clearly, a push for efBciency and increased productivity was a 
major theme in the cases discussed. In addition, the above cases 
reveal that industrial relations with Telecom Australia at the 
broad formalised level was not dominated by any major industrial 
disputes similar to those that took place in the late 70s and 80s. 
Rather, cases heard by Commission involving potentially divisive 
issues such as new technology and changed work organisation 
seem to have been accompanied not by high levels of industrial 
action but by a substantial amoimt of agreement between 
management and unions. The unions do not appear to have stood 
in the way of change so long as their members were adequately 
remimerated. The significant changes under the Structural 
Efficiency and Restructuring and Efficiency principles to the 
organisation of work, and the structure of awards and 
classifications is fiirther evidence of this less conflictual pattern of 
industrial relations. Significant changes oriented toward efficiency 
goals have been agreed to without major problems. 
In this respect, the cases suggest that the pursuit of efficiency 
measures at Telecom have been done through consultation 
between management and Telecom unions. That is, Telecom 
management has not attempted to introduce change by making 
unilateral decisions or by adopting aggressive and antagonistic 
strategies. Rather, in accord with the Government's consensus 
orientation, they have adopted a strategy that is based on the 
pursuit of reforms through consultation. In other words, they 
have used the REP and SEP processes to introduce, with the 
agreement of the imions, measures to improve efficiency; rather 
than forcing them through, regardless of whether or not they are 
accepted by imions and employees. This orientation was evident 
in all the Telecom REP and SEP cases. For example, in the 
clerical integration case management representatives put the 
view: 
that Telecom had achieved by negotiation an agreement which 
would allow it to face the corporate and commercial challenges for 
at least the next decade. (AIRC, YIIVll^l p2) 
It thus appears that, at least at the formalised national level, 
Telecom management has moved away from the aggressive 
approaches adopted in the 1970s and early 1980s and are, 
instead, adopting industrial relations strategies that pursue 
reform through consultation. 
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AT THE LOCAL LEVEL 
The above cases do provide a useful impression of industrial 
relations within the organisation and an insight into changes in 
Telecom management's industrial relations strategies. However, 
an assessment of industrial relations based solely on cases 
brought before the Industrial Relation Commission clearly cannot 
present a complete picture of the industrial relations climate 
Within the organisation. The cases discussed above tended to 
involve issues that were dealt with at a national or centralised 
level between senior members of the imion and management 
hierarchy. While all the cases, particularly those under the 
Principles, had major implications for lower levels of the 
organisation, the cases themselves do not and cannot be expected 
to provide an understanding of the complexion of industrial 
relations at lower levels. In particular, proceedings within the 
Industrial Relations Commission cannot be expected to provide 
direct insights into the nature of workplace industrial relations; 
nor the day to day industrial relations approaches or styles of 
management. 
In order to establish a more complete picture, in January and 
February of 1990 the author undertook a series of in-depth 
interviews of managers and unionists primarily working in the 
WoUongong and Wagga Wagga districts of Telecom. In all, 22 
people were interviewed: specifically: 2 managers at the regional 
level (located at Burwood); 9 at district management level (5 from 
WoUongong and 4 from Wagga Wagga); 3 supervisors (1 from 
WoUongong and 2 from Wagga Wagga); and 8 union 
representatives (4 from WoUongong and 4 from Wagga Wagga). 
The interviewees were drawn from the major occupational 
groupings in the organisation: administration, technical and 
lines. Interviews ran for periods of between 1 to Shrs^ and 
covered a range of topics related to the interviewees experience of 
and attitude towards industrial relations. More particularly, 
^ Many interviews were conducted over two sessions of around 1.5 hours each. 
interviewees were asked open ended question that were aimed to 
establish the following: 
views on the present industrial relations climate within 
the organisation: for example, how conflictual industrial 
relations was when compared to earlier periods, and what 
issues were having the greatest impact upon industrial 
relations at their levels; 
opinions on the quality and role of management at 
various levels in the organisation and the quality and role 
of trade unions and trade imion representatives: in 
particular, interviewees were asked about the strategies 
adopted by management to industrial relations and the 
character of the role adopted by unions; 
the impact that the push towards commercialisation and 
privitisation is having upon industrial relations and 
peoples attitudes within the organisation at their level; 
and 
differences between the character of industrial relations 
in rural centres, such as Wagga Wagga, and in more 
urban/industrial centres, such as WoUongong. 
The findings of the interviews are discussed below starting with 
the views and beliefs of management. 
MANAGERS 
A consistent theme among managers was that industrial relations 
at the regional or local level had improved over the last 10 years. 
In the past, it was argued, industrial relations had been a real 
problem at the local level. In recent years, however, the situation 
had improved considerably. All managers claimed that they had 
very few problems in the industrial relations area: industrial 
relations was generally consensual and collaborative. 
Managers argued that the major reason for this improvement was 
a fundamental change in the industrial relations approach 
adopted by managers. In the past, they argued, Telecom 
management had been autocratic, unapproachable and unwilling 
to inform or communicate with the unions and employees. 
Quoting one of the managers in Wollongong: 
We had a management team in those days that was very 
autocratic. My boss in particular, who is no longer with us, I got 
along alright with him; nobody else did. He was reaRy pig headed 
and his immediate boss, who worked on the sixth floor, never 
stopped off at one of the other floors in the ten years that he was 
up there, and never left his office either. And he was an autocratic 
engineer. That was the working environment that we were working 
in. I could get through to my boss but it was very difficult. The way 
Ifl)und to do it wcLS to visit the same bowling club as he did, and I 
could get through to him over a beer. But I couldn't at work, 
whatever they said went. They weren't willing to listen. 
This particular manager claimed that imder the previous 
managerial approach the only way that employees could get 
things done was to go to the imion. The impact of this, he 
implied, was that people began to automatically go to the union 
first, regardless of the nature or importance of the problem they 
wished to raise. 
It was claimed by managers that the old autocratic approach had 
given way to a far more open approach, which stressed effective 
communication and consultation and, as a result, was having 
beneficial effects upon industrial relations. The new management 
approach, it was argued, was underpinned by the notion that 
most industrial relations problems could be avoided by open and 
honest consultation between the parties and by ensuring that 
employees have a say in decision making. The following quotes 
from managers illustrate these ideas very effectively: 
I have always found it best to approach people in an open and 
honest manner, and make them aware of as many of the facts that 
you have available to you as is possible. So that when you are 
discussing either a conflict or a problem they have, you are both 
looking at the same set of facts „.You can establish some rapport 
with people, and ask them what their real concerns are..you 
usuaRy find that the real concern is unrelated to the issue that is 
on the table at the time, and it is a matter of reaRy getting to that 
before you can start talking. 
If there is no result yet, you go and tell them there is no results 
yet „that is good because then the association rep will come up 
and say "have you heard anything yet' or "what is going on" and 
they feel more free to talk to you..so it is Just a matter of 
establishing an open relationship with people. 
And 
You have got to get to the staff and talk to them and you wHlfind 
they wiR respond to Just your being there and speaking to them. 
You mightn't have to speak to them on anything concerning work. I 
have found that my style of management is Just to make myself 
available and to discuss anything they want to raise. I wUl start 
talking and give them an opportunity to make some leading 
questions or comments Just to get them talking. I feel thats paid off 
enormously. 
It was clear from interviews with most of the managers that the 
new open communicative approach was part of a general change 
in Telecom management's strategies toward industrial relations 
and the management of employees. The aggressive confrontation 
strategies associated with the Fraser period were being replaced 
by an emphasis upon consultation with unions and open 
commimication with employees. 
It was apparent that the strategy of consultation associated with 
the formalised REP and SEP process was also being adopted in 
order to facilitate the implementation of other reforms. For 
example, the regional human resources manager pointed out that 
the introduction of changes to the structure of districts within his 
region (discussed in the next chapter) had only commenced once 
in-principle agreements were reached between unions and 
management. More broadly, the major restructure of Telecom's 
corporate structure (also discussed in the next chapter) was 
underpinned, he indicated, by a management strategy which 
included a considerable period of negotiation between senior 
management and all Telecom unions. 
The regional human resource manager also indicated that the 
formulation of industrial relations strategies had become a vital 
aspect of all management initiated reforms within the 
organisation. He stated that in line with the general push for 
decentralisation, management at lower levels in the organisation 
were being made responsible for the formulation of industrial 
relations strategies. In the past he argued: 
the decision was made and then the industrial relations strategy 
was built to deliver that decision. Therefore the final outcome was 
not always what was wanted because you had to compromise. If 
you come up with an idea now, you have got to come up with the IR 
strategy to go along with it. Which means they (managers) have to 
think: instead of thinking this is a brilliant idea, we wUl shut this 
place here and then somebody else can go through all the pain. Yes 
it won't get considered now untd we see the IR strategy and what 
we wiR do is, we wiR comment on the IR strategy. Our experts wtil 
actually say, no you have got a hole here and a hole there. In the 
past we have built the strategy for them and that is where we 
failed because we never made the managers think in terms of 
industrial relations and they should have beerL 
It was inferred by the human resource manager that the 
emphasis upon the incorporation of industrial relations strategies 
into management decisions at all levels within the organisation 
was a major explanation for improved industrial relations. His 
argimient was verified by other managers who indicated that this 
new approach in association with a more consultative orientation 
was having a very beneficial effect. 
According to a number of managers, the emphasis upon more 
consensual based industrial relations strategies was, at least in 
part, related to new corporate level strategies that emphasised the 
pursuit of increased efficiency and competitiveness through a 
concentration on the needs of customers. These strategies it was 
argued portrayed the success of a customer focus as dependent 
on providing employees with meaningful work and the 
opportunity to be involved in decision making. 
In this respect, some managers mentioned the organisation's 
Vision 2000 initiative which had been developed at the corporate 
level in 1986. Vision 2000 was designed to improve performance 
by focusing on what was called three core values: putting 
customers first; using employees to make it possible through 
cooperation and teamwork; and seeing business success as a key 
to the future. In line with this orientation, imder the Vision 2000 
program people throughout the organisation were encouraged to 
participate in local projects aimed at improving Telecom's 
operations (ATC 1988; ATC 1989). 
The most common initiative mentioned was the move toward 
Total Quality Management (TQM). TQM was described by 
managers as a strategy that involved the pursuit of continuous 
improvement through a combination of scientific management 
methods and participation by employees. Quoting one manager at 
length: 
TQM, what does that means? What we are saying is that every 
single thing that happens in the company should be of quality. 
Quality is not Just high quality but quality as defined by the 
customers. Also, we never say we have achieved the required 
quality: it is a process of continuous improvement. It is a 
management philosophy which is based on a top down approach. 
This means that managers create the systems that people work in, 
and managers are responsible for changing the system. 
What we are saying is you get your work process and you get it 
down to the most simple non-complex way of doing it so that it is 
absolutely foolproof. And what that basically comes down to is 
using two sources of information: statistical process control which 
involves scvsntiflc management techniques, and participative 
management - the people that work in the process are the experts. 
So the idea is for managers to get these two bodies of special 
knowledge together in order to work on changing things. 
Asked what assumption TQM makes about peoples' attitudes the 
same manager said: 
That people are basically good and want to do a good Job and what 
managers have done over the last whatever years has put 
impediments in their way. So what managers now need to do is 
take away those impediments and allow people to take pride in 
their work agairL 
Not all managers agreed that the improvement in industrial 
relations was simply due to more consensual industrial relations 
strategies bolstered by participative approaches such as Vision 
2000 and TQM. Some managers indicated that the reality was a 
bit more complex. For example, one manager argued that the 
depressed economic times and the consequent risk of 
unemployment meant workers were less willing to engage in 
strike action. This manager also argued that the threat of 
privitisation meant workers shied away from highly visible 
industrial disputation. Another manager claimed that, in addition 
to the shift in management strategies, the improvement in 
industrial relations was related to a more constructive attitude on 
the part of unions. He argued that unions appeared to be more 
willing to talk and accept change. This he claimed was because 
unionists were better trained and more skillful than in the past. 
While all the managers interviewed argued that industrial 
relations had improved, none claimed that the situation was 
perfect. Industrial relations problems still arose. 
A source of local problems according to many managers was 
industrial relations developments and activities at the national 
level. Political activity between the senior union officials and 
senior Telecom management, it was commonly argued, created 
delays and problems at the local level that could very easily boil 
over and create real industrial problems: 
I dislike the way things seem to be polttically linked all the time in 
that we are always playing one game against another game at a 
higher level than the real topic thafs on the table. That annoys the 
heU out of me, that these guys at the depot level sometimes are 
used as pawns in a game when the win or lose has to be 
determined somewhere outside of the district While the 
Associations argue that they are doing the best for their members, 
in actual fact they, through many wheels and cogs, are linking it to 
something else in order to get a win against Telecom. I guess that 
is the nature of industrial relations but it doesn't go along with my 
open policy. 
In this regard, one manager argued that it was important to tiy 
and keep industrial relations down at the local level. To let it go 
any higher, he claimed, was to lose control: 
My view on industrial relations is try and keep it local, try and 
keep it down to the lowest number of people. Once it gets to state 
level well they are playing politics - I'm talking management side -
you lose control of it. So if a manager wants to maintain control of 
his own district or industrial relations, he has to keep it local; once 
it has gone outside the local area I think you have failed. 
The issue of politics was raised by other managers, but most 
commonly in terms of union politics. In particular, the political 
aspirations of individual unionists were highlighted by a number 
of managers as a factor that could create difficulties: 
GeneraRy, I find the people in the union movement are fairly 
cooperative with the exception of a couple of hard ones whose role 
in life seems to be to score points to keep themselves in office 
rather than look at the business that we are in and trying to work 
with the district management to, in a cooperative sense, try and do 
the best for Telecom. 
The existing structure of unions and attempts to rationalise them 
were, for many managers, a source of potential conflict. The 
existence of strong demarcations between the ATEA/APTOA and 
the AFTU was, according to some managers, a severe limitation 
on the viability of the organisation. Without the creation of "one 
workforce", it was argued, Telecom would not be able to compete 
effectively in a deregulated market. Because of this, managers 
saw the amalgamation of the ATEA/ATPOA and APTU as the most 
important industrial relations issue needing to be addressed: 
The biggest issue that is going to hit this place, I think, is the one 
workforce. They are going to have to address that one - the 
amalgamation of the two mcyor unions - in the immediate JUture, in 
the next two years, if we are going to be a viable organisation. 
While union structure and politics were a source of frustration, 
surprisingly, all managers argued that unions were vital and far 
from irrelevant in the organisation. In fact, a common theme was 
that unions were an important management tool, who helped to 
improve the flow of information between management and 
employees: 
Well I use trade unionism, the union reps at the depot I get them 
together, I speak to them to sort out their area, I say 'what are your 
problems, be open with me', I let them talk to me and I talk to them, 
Thafs the way I get the feeling of the bloke that is more in the 
background„By using the union reps I can get to the seat of the 
problem. 
and 
They can tell you things that are worrying somebody that you don't 
know about and that you wouldn't probably find out about and it 
probably would have festered. Also if you can convince the union 
rep that you are telling him the truth, then the person gets it from 
another source who they trust and are more likely to believe it. So 
thafs handy, I don't know whether it always works that way. It 
certainly works here. 
Over and above these issues, according to all managers, were 
problems related to the enormous amount of change faced by the 
organisation and the considerable imcertainties this created for 
employees. All managers indicated that the future was 
exceedingly uncertain and many indicated that this was having a 
detrimental influence upon the morale of their employees. This, 
they argued, would eventually have a detrimental impact upon 
industrial relations. The perception was backed up by a large 
culture survey undertaken by a consultancy firm in both 
districts, which had Just been completed and the time of the 
interviews. According to the managers who had seen the results, 
the survey indicated, amongst many other things, that Telecom 
employees suffered from very poor morale. This, many managers 
argued, was particularly related to strong rumours about the 
future of the organisation and the very real threats of job losses 
associated with the moves towards a commercial orientation. 
Many of the managers empathised with their employees concerns 
but could do nothing about it. Their employees wanted more 
information but they, the managers, were Just as much in the 
dark and under threat. 
SUPERVISORS 
Turning to the views of the supervisors on industrial relations 
within Telecom, they appeared to agree fairly strongly with 
managers that industrial relations within the organisation at the 
local level had improved considerably. A major reason for this 
improvement according to one of the supervisors was the change 
in the economy and the introduction of new technology. In the 
past trade unions, he argued, had had a strangle hold on the 
community, but the downturn in the economy and the 
introduction of new forms of technology had left unions with little 
clout. This supervisor also insisted that change was related to 
improvements in the skills and strategies of management. He 
claimed that, while they could still improve, management's style 
was changing from the autocratic to the open and this, he 
suggested, had led to real Improvements: 
The guys actuoRy know who the district manager is, they know 
him on a first name basis, he speaks to them, he knows their 
problems..tt has meant such a change for this area you wouldn't 
know it. There is not some siRy bastard up there who knows 
nothing about us, he is a part of us.. 
It was also argued that industrial relations within the 
organisation had improved because imion officials and 
representatives had become more skillful. As one supervisor put 
it: 
„the unions have had to smarten up their game and I think that all 
trade union people at the top levels are much more skillful than 
they were years ago. Before, the union official, he was a good 
crowd pleaser and he could tell a Joke, and he could drink., he was 
one of the boys. But now, you only have to look at the top people in 
union management, the Simon Créons, the BiR Keltys, they are 
very intelligent, and it wouldn't matter what side of the fence they 
were on, they would stUl succeed. 
In line with this, all the supervisors agreed that unions had a 
vital role to play, but not in the way argued by managers: as a 
useful tool. Rather, unions, they argued, were an important form 
of protection for individuals: 
You have got to have someone to represent yow Managers, they 
are only individuals, anyway, a lot of the tune they are carrying out 
duties which they have been instructed to do. Unions, you know, 
they have different sources.Xhey have got more access to higher 
bodies or parliamentarians. You definitely have got to have them. If 
you worked for a smaR company, you can speak to your boss 
directly and you can work out a deal with him as an individujoL In 
a big company like Telecom you can't do that so you have got to 
have someone to represent you. 
Also in accord with managers, the supervisors did not think that 
industrial relations in Telecom was perfect. They expressed fears 
about what might happen in the future. All argued that the 
uncertainties faced by all Telecom employees could cause 
industrial problems. Quoting one of the supervisors: 
Once again they (the staff) are getting the same vibes as an 
elephant or ant gets, instinctive things that have to do with 
preservation. Now if you don't know or you are not too sure, and 
the future doesn't look good and there is a possibRity that Mr 
Hawke has let you down, and even senior managers are not 
prepared to tell you things because they don't really know whether 
they have it right, it is not very morale boosting. 
UNION RBPRESENTATIVES 
Most union representatives argued that industrial relations had 
improved considerably and that this was primarily related to 
management's more open strategies. They agreed with the views 
expressed by management and supervisors regarding the 
autocratic style of management in the past. Quoting one of them: 
When I came here ten years ago, the administration managers here 
in those days were very senior men and very old men, they were 
all old school tie blokes. The wiions to them were a disease to be 
dealt with. If you wanted something, for instance, if you couldn't 
totally Justify it you wouldn't get it. It was ridiculous the things that 
were going on. 
This closed approach led, the xmion representatives argued, to 
considerable industrial relations problems: 
It got to the stage here that we would get no answer whatsoever. 
So we said righto it is no good going to you, we have given you a 
chance so we wHljust ring Sydney. It is pretty bloody crook if you 
go and bypass your local people..by gees there were some 
disputes. 
However, a new management approach, they argued, had 
emerged, which was based on improved communications. 
Industrial relations they claimed had improved as a result: 
.„before when they used to introduce things, they didn't talk to the 
unions, or the people, they Just said: "bang this is it, as from 
Monday you wUl do things this way". Now when they introduce 
thirds the first thing they do is caR in the executive of the sub-
branch and explain what they want to do and ask what do you 
think about it. 
and 
We know that if we have got a problem we go straight through the 
manager now. I wouM say it has improved 400 percent and thats 
a bloody lot, even in my opinvort 
Two representatives argued that, while the industrial relations 
climate was better than in the past and management's approach 
definitely improving, some managers still adopted behaviour 
which created unnecessary industrial problems. It was claimed 
these managers were creating an "air of suspicion". The 
representatives felt unable to trust management generally 
because they never really knew what some managers wanted or 
were trying to do: 
It would be nice to be able to Just go to a meeting, and put your 
cards straight on the table and know that management is doing 
exactly the same. You know it would Just save so much time and 
so many problems. 
One union representative argued that industrial relations had 
deteriorated. A large part of the reason for this, he argued, was 
the existence of exceedingly bad lines of formal communications 
throughout the organisation. Quoting him: 
Like one of the things that I have noticed within Telecom is that 
communication is hopeless and yet on the grape vine you find out 
within a day and then you might get a piece of paper coming 
through the system that is two or three months old. 
More specifically, he claimed that local industrial relations was, 
when compared to that at the national level, very poor. This 
delegate consistently argued that his relationship with more 
senior levels of management outside the district was far more 
consensual than his relationship with local managers. The major 
cause of this he argued was that the local managers lacked 
industrial relations skills. 
As with managers and supervisors, union representatives strongly 
identified imcertainty and the continuous process of change going 
on in the organisation as a major source of potential problems. All 
claimed that morale was low because of insecurities about the 
future. As the following quote reveals, many people saw no future 
in the organisation and were looking for ways to get out: 
Fred said to meJ'l'm thinking of getting out very shortly, I cant see 
any Juture for us". He says "ten years Telecom wtil be lucky to be 
here". Everyone is ux)rried, and the common thing is that Telecom 
won't be here in ten years time. 
The other threat to industrial relations according to a number of 
union representatives was changes at the top of the organisation. 
At the time of the interviews, a senior level manager in the 
organisation had been recently replaced by a new manager 
recruited overseas. The imion representatives were very 
suspicious about this development claiming that the "Canadian" 
(he was rarely referred to by name) was brought in to take the 
unions on and break theml^: 
Yes he is taking us on, thofs why they got him over here. 
Canadians, they are no different from the bloody Yanks. They have 
cdl got the same bloody view. You've come when its nice and quite. 
I reckon if you come back in twelve months, if this bloke isn't 
shifted out of the way, you will find things starting to turn bad 
again. 
On the issue of union coverage, representatives claimed that the 
amalgamation of the APTU and ATEA/ATPOA was inevitable. In 
addition, they argued that it was an important and very valuable 
development. However, most indicated that the amalgamation 
process would not be easy. Some argued that the extreme rivalry 
between the two unions and the chauvinistic attitudes of some 
The "Canadian" was one among many overseas managers brought in at the senior level of the organisation. 
Employees tended to view these people suspiciously, believing they were henchman intent on destroying the 
organisation. 
sections of the membership would cause difficulties. Others 
claimed that the two tmions had different ways of operating which 
made them incompatible. Quoting an ATEA representative: 
There is a lot of differences within the two wiions. Ows is a totally 
democratic wiiorL If it comes down to a decision, which is going to 
be a charge of policy or a new wage system or a new 
superannuation scheme, the decision has to go to a mass meeting. 
With the APTU the executive makes the decision and then they 
might put it to the members or they might not: it doesn't really 
matter. You are talking to a centralised body making decisions for 
30,000 members or something. 
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN RURAL COMBIUNITIES 
As the above discussion indicates, the overall orientation of the 
interviews was towards establishing a broad imderstanding and 
impression of the issues affecting the character of industrial 
relations within the organisation at regional or local levels. 
However, part of each interview was also focused on 
distinguishing the differences between industrial relations in 
rural and urban environments. The reason for this relates to 
location of this study. The events being studied took place within 
a rural context. It is important, therefore, to establish not only the 
character of industrial relations in the organisation generally, but 
also whether industrial relations within Telecom in rural areas 
has its own unique character. 
Ill 
In terms of the issues discussed above, managers, supervisors 
and union representatives in Wagga Wagga responded in pretty 
much the same way as their counterparts in WoUongong. The 
dominant argument that industrial relations was good and 
improving; that unions had a vital role to play despite political 
machinations; that amalgamation of the ATEA/ATPOA and the 
AFTU was vital but difficult; and that the largest potential 
problem related to imcertainty and consequent low morale was 
shared by interviewees across the two regions. Despite this, a 
number of the managers, supervisors, and union representatives 
interviewed had had recent experience in both districts or in rural 
and urban areas and they indicated strongly that there were real 
differences. These people were asked to discuss the differences 
and put forward possible explanations. 
The dominant argument was that industrial relations in rural 
areas was far less conflictual, that imionism was weaker, and 
that employees were generally less militant. All people interviewed 
made this claim with one partial exception: one manager argued 
that, although rural people were less militant and industrial 
relations less problematic in rural areas, rural workers when 
involved in a dispute could fight Just as hard and long as their 
urban colleagues. 
The reasons put forward for the difference were varied, but in 
broad terms could be divided into two general themes. One set of 
arguments related to the comparatively weaker economic and 
political power of people working in rural communities, while 
Other arguments had to do with the perceived character and 
nature of daily life in country towns. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, arguments of the first type were 
predominantly put by union representatives. It was argued that 
people in rural commimities tended to be trapped in a fairly weak 
labour market. Rural communities offered few good employment 
opportunities and, therefore, once in a Job workers tended to be 
reluctant to Jeopardise their positions by engaging in industrial 
conflict. On the other hand people in urban areas, it was argued, 
tended to have more options for emplojnnent and, thus, were 
more willing to be industrially active. Further to this, it was 
argued that the relatively small numbers of workers in rural 
workplaces meant that they were more easily controlled and 
influenced by management than their urban coimterparts who, 
particularly in places such as WoUongong, were surrounded by a 
strong imion movement and industrial culture. Finally, it was 
argued, that workers in rural communities lacked the industrial 
muscle of urban workers because of their poor strategic position. 
This argimient was put most clearly by a manager who said: 
In the metro they have got more power, you know, you have got a 
huge telephone exchange like Pitt Street- largest telephone 
exchange in Australia, You have got huge industrial power. Why 
does it reoRy matter in the big world if a place like Tumut exchange 
goes off the air because of industrial problems- not that it would-
but it doesn't reaRy matter in the big picture. It matters to the 
Tumut people. But does it matter nationolly? I don't think it does. 
Arguments that related to the character and nature of daily life in 
rural communities seemed to be more popular amongst 
supervisors and managers^ 1. It was argued that the quality of life 
in rural commimities was far better than that which existed in 
the city and this meant workers were more satisfied and less 
concerned about industrial conditions and less willing to engage 
in industrial action. As the following quote indicates, to most 
interviewees a 'better quality of life' meant a slower or less intense 
pace of work and business activity: 
Sydney, I wouldn't like to live there, I could think of nothing worse. 
The few times I go up there on courses you turn around and have 
to get up at bloody five o'clock in the morning. Like I am up at five 
anyway, but I'll turn around, I'll meander through the house and 
you know, have a cup of tea and feed the cat, and read a bit or 
something like that. But if I was in the city, I would have to race for 
the train. Then, you know, you are in there aR bloody day in the 
same environment and you come out and you are Just glad to get 
away, but you leave in the dark and you get home in the dark. 
The quality of life argument was a common one, but perhaps the 
most common argument was based on the notion that rural 
communities are smaller and far more close knit than urban 
commimities. Virtually every person interviewed argued that in 
rural communities, because of their size, you were far more 
visible as an employee, and, indeed, representative, of Telecom 
Australia than were people who work for the organisation in 
^ ̂ It must be said that some of these argumorits portraved rural life m highly romanticised and idealistic terms. 
urban areas. That is, you are more likely to meet and socialise 
with customers outside of work and, thus, more likely to have to 
take you Job home with you and face comments and criticisms 
about the organisation. This meant, it was argued, that rural 
Telecom workers had a greater incentive, or were put under more 
pressure to perform. As one supervisor put it: 
We live with our customers. Now I have got to go home from here. I 
go and have a beer at the pub, they (the other drinkers) are all my 
customers and they all know where I work, I might seR them a 
phone, they might ask me to do something about their phone or 
something else. So, you are dealing with your customers all the 
time. It makes you realise that you have got to do your Job well or 
make sure its done well for you. 
These strong community linkages and pressures, it was argued, 
had an influence on industrial relations: people were far less 
willing to engage in industrial action both because they didn't 
want to inconvenience their friends and acquaintances and 
because they wished to avoid derision and anger from other 
members of their community. 
Summarising the above, the overall impression from the 
interviews was that industrial relations in rural communities is 
less problematic for a range of social and economic reasons. 
However, given that the impressions held by unionists, managers, 
and supervisors of industrial relations in their region did not vary 
to any substantial degree between interviewees in Wollongong and 
Wagga Wagga it is tempting to play down the claim. That is, to a 
certain extent the claim that industrial relations in the country 
was more consensual than in urban areas was in contradiction 
with the fact that interviewees regardless of where they came from 
tended to make similar statements about the general nature of 
industrial relations in their own district. But, the similarities may 
be coincidental. Perhaps, at other times or in other contexts the 
differences may manifest in different levels of industrial conflict. 
In addition, the perceptions were so strong that to deny the 
claims would be to ignore a possibly powerful influence in its own 
right: people may come to act in accord with their own visions 
and beliefs. The issue needs further investigation and, as a result, 
will be addressed again briefly in the concluding chapter of this 
thesis. 
CONCLUSION 
The previous sections illustrate that in general industrial 
relations within Telecom has been more consensual in the last 
eight years than it was in the early 70s and 80s. This is despite 
the fact that the organisation has undergone extensive changes 
and faces a very imcertain future. It can, perhaps, be tentatively 
concluded that the main reason for this was the change in 
managerial style and the orientation towards a decentralisation of 
decision making in the organisation. In the last chapter MuUer 
(1980) was identified as claiming that with the vesting of the 
Telecom, management became aggressive and decision making 
more centralised. This, it was argued, led to a more conflictual 
industrial relations pattern. As the IRC cases indicate and the 
interviews demonstrate, the trend in more recent times has been 
towards a more decentralised approach to decision making with 
management playing a far less autocratic role and adopting far 
more communicative and conciliatory strategies towards 
industrial relations and the management of their employees. 
The general industrial relations climate discussed above and the 
reforms described earlier form the context within which the 
industrial relations activities in the Riverina region took place. 
More specifically, the overall reform process, with its efficiency 
orientation, is the driving force behind the changes that have 
occurred in the Telecom-Riverina district. That is, they are what 
lies behind the attempts to improve the efficiency of the district. 
In the following chapters the details of the specific reforms, their 
implementation and consequences in the Riverina district are 
described. 
CHAPTER 5 - THE AIMLALGAMATION STRATEGY AND INDUSTRIAL 
RELATIONS IN NARRANDERA 
INTRODUCTION 
In the last two chapters a historical overview of Telecom Australia 
and a description of industrial relations within the organisation 
since 1975 was provided. Specifically, in Chapter 3 a selective 
summary of major events and important structural and 
operational changes was presented. In Chapter 4 the broad 
character or climate of industrial relations within the organisation 
was described. As stated at the beginning of Chapter 3, the aim of 
the chapters was to provide a background to the events that have 
occurred in the Riverina region of Telecom over the past 4 years. 
The major conclusion that can be drawn from these two chapters 
is that industrial relations in the last few years has been 
consensual when compared with the experience of the early 
1980's. This is despite the existence of extensive change, 
imcertainties in the future and very low staff morale in the 
organisation. The reason for this change, it was hypothesised, is 
related to a change in managerial style. There has been a move 
away from an antagonistic approach toward a more open and 
communicative style and more decentralised decision making 
processes. 
In this chapter the focus is narrowed considerably to 
developments since 1987 in the Riverina - Murray District of 
Telecom. Specifically, the emphasis will be upon a description of 
the progress of a particular managerial strategy: the 
amalgamation of the Narrandera and Wagga Wagga districts, and 
the effect of this strategy upon the character of industrial 
relations within the Narrandera office. This chapter has two aims. 
First, it will enable a further examination, at a local level, of the 
claim that industrial relations has become more consensual and 
management less antagonistic. Second, and more importantly for 
this thesis, the chapter will aid and lead into an analysis of the 
concept of 'managerial strategy' discussed in Chapter 2. 
Data for this and the next chapter was collected during late 1990 
and early 1991 in interviews with Telecom managers, supervisors, 
clerical staff and union delegates located in the Narrandera and 
Wagga Wagga offices and the regional head office at Burwood. 
Twenty-five people were interviewed: 12 managers, 4 Junior 
managers/supervisors, 4 union delegates and 5 clerical 
employees. Interviews ran for between 1.5 and 3 hours in 
duration and were aimed at establishing a clear picture of 
activity in the Riverina - District. A particular emphasis in the 
interviews was put on establishing the influences on and the 
impacts of the amalgamation strategy as well as how it was 
developed and progressed. 
In addition to the interviews, data was collected from the local 
Narrandera newspaper. The Narrandera Argus, and from Telecom 
annual reports. 
^^ Many inteiviews were conducted over two sessions of around 1.5 hours eacL 
NARRANDBRA. 
Narrandera township is located on the Mumimbidgee River about 
100 kilometres west of Wagga Wagga; equidistant from Sydney, 
Melbourne and Adelaide. The town is on the outskirts of the 
Mumimbidgee Irrigation Area and serves the farmers in the 
region who are mainly involved in the production of wheat and 
wool (Narrandera Chamber of Commerce, 1965). 
The township was officially gazetted on the 28th of April 1863. 
The dominant activity in the new town was to serve the needs of 
stock owners who used a punt to move their stock across the 
Murrumbidgee River. In 1881 the railway reached the town and, 
as a result, the population increased and commercial activity 
began to grow and diversify. At the turn of the century the 
population of the town was 2255 people. In September 1902 a 
telephone exchange opened and by 1910 seventy-four subscribers 
were connected. In 1908 the town was given an additional boost 
with the building of channels for the Murrumbidgee Irrigation 
Area. By 1924 Narrandera had a population of more than 10,000 
inhabitants. (GamLmage,B. 1986) 
However, from the mid 1920s onwards the town went into 
decline. By 1933 the population had fallen by 4329 people and 
economic decline has continued ever since; particularly over the 
last thirty years: 
The 1961 - 81 town population was static - officially it rose 6.3%, or 
by 295 people, but 244 of these were Aborigines not counted in 
1961 - and the 1961 - 85 Shire population outside Narranderafell 
by about 27%, from 3720 to an estimated 2400, By 1981 94% of 
townspeople were Australian bom, compared with 78% nationally, 
and 18.8% were over 60 compared with 13.9 % nationally. 
Narrondera was becoming a retirement towru After 1935 
residential areas grew, but by 1984 the number of businesses had 
fallen by about 25%, and there were fewer larger businesses than 
in 1935. The town's largest employers, the railways, the council, 
the Ex-Servicemen's Club, were all service related, there were 
empty shops in East street, and the town's average income was 
well below the national average in 1981. Although unemployment 
was about the national average in 1981, 35.9% of employed 
townspeople worked for government, compared with a national 
average of 24.3%. Narrandera was being propped up by service 
industries, many funded from the outside. (Gammage, B. 1986, 
pl84) 
According to the Australian Bureau of Statistics, in 1981 the 
population of the town was 7548. This had decreased to 7386 by 
1986 (The Narrandera Argus, 7/10/87). Population figures since 
1986 are not available but it can, perhaps, be assumed that the 
decline has continued. In fact, it could be reasonably assumed 
that the pace of decline has quickened. This is because, starting 
jfrom around the beginning of 1988, the 'propping up' mentioned 
in the above quote has been progressively withdrawn. 
In the last four years nearly all the federal and state government 
departments and services in the town have been rationalised. 
During the period 1987 to 1991, 165 government positions were 
lost from the town. The positions had been in organisations with 
a long history in Narrandera such as the State Rail Authority, the 
Grain Handling Authority, the Department of Business and 
Consumer Affairs, the Education Department, and Medicare. 
Some rationalisations involved reductions in staff members, but a 
continued service in the town. However, a significant number of 
staff cuts were as a result of a complete closure of operations. For 
example, the State Rail Authority closed the Narrandera station 
and branch lines, and Medicare shut down its local office. The 
Grain Handling Authority and the Department of Business and 
Consumer Affairs also closed their offices in Narrandera and 
added salt to the wounds by moving operations to Wagga Wagga 
(Narrandera Argus, 6/10/88) 
It is against this backdrop that the activity at the Narrandera 
office of Telecom, described below, must be understood. 
Narrandera's long term decline means that any new threat to the 
reducing pool of Jobs creates great hostility within the 
community. The effects of this hostility on Telecom management's 
strategy to amalgamate the Narrandera and Wagga Wagga 
districts will be discussed in the next chapter. In the rest of this 
chapter the progress and industrial relations impact of the 
amalgamation strategy will be discussed. 
^^ There is intense rivalry between Narrandera and Wagga Wagga. People living and working in Narrandera are intensly 
suspicious about, and appear to resent, the growth of Wagga Wagga which is now the largest non coastal tovm (city) in 
NSW. 
DIVISIONALISATION 
Before July 1988, Telecom Australia was structured on a state by 
state basis with the corporate head office of the organisation 
located in Victoria. Each state office was responsible for all 
operations within its own geographical boundaries. The NSW 
state office in Sydney oversaw 15 districts; one of which was 
Narrandera. The Narrandera district extended west from the 
township out to Ivanhoe and Balranald in western NSW (ATC, 
1988). 
In July 1988, following nearly six months of negotiations between 
senior management and the major unions, the structure of 
Telecom was radically changed. The state based structure of the 
organisation was replaced by five separate 'customer divisions': 
Corporate Customer Division; Metropolitan Division; Country 
Division; Special Business Products Division; and Broadcasting 
Division. In addition, a Corporate Centre, and four 'shared 
resource units': Network Engineering; Information Systems; 
Research; and Services group were created (ATC, 1989). 
The rationale behind the change, it was argued, was to make the 
organisation a more market oriented, customer based enterprise. 
This would enable it to meet the challenge of deregulation by 
focusing on the "dual imperatives of financial success and service 
quality" (ATC, 1988 pl2). 
The new structure crossed state boundaries and was claimed to 
be designed to meet the needs of the organisation's different types 
of customers. Thus for example, the Corporate Customer Division 
was designed to meet the specific need of Australian business, 
while the Metropolitan Division was oriented towards the needs of 
residential customers in suburban Australia. The role of the 
Corporate Centre was to provide advice to the managing director 
and to monitor business performance; the "shared resource units" 
would provide support to the five operating divisions and the 
Corporate Centre. The Country Division, as the name suggests, 
was "established to meet the needs of country customers whose 
business or place of residence is beyond the metropolitan areas" 
(ATC, 1988 p55). 
The head office of the Country Division was set up in Brisbane: in 
order, it was claimed, to be closer to the customers it was 
designed to serve Below the head ofiice level the Division was 
divided into seven regions: NSW North; NSW South; Victoria; 
Tasmania; Queensland; South Australia and Northern Territory; 
and Western Australia. The Narrandera and Wagga Wagga 
districts were incorporated into the NSW South Region along with 
Bathurst, Goulboum, WoUongong, Campbelltown, and Canberra. 
^̂  The location of the head office, perhaps, had more to do with the fact the new general manager of the Division had 
been the Queensland State Manager. 
AMALGAIMLATION 
In the 1988 Annual Report pressures for change that would have 
a significant impact upon the Narrandera and Wagga Wagga 
districts were flagged: 
While revenue per service is comparable (in the country) with that 
of the metropolttan services, expenses are considerably greater. 
High on the list of priorities then wiU be measures to contain the 
costs of both providing and maintaining services, particularly in the 
rural and remote areas. Maximum use will be made of available 
technology to help achieve this aim and attention wûl be given to 
management structures and stcff deployment (ATC, 1988 p55) 
In line with this statement, senior management in Country 
Division put pressure on management in regional head offices to 
develop strategies that would improve productivity and efficiency. 
This pressure basically took the form of directives to regional 
management to find ways of rationalising functions. Divisional 
management did not stipulate how this should be done. Rather, 
in line with the moves to decentralise decision making, discussed 
in the last two chapters, they devolved responsibility for the 
formulation and implementation of an appropriate strategy to 
regional management. Managers in the new head office of the 
South West Region, decided to meet these pressures by 
amalgamating districts. This strategy, it was thought, would 
increase efficiency and productivity because it would allow a 
rationalisation of district management positions and 
administration functions such as human resource management 
and finance. As one regional manager put it: 
..with divisionalisation we looked at what we had inherited as a 
region: we had eight districts plus another branch of construction 
workers, that s nine branches. We had to ask owselves if we could 
sustain that level of management or whether we could reduce some 
of that overhead component and some of the layers of 
administration. (With amalgamation)..! suppose our aim was to 
minimise that amount of overhead component and, with that, aR 
the hidden positions that seem to float around. 
Once regional management had decided to amalgamate districts a 
strategy was developed to enable the determination and 
implementation of a new South West Region structure. The 
strategy involved two separate but interrelated processes. First, 
the regional board, which was composed of aU district managers, 
was asked to review the district boundaries. They were asked to 
determine whether existing boimdaries were suitable under the 
new divisional structure and whether it was possible to alter 
boundaries. In order to help this process, district managers in 
geographically close districts were asked to investigate their 
boimdaries as part of a team exercise. In this regard, the district 
managers firom Wagga and Narrandera were put together in one 
team. 
Second, regional management established working parties who 
were sent to each district to analyse operations. Hieir brief was to 
determine where community of interests existed and to work out 
how many of the eight districts could be effectively amalgamated. 
On completion of their studies the working parties put forward 
their recommendations to regional management. With regard to 
the Narrandera and Wagga districts, they recommended 
amalgamation and the creation of one centre of administration. 
They also recommended that one manager should be put in 
charge of the district. 
The recommendations of the working parties on amalgamation 
were backed up by the district manager teams. Their discussion 
had led to many district managers deciding that the 
amalgamation of some districts was important. For example, the 
Wagga district manager became aware of proposals, originating 
from the Victoria Country Region, for a transfer of control of a 
switching area located in the south of the Narrandera district to 
the North Eastern District of the Victoria Region. This transfer 
would result in the Narrandera district loosing around 7,500 or 
about one quarter of its subscribers and would, thus, mean a 
thirty per cent reduction in the workload at the Narrandera 
District office. 
This led the Wagga Wagga district manager to put a proposal to 
regional management, and the board of district managers, 
suggesting a merger between the Wagga Wagga and Narrandera 
districts. His proposal, developed in consultation with the Wagga 
Wagga management group, went in to the management structure 
of an amalgamated district and to the timing of the 
amalgamation. The Narrandera manager, he argued, was due for 
retirement in the near future and that would be an ideal time for 
an amalgamation of the two districts with the headquarters 
located in Wagga Wagga. 
In January 1989 regional management decided to amalgamate 
the Canberra and Goulbum districts, the Bathurst and Dubbo 
districts, the WoUongong and Nowra districts, and the Narrandera 
and Wagga Wagga districts. In making these decisions, regional 
management decided not to determine where the new district 
head quarters would be. Quoting a regional manager who was 
involved in the decision to set up a new combined Wagga -
Narrandera (Riverina Murray) district: 
We recommended that there be a centre for administration, that 
there he one manager in charge and there be a rationalisation in 
the number of managers. We didn't say where that manager 
should be located. He could be located at Narrandera or he could 
be located at Wagga or even down in Albury because he was 
controlling a group of supervisors or managers within the overall 
geographic area So we deliberately didn't say where the 
manager's office was going to be. 
This manager stated that the decision about where the new head 
office would be was to be left to the discretion of the the District 
Manager for the new combined district. In this respect, regional 
management decided to advertise all the district manager jobs 
and leave the decision about location for the successful applicant. 
As part of their amalgamation strategy, during the process of 
deciding which districts would be merged, regional management 
had discussions with Telecom staff associations and with 
representatives of local coimcils. The discussions covered a broad 
range of issues including new regional organisation structures, 
the likely impact on technical workers and clerical functions, how 
affected staff were to be treated, and what would happen to the 
managers whose positions were abolished. These discussions led 
to in-principle agreement from the staff associations on the 
amalgamation of districts. In addition, the staff associations 
agreed to the setting up of working parties which would address 
the rationalisation of administration and customer services 
functions in the new amalgamated districts. Regional 
management agreed that no affected employees were to be forced 
to transfer or be retrenched. 
In discussions with local councils, regional management gave 
undertakings that Telecom would ensure a continued presence in 
the affected communities. What the concept of "presence" actually 
meant, however, was left somewhat ambiguous. As one regional 
manager suggested: 
And, of course, a lot of discussion took place on what those words 
(presence in the community) meant. They wanted an undertaking 
that we would never close Bathurst, Goulbum or Narrandera: that 
they wUl stay there as a distinct entity. So we had to deal with 
their concerns. We couldn't move away from where we were 
heading but you had to accommodate the people by coming up with 
the right form of words. So the appropriate words got used, which 
gave them a life raft, but whether it was tied up to a moving ship or 
a dock, they didn't know. 
The agreements were presented to the new district managers as 
frameworks for progressing the amalgamation of their districts. 
In-principle agreement had been reached for the amalgamations 
and the consequent rationalisation of managers and clerical staff. 
The district managers were given the discretion to determine 
where they would locate their headquarters, and which 
management positions they would keep. They were also given the 
responsibility for deciding who would fill the remaining 
management positions, and what rationalisations they would 
pursue in the clerical administration and customer services 
areas. In addition, as part of their brief the new regional 
managers were required to start smoothing over or healing the 
wounds and bringing the staff in the two old districts together. 
The time firame, set by Regional management, within which this 
process was to be completed was three months. 
In the Riverina - Murray district this dead-line was not met. As 
the following describes, the amalgamation of the districts became 
a very drawn out process that was never reaUy completed 
satisfactorily. In April 1991 a new structure was introduced that 
superseded the district structure and left the amalgamation 
strategy incomplete. 
The old Wagga Wagga district manager was appointed as the new 
Riverina - Murray district manager at the beginning of May 1989. 
He had been a reluctant applicant for the position. In fact, he had 
to be persuaded by regional management to apply and was 
selected from a large field of applicants including the old 
Narrandera manager. The old Narrandera district manager 
subsequently retired at the beginning of July 1989. 
Following his appointment, the District Manager advised that his 
first priority was to look at the structure of functional managers 
(the management level immediately below the district manager 
level) in the new district and to make appointments to positions 
that would cover the whole district. In stating this, he was quoted 
in the local Narrandera newspaper. The Narrandera Argus, as 
indicating that he did not envisage any radical changes: 
No sweeping changes were anticipated as a result of the 
restructuring of district management and basically the manager's 
roles would be the same as previously with a few added 
responsibilities such as dealing with budgets and making some 
decisions without the need to take them to the District 
Management. (The Narrandera Argus, 30/589) 
At this stage the new district manager evidently did not envisage 
a wholesale rationalisation of management positions. The major 
change he foresaw, was the removal of the old Narrandera district 
manager position: 
..it was Just a matter of removing [the old Narrandera manager], 
who was prepared to retire, and then putting the district under one 
management, giving it a new name, and leave the management 
structure underneath, everyone was to retain their Jobs, 
Prior to the amalgamation, the Narrandera district had fifty five 
staff working in the district head office. Five of these were 
managers: the district manager: one internal plant and one 
external plant manager: a customer services manager and an 
administration manager. In the Wagga Wagga district these 
positions were duplicated. Below the functional manager position 
there were several first line management positions in each 
district. The initial stages of the amalgamation saw the new 
district manager identify eight managerial positions as being 
surplus to requirement: the district manager Narrandera, three 
functional manager positions, two district financial coordinators, 
one senior personnel officer and one operations analysis position. 
The impact of these changes on Narrandera management, the 
new district manager claimed, would be the loss of two fimctional 
manager positions and their replacement with a more senior 
management position: 
In effect Narrandera wiü be losing two managerial positions due to 
the combination of the Customer Services and Administration 
Managers' positions, and in their place would gain the Commercial 
Manager, who would control both these areas as well as financial 
procedures and stores. (The Narrandera Argus, June 22, 1989) 
In addition, he stated that two new district positions: Finance 
Manager and Staff Relations Manager, would be established. One 
or both of these new positions, he stated, could be located in 
Narrandera. 
At the beginning of July 1989, the Riverina-Murray District 
Manager announced that appointments had been made to the 
Staff Relations and Finance Manager positions. He also 
announced that the successful applicants had come from Wagga 
and that the new positions would be located in Wagga. In 
addition, during July 1989 the old Narrandera district 
Administration Manager was appointed as the Commercial 
Manager of the Narrandera office. The old district Customer 
Services Manager subsequentiy retired in September 1989. 
Thus, as a result of the amalgamation by July 1989 the new 
district had one District Manager and six functional management 
positions; a Commercial Manager at Wagga Wagga and 
Narrandera; and four external and internal plant management 
positions renamed as Operations Manager (Service) Narrandera, 
Operations Manager (Service) Wagga Wagga, and Operations 
Manager (Network) Narrandera and Operations Manager 
(Network) Wagga Wagga. The Finance Manager and Staff 
Relations Manager positions were located at one level below 
functional management. 
However, this structure did not exist for very long. According to 
the District Manager, it became clear over the following months 
that more functional management positions could be rationalised. 
He argued that the district didn't need the same number of 
managers under a combined structure as existed when the two 
separate districts existed. The drive to extend the rationalisation, 
he argued, was logical and necessary. Thus, a second phase of 
rationalisation commenced which involved the cutting out of two 
more functional management positions. 
In February 1990 the Riverina-Murray District Manager was 
forced to resign from the organisation for unspecified reasons. His 
position was temporarily filled by a manager from the Canberra 
district. 
In early April 1990 the temporary district manager announced 
that the Operations Manager (Services) Narrandera and 
Operations Manager (Services) Wagga Wagga positions were to be 
combined into one district wide position entitled District 
Operations Manager (Services). The position, which was 
subsequently filled by an applicant from another rural district, 
was to be located in Wagga Wagga. The old Wagga Wagga 
Operations Manager (Services) had previously transferred to 
another district while the old Narrandera manager was moved 
sideways to a daily operational position. 
During May 1990, the two Commercial Manager positions were 
amalgamated. The Wagga Wagga Commercial Manager was 
appointed to the new district wide position; the Narrandera 
Commercial Manager was appointed as Office Manager 
(Administration) Narrandera and a new position; Office Manager 
(Customer Services) Narrandera, was created. The office manager 
positions were non-fimctional management positions reporting to 
the new District Commercial Manager. Thus, the Narrandera 
Commercial Manager was effectively demoted. Possibly because of 
this, following his appointment to the office manager position he 
took a redundancy package and left the organisation. 
In June 1990 a regional level manager was appointed as the new 
permanent Riverina District Manager. He inherited a district 
where all but one of the functional level managers were located in 
Wagga Wagga. The Management structure at the Narrandera 
office had been reduced to one functional manager: Operations 
Manager (Network) Narrandera, the Office Manager (Customer 
Services) plus a number of supervisory positions. The Office 
Manager (Administration) position was left vacant after the 
departure of the Narrandera commercial manager. 
In the next phase of the amalgamation process the new District 
Manager shifted his attention from the management structure to 
the clerical levels of the district. 
Around the end of August 1989, five vacant permanent customer 
services positions at the Narrandera office were filled by 
temporary staff employed on month-to-month contracts. In July 
1990 the new District Manager and Commercial Manager decided 
to push the rationalisation process further by not renewing the 
contracts for the five temporary staff beyond the middle of August 
1990. According to the Commercial Manager, the five had 
originally been appointed to allow an easy transition to new local 
clerical structures associated with the implementation of the 
clerical integration package (agreed to under the 1988 Award 
Restructuring process discussed in Chapter 4). He argued that 
the positions could not be Justified over the long term. Narrandera 
had a smaller staff to customer ratio than Wagga and Albury and 
retention of the positions was, therefore, not economically 
rational. Quoting him: 
I mean the sort of numbers for Albury were something like 28 staff 
and 40,000 customers and similar sorts of figures at Wagga. At 
Narrandera they had 25 people rwining only 30,000 customers 
and a whole lot less turnover as well It is a dead sort of area over 
there and it would be obvious to Blind Freddy that they needed to 
get rid of people. 
Further, the Commercial Manager stated that the timing of the 
terminations was driven by award provisions which provided for 
the automatic conversion of temporary employment to 
permanency after 12 months continuous service. 
The reaction of Narrandera clerical staff to the decision was 
hostile and involved industrial action (discussed further in the 
second half of this chapter). As a result, the implementation of 
the proposal involved a series of negotiations between district 
management and local union delegates. FuriJier discussions took 
place between management at the regional level in Burwood and 
full time officials of the Public Service Union. The outcome of 
these discussions was that two of the five temporary employees 
were provided with 18 hours part time work each per week. It was 
also agreed that the possibility of the two people being given full 
time permanent work would be investigated after six weeks when 
it was imderstood that a number of full time employees were 
scheduled to retire. 
Following the six week period and a review of the staffing 
situation, both part-timers were reinstated: one in a position 
vacated by a retiring employee. The overall result, therefore, was a 
reduction in four positions. 
The next stage in the amalgamation process involved the 
rationalisation of clerical administration fimctions within the new 
district. Before the amalgamation, both districts had clerical 
areas which looked after the administration of personnel and pay 
records and works and costing functions. Following the start of 
the amalgamation process, the administration areas continued to 
exist and function as separate areas. Despite being flagged as 
areas needing rationalisation in the original agreement between 
regional level management and the unions (struck during the first 
half of 1989), as of May 1990, fifteen people were still located in 
the Narrandera office administration area and seventeen in the 
Wagga office In addition, each section was still run by a Junior 
management position below which were several supervisory 
positions. 
However, on his appointment the temporary district manager 
decided to push for an amalgamation and rationalisation of the 
two administration areas. Separate administration areas, it was 
argued, could not be allowed to continue because they created 
inefficiencies and potential discrepancies in the way employees 
were remunerated and handled. As one fimctional manager 
argued: 
We have in Narrandera and in Wagga personnel sections that look 
after the welfare of the staff, whether it be leave or whatever. Now 
aR of owr employees whether they work out of Narrandera or 
Wagga their detaUs are on PERKINS the data base. There is no 
reason, therefore, why administration has to be done at 
Narrandera, because it can be done just as easily at Wagga They 
could do the whole lot from one centre. Thus, you would have Just 
one area controUing the clerical activities associated with the day 
to day work of the field staff. Also with only one area there would 
only be one interpretation of particular guidelines. We have had 
trouble at Narrandera with administration people adhering to what 
they beUeve to be the letter of the award; whereas the people in 
Wagga interpreted it in a completely different way. So you had two 
different interpretations within the one district. 
^^ Administration functions for the Albury office had been handled by Wagga Wagga prior to the decision to 
amalgamate districts. 
In slightly more direct terms, the Commercial Manager argued: 
The adwinistration group is a support group to management; most 
of management is at Wagga and is going to remain that way, 
therefore, the support group should be at Wagga and that is what 
we should be working towards. 
In line with the District Manager's decision, in May 1990 the 
Commercial Manager devised a strategy aimed at the long term 
transfer of all administrative fimctions from Narrandera to Wagga 
Wagga. District management's ideal option would have been to 
transfer all the functions over in one quick move; however, this 
was not seen to be a realistic first step: 
(We decided) that we would tolerate a certain amount ofoutposting 
at Narrandera in order not to upset individuals too much there. We 
obviously tried not to do it in one hit because that would create a 
lot of turmoil for the people over there. So, those that are interested 
and committed over there we wUl probably give them the 
opportunity to continue; with some disadvantage to us really 
because option one would have been to shift the whole bloody 
thing over here to Wagga and get the structure up and running 
under one person and probably not have anything else. 
In line with the original 1989 agreement between Regional 
management and the unions on the amalgamation process, at the 
end of May 1990 the District and Commercial manager 
established a working party. The working party was to be 
composed of employees drawn from tJie Narrandera and Wagga 
Wagga offices. Its terms of reference were to come up with 
recomimendations on how to most efficiently structure 
administrative functions within the amalgamated district and to 
investigate the potential for rationalisation of the customer 
services area. 
After several months of deliberation, the working party 
recommended that staffing levels in the customer services area in 
both the Wagga Wagga and Narrandera offices should remain as 
they were. Further, they suggested that the structure of the areas 
should be left to each office to review. They recommended that no 
rationalisation of the administration functions should take place, 
but it was suggested that administration duties could be shared 
more equitably between the offices. This could be achieved, the 
working party claimed, by transferring work to the Narrandera 
office. 
The working parties recommendations were clearly not in line 
with those hoped for by the new District Manager, nor the 
Commercial Manager. As a result, following receipt of the working 
parties recommendations, the Commercial Manager developed his 
own proposals for a re-structured administration area. His 
proposals provided for a rationalisation of the administration 
function. 
In September 1990 this proposal was put to a new representative 
group of staff from both the Narrandera and Wagga offices who 
undertook to discuss the proposal with other employees back at 
the workplace. The representatives returned with a range of 
suggested modifications only a few of which district management 
agreed to. As a result, it was decided that the proposal would be 
put to a vote of employees via the state branch of the Public 
Service Union. 
At the beginning of November 1990 the Commercial Manager sent 
a revised version of the proposed structure to the PSU 
accompanied by a letter indicating that the proposal took into 
account, as far as practicable, the concerns raised by staff. In the 
letter the Commercial Manager also highlighted the importance of 
having the new structure implemented as soon as possible. 
The structure proposed by the Commercial Manager envisaged a 
full integration of the administration function under the control of 
one Junior management position (Administration Officer). The 
Administration Officer was to be located in Wagga Wagga and 
would be responsible to the Commercial Manager. Administration 
functions would continue at Narrandera over the short term and 
would be overseen by a supervisory position reporting to the 
Administration Officer. The work of the Narrandera section, it was 
proposed, would not be discrete but an integral part of the 
administration workload for the whole district. 
In the short term, the impact of the proposal on staffing levels for 
the whole district was identified as a reduction by five positions, 
all of which were located in the Narrandera office. In addition, it 
was proposed that three other positions would be transferred to 
Wagga Wagga. This would leave a total of seven administration 
staff located at the Narrandera office. 
Within the proposal it was clearly stated that over the long term 
all administration fimctions at Narrandera were to be phased out: 
It is part of the longer term strategy that all admin Junctions would 
be performed by one group based in Wagga. Positions which 
become vacant at Narrandera would, therefore, be transferred to 
Wagga and physically filed at that centre provided that they 
continue to be Justified based on workload, (Commercial Manager, 
9/11/90) 
On receiving the proposal, the state office of the PSU did not 
organise a ballot but, instead, passed it on to the Wagga and 
Narrandera staff seeking an expression of their concerns. The 
concerns of both Narrandera and Wagga Wagga staff were 
received by the imion at the beginning of December and 
immediately passed back to Wagga Wagga management. The 
concerns raised by Narrandera staff went, amongst other things, 
to training and leave coverage issues, timing of the movement of 
all administration functions to Wagga Wagga and a demand for 
reinforcement of commitments by management to no forced 
relocations or transfers. In addition, they said that: 
(PSU) members wiR not consider accepting the proposal until 
proper duty statements for aR positions and spare officers are 
clearly defined in writing, (Narrandera employees, 7/12/90) 
Wagga Wagga staff also indicated considerable dissatisfaction 
with the proposal: mainly with regard to the Junior management 
administration of&cer position. They argued that two Junior 
management positions should be created, one responsible for 
human resource management functions and the other for finance. 
District management responded to the staff concerns in a letter to 
the NSW Branch of the PSU half way through January 1991. In 
the letter the Commercial Manager explained that only one Jimior 
manager was required because of the long term strategy to 
relocate all administration functions to Wagga, as weU as the 
need to achieve improved coordination of administration 
activities. The retention of several supervisory positions below the 
administration officer position, it was claimed, would help even 
out workloads. In the letter the Commercial Manager stated that: 
No formal time span can be nominated during which outposting wUl 
continue. This wiU depend on a rumiber of factors. In effect, all 
Narrandera administration positions are being declared surplus, 
though it is possible to continue the placement of a certain number 
of administration staff at that centre in the shorter term. The right 
is reserved if opportunities arise to transfer functions to Wagga and 
reduce staff at Narrandera through voluntary redundancy 
(15/1/91). 
The Commercial Manager reiterated district management's 
commitment not to make any forced transfers or relocations. He 
also indicated that in district management's view the staff 
numbers proposed at each office were enough to allow for the 
usual levels of short term leave. Finally, he attached duty 
statements for all continuing positions. The Commercial Manager 
signed off the letter by stating that district management intended 
to implement the proposals with effect from 23 January 1991. 
Following discussions between the Commercial Manager and 
representatives from the NSW Branch of the PSU, the Commercial 
Manager sent a slightly revised version of the same letter to the 
Branch office of the imion in early February 1991. In the letter he 
stated that: 
it is in the interests of both management and staff that this 
amalgamation proceeds quickly, advice by 13 February 1991, is 
requested if you desire to discuss any issue Jiather (5/2/91). 
However, this was not to be. The Commercial Manager's proposal 
became caught up with a far broader set of issues. At the 
beginning of February 1991 the District manager wrote to the 
state office of the Public Service Union and the Australian Postal 
and Telecommimications Union advising that in response to an 
examination of all staffing requirements within the NSW South 
and West Region some positions within the Riverina - Murray 
district were to be cut. The staff cuts, he advised, were to be 
primarily at the supervisor level. Six supervisory positions were to 
be made redundant in the customer services areas: two positions 
from the Wagga Wagga office, two from the Narrandera office and 
two from the Albury office. Seven supervisory positions were also 
to be cut out of the cable assigning and estimating section at 
Narrandera. In addition, the District Manager advised that all 
administration fimctions at Narrandera were to be centralised to 
Wagga Wagga and this meant that initially five positions would be 
surplus to requirements. As the following quote suggests, the 
District Manager had decided to use the broader staff reductions 
to hasten the rationalisation of the administration area: 
The admin review, we put it in the current round of negotiations but 
all we put in was what we negotiated with the association in the 
first place (talked to the staff about in the first place) which was to 
amalgamate Wagga and Narrandera administration sections into 
one. We Just included those proposals in this round to speed it up a 
bit because it is going very slowly. 
After several months, negotiations at the regional level resulted in 
an agreement in early May 1991 between the Public Service 
Union, Telecom regional management and the District Manager. It 
was decided that three clerical services positions would be cut: 
two in Narrandera and one in Wagga. Four of the five remaining 
Narrandera administration positions would also be made surplus 
to requirements. The proposal to centralise the Narrandera 
administration fimctions was also agreed along the Unes initially 
proposed by the Wagga Wagga Commercial Manager: a complete 
transfer over time but a commitment to no forced transfers or 
relocations. Thus, in theory, another stage of the amalgamation 
process had been achieved. 
Despite this step, as of April 1991 the amalgamation process 
became redundant. The District Manager's announcement in 
February of regional staff cuts was actually part of a broader 
rationalisation of staff numbers throughout the Country Division. 
The divisional cuts were being driven by corporate level 
management and were a response to the revenue shortfalls 
experienced by Telecom as a result of the down turn in the 
national economy. As one regional level manager put it: 
Corporate dollars were required because of our revenue shortfall 
people weren't making STD phone calls and all the rest of it and 
our revenue shortfall was billions of dollars. We had to provide a 
contribution towards that so it meant we had to cut expenses. One 
of the mc^or expenses is labour. 
In addition, the cuts were being driven by divisional management 
as a further way of meeting the demands faced by deregulation. 
In this context, senior management indicated an intention to 
scrap the Country Division's district based structure. Quoting 
from the Narrandera Argus: 
A meeting between the PSU and Telecom's Executive General 
Manager (Country Division), Mr Michael Makieve, last Thursday, 
made it clear that Telecom plans to embark on a staff cutting 
exercise that wUl seriously affect the working lives of every PSU 
member in Country DivisiorL Mr Makieve made it clear that he 
believed the current district structure in the division had no place in 
the new deregulated environment and in particular he referred to 
the districts on the east coast of Austrahcu A reduction in the 
number of district offices and a staff reduction in the order of8000 
Jobs over the next one to two years is envisaged, (Narrandera 
Argus, February 19,1991) 
In line with this, at the end of April 1991 a new divisional 
structure was put in place which replaced the, incomplete, 
amalgamated district structure with an "area management" 
structure. Under the new structure the Riverina Murray district 
was split in two with an Area Manager being placed at Albury and 
one at Wagga: Narrandera missed out and was placed under the 
control of Wagga Wagga. The Wagga Wagga district manager was 
given the position of Area Manager, but all the remaining 
functional management positions were declared redundant. That 
is, the Commercial Manager position, the two Operations 
Manager (Network) positions and the Operations Manager 
(Services) position were declared surplus to requirements. The 
effect of the change was to remove a middle layer of management 
from the structure of the Country Division. This, as the following 
quote from a regional manager reveals, was in line with divisional 
management's long term goals: 
At present we have got a (regional) general manager, district 
managers, and junctional managers. Now, the structure wUl go 
general manager, area manager so it has taken one layer of 
management out. So the aim is to reduce the layers of 
management,,Jirea manager mokes sense, it is reducing the 
number of layers of management between the MD down to the first 
line supervisor. At present there is about eight levels - if the MD 
wants to make a statement that he wants to be interpreted all the 
way down the line and stiR make sense when it gets to the first 
line supervisor - there is a lot in between them Area management 
saves overhead and also flattens the comnvmication chain too. 
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS CONSEQUENCES 
Prior to the amalgamation process industrial relations within the 
Narrandera office could be characterised as generally consensual. 
According to managers, union delegates and employees, 
industrial disputation had been rare; a tight knit relationship 
existed between management and employees; and employee 
morale was high. It was claimed that before the amalgamation of 
the Narrandera and Wagga Wagga districts, delegates in the 
Narrandera office provided little more than an information service 
to members. As one delegate put it: 
There was not too much for me to do before. You know, the 
delegates Job was felt to be a fairly easy one - sending out the 
news that wouM come throughfrom branch office. 
According to this delegate and others, the only industrial disputes 
that occurred in the district were about national wage issues and 
were at the behest of branch and national union offices. In other 
words, Narrandera employees rarely instituted industrial action 
themselves but simply followed national directives. 
This passivity was evidently not confined to the Narrandera office 
but was also a feature of many of the offices throughout the 
district. One manager went further by claiming that many clerical 
workers in the district were often reticent to follow national leads 
and often decided not to go on strike. He had evidently come 
across this attitude in a rather embarrassing way when he first 
arrived at the Wagga Wagga office: 
I was, I am still a union member but I was a fairly staunch union 
member when I left WoUongong to go to Wagga to become a 
manager, I forget what the industrial problem was but it was 
decided natvonaRy that we would have a one day strike. So I 
promptly went on strike. I went to work the next day and everyone 
said: "where were you yesterday?' So I was the only one who had 
a day off. The section that I managed had about 20 people in it but 
I was the only one who had the day off. 
In addition to low levels of industrial disputation, prior to the 
amalgamation the relationship between management and 
employees in the offices was also good. Delegates pointed out that 
occasionally the odd manager or employee would create problems, 
but in the main there was a high level of trust between the two 
groups. In the Narrandera office this good rapport, it was argued, 
was associated with a high level of morale and was based on the 
good leadership skills of the old Narrandera management. A 
supervisor in the Narrandera office summed up the relationship 
in the following way: 
Morale was good, but remember we are talking about the morale in 
a place that was organised by people who were wiRing to take a 
leadership role and make a decision. The old Narrandera 
management team, they took a leadership role. Certainly there 
were disagreements but we could all work them out. Occasionally 
there would be a direction or something but that is Itfe, 
The Operations Manager (Network) Narrandera concurred with 
this view: 
We as managers had a pretty good rapport with the people. 
Because we lived pretty close to them, we weren't sort of separated 
from them. We got on pretty well and there was really no real 
hassles. 
The amalgamation process changed all this. Interviews conducted 
with managers and staff clearly revealed that the whole 
amalgamation process created a considerable amount of fear 
amongst Narrandera staff. In the past, they argued, Telecom Jobs 
had been amongst the most secure in the town. Further, Telecom 
offered a career structure: in Narrandera, clerical employees had 
opportunities for promotion without having to leave the town or 
the district. However, the amalgamation of the Wagga Wagga and 
Narrandera districts was seen as a direct threat to their security 
and opportunities. 
In this regard, the clerical staff saw the amalgamation as having 
three potential negative outcomes. First, the removal of local 
Narrandera management was seen as a threat to opportimities for 
advancement within the Narrandera office. As one manager put it: 
When all the managers went from the area the feeling amongst the 
clerical staff was: "Well here goes the career structure. I haven't got 
a chance to stay in Narrandera and become the boss anymore. 
Second, Narrandera staff firmly believed that in the short term 
the amalgamation would lead to the Wagga Wagga office taking a 
lot of the good work over; thus leaving them at a disadvantage. 
The third, and most frequently predicted, negative outcome was 
that the Narrandera ofi&ce would be eventually closed. Despite 
continual assurances from Wagga Wagga management, 
Narrandera staff strongly believed that the real rationale behind 
the amalgamation was an attempt by Telecom management to 
close the Narrandera office completely and trsinsfer all clerical 
positions to Wagga Wagga. In fact, as the following quote reveals, 
some of the staff at Narrandera believed that the amalgamation of 
the district was Just the beginning of a long term centralisation of 
clerical frinctions to metropolitan cities: 
Well I would take ttfiirther than that and I can see quite logically 
that they could do away with this office completely and Wagga 
Wagga office completely. And they can have a set up in each town 
where they have an administrative type person working in an 
exchange or shop-front or something fr>r customer contact They can 
move the electronic facilities we have today and all the 
administration and paperwork, or whatever you would like to call 
tt, into a huge central office somewhere. 
These beliefs and fears had a negative effect on Narrandera 
employees attitudes to work as the following quote suggests: 
I don't think there would be one person who feels as happy as they 
were two years ago. It doesn't matter how many years you have 
been in the place - twenty five or Just five, it is absolute apathy 
towards the organisatiorL I don't know how to put it into words, 
you are sort of living day by day. People have Just lost interest 
Just the impact of workup in a situation where you feel you have 
an axe hanging over your head and you feel tt could drop anytime. 
The axe Just seems to hang there and hang there. And things Just 
seem to drag on so it Just eats away at you day by day. They are 
runnir^ the organisation down- the one thing you have been 
working for all your life. What it does is everyone is so down that 
little things become big things and spread further and further. It is 
not a happy little work place. 
The consequence of all this was a break down in the established 
consensus. The amalgamation created a far more adversarial 
industrial relations climate in the district. Industrial passivity, 
high morale and trust were replaced by disputation, and a 
growing level of distrust. 
Where in the past clerical workers were occasional followers of 
national calls for action, the amalgamation process resulted in 
them becoming initiators of a number of disputes. 
The first of these was in response to the non-renewal of the 
employment contracts for the five temporary staff. As discussed 
earlier, management's decision not to renew the contracts drew a 
very hostile reaction from clerical staff in the Narrandera office. 
The decision was seen by the Narrandera staff as a part of an 
attempt by Wagga Wagga management to downgrade the role and 
viability of the Narrandera office and they, therefore, saw it as a 
threat to their jobs. This strong feeling is exemplified in a 
statement by one Telecom employee to the Narrandera Argus: 
Narrandera has already lost its Telecom general manager and I 
feel these Job cuts are the second step in the downgrading of 
clerical personnel at Narrandercu Ultimately this could result in the 
loss ofTelecomJrom the town (19/7/91, p6). 
In the initial stages of the dispute Wagga Wagga management, 
represented by the newly appointed Human Resource Manager, 
and Narrandera representatives of the Public Service Union tried 
to negotiate a local solution. However, these talks quickly broke 
down: the union representatives wanted a review of the whole 
decision, but the Himian Resources Manager was tied to the 
reduction in the five employees. 
In response to this, the Narrandera employees commenced a two 
day stoppage. This lifted the treatment of the dispute up to the 
regional level where negotiations continued between regional 
human resource managers and branch level union officials. 
Discussions at this level evidently continued for a couple of weeks 
without any compromise being reached. As a result, the staff at 
Narrandera embarked on another two day stoppage and the 
Public Service Union officials advised Telecom Managers that 
unless progress was made they would take the issue to the 
Industrial Conmiission. 
Discussion then continued at the regional level and resulted in an 
agreed solution between management and the union. But the 
proposal was rejected by the Narrandera staff who insisted more 
strongly that the whole issue be brought before the Industrial 
Commission. Further negotiations continued and eventually 
resulted in an agreement, described earlier, which was suitable to 
a majority of the Narrandera staff. However, according to the 
senior delegate at the Narrandera office, the Narrandera staff were 
still not happy. Despite the advice of imion officials, many still 
wanted the issue taken to the Industrial Relations Commission. 
As one union delegate put it: 
There was stiR a lot of people against it. They stiR wanted to go to 
the CommissioTh A vote was taken and it was pretty close. There 
wasn't a real lot in it. 
The next industrial dispute took place in response to the District 
Manager's announcement in early February 1991 to cut six 
customer services staff, five administration staff and transfer the 
administration function from Narrandera to Wagga Wagga. One 
week after the announcement Narrandera clerical staff voted 
imanimously to take industrial action. They decided to impose 
revenue bans, which meant a significant slow down in the 
processing of in-coming payments for Telecom services. In 
addition, they decided not to answer phones anj^time before 
9.30am and after 3.30pm and they imposed a ban on the 
processing of service orders for work to be done within Telecom. 
Finally, the Narrandera staff voted to halt the preparation of 
information and statistics normally provided to management and 
decided to discontinue any work that had previously been the 
responsibility of positions left vacant. 
The Narrandera office bans remained in place until early March 
when state wide bans that had been imposed by the Public Sector 
Union NSW branch were lifted in order to allow negotiations to 
take place. The Narrandera staff held a ballot and voted in favour 
of lifting their bans as well. They warned management that they 
would be reimposed unless "meaningful negotiations with NSW 
Country South and West management take place" (Narrandera 
Argus, 5 March 1991 pi). 
Following the lifting of the bans, negotiations did take place at the 
regional offices between the imion delegates at Narrandera and 
Wagga Wagga, the District Manager and regional level human 
resources managers. The negotiations drew out over a one month 
period with a major sticking point being the rationalisation and 
transfer of administration functions to Wagga. 
Regional and district management firmly wanted the 
administration issue to be a part of any settlement. The 
Narrandera and Wagga Wagga delegates, on the other hand, 
insisted that the customer services rationalisations had to be 
negotiated and settled upon first. According to the Wagga Wagga 
delegate, this insistence was driven by a fear amongst clerical 
staff of the long term impact of the amalgamation and transfer to 
Wagga of administration fimctions. He argued that the 
Narrandera staff were concerned about whether they would be 
either forced to move to Wagga or forced to leave the company 
and face imemployment. The Wagga staff he argued were also 
concerned but their concerns were not so much about 
employment security as they were about how the new 
amalgamated structure would operate and what level of manager 
would lead the function: 
WelZ, the Wagga concern was more who was going to be the boss, 
because they didn't have the worry of having to move family so 
theirs was more a work oriented thing of who was going to run it, 
their mcgor question was: can you run it with only one manager, do 
you need two managers? 
As stated earlier, the negotiations at the regional level eventually 
ended in an agreement that saw a reduction in the number of 
positions to be made redundant. Nevertheless, the staff at 
Narrandera were left far from happy. The cuts had hit their office 
harder than any other and as a consequence their fears about the 
future of the Narrandera office continued to grow. As one delegate 
from Narrandera put it: 
Telecom has already ripped the heart out of its management 
structure and has targeted supervisory positions this time. The 
next round wiR be workers at the lower levels. (Narrandera Argus, 
16/4/91, pi) 
As is evident from the above discussion, staff at Narrandera 
became more industrially sensitive. And in this regard, they 
began to criticise the PSU for being too slow and ineffectual: 
A lot of people don't think the union is helping them either. Once 
you used to be able to go to the union with a personal problem and 
presto it would be fixed up. But tf it is a personal problem today, 
you can be sure they wont fix it up. If it is something a little bigger, 
maybe they wiU look at it. If it is a reaRy big problem they might 
redly round but always too late. 
Further, Narrandera staff developed a strong negative attitude 
towards management. Regardless of whether the managers were 
from Wagga Wagga or Narrandera, the staff felt that management 
had either let them down or were intent on eliminating jobs in the 
Narrandera office. As pointed out earlier, prior to amalgamation a 
good relationship had existed between Narrandera management 
and staff; however, the relationship soured in the early months of 
the amalgamation. Narrandera management, it was argued, had 
let the clerical staff down by not arguing strongly enough for the 
Narrandera office. As the following two quotes reveal, staff in the 
Narrandera office felt betrayed by their managers and were very 
angry as a result: 
Our commercial manager was the most ineffective man I've met in 
any management group whatsoever. He seemed to have no 
leadership, no goals, no aspiration, no nothing -except to achieve 
and win for himself. And he didn't have the least bit of loyalty. He 
was seen as their (Wagga Wagga management) lackey, I hate to 
use that term, but he was seen as their man in Narrandera, He 
really didn't stand up and represent us. He wasn't the type that 
could have done that. He was a "yes" man. 
and 
The (old Narrandera) district manager wasn't interested in 
anything. He also lived at Wagga, I think his support was with 
Wagga, right from the start. A couple of times he came out and said 
he was on our side, but he didn't do anything. I think management 
Just weren't prepared to accept their responsibilities. 
While the Narrandera staff felt betrayed by their own 
management, they strongly believed that Wagga Wagga 
management was intent on taking over Narrandera completely. As 
one Wagga Wagga manager put it: 
It was certainly seen as us and Narrandera, We were seen as the 
takeover merchants, Dwing the war in Kuwait the Narrandera 
people called the Wagga Wagga managernent the Iraqis. 
In addition, the clerical staff at Narrandera came to strongly 
distrust management's intentions. Regardless of the claims made 
by managers, the Narrandera staff questioned its authenticity: 
We have learnt a bitter lesson: we never believe what they are 
teUtng us - you go in and pick the eyes out of it to find out what 
makes their statement tick, and if it doesn't line up you Just say I 
can't beUeve that. 
Unfortunately for the Narrandera staff, their suspicions and 
beliefs about the future appear to have been validly held; though 
not because of the amalgamation strategy. Since the decision in 
May 1991 to create a new area manager structure in the region, 
the rationalisation process throughout Telecom has continued. At 
the end of July 1991 it was announced that a number of offices 
would be closed. In particular, it was annoimced that all 
customer services areas within the South West Region were to be 
investigated and a decision made as to which ones could be 
effectively rationalised. In November 1991 they were advised that 
the Narrandera customer services section was one of those to be 
closed. This meant the loss of 19 Jobs (The Narrandera Argus, 
25/7/91, 7/11/91). 
As in the past, the Narrandera staff reacted by imposing bans. 
Through this action they managed, in line with a national union 
agreement, to gain a moratorium on retrenchments until the 
beginning of 1993. However, Telecom management indicated that 
the eventual closure of the customer services area was inevitable. 
This was underscored in Jime 1992 with an announcement that 
the stores area at Narrandera was to be closed. This, in addition 
to the removal of administration functions, effectively meant that 
as from January 1993 the presence of Telecom as a major 
employer in Narrandera would cease (The Narrandera Argus, 
2/4/92, 18/6/92). 
CONCLUSION. 
In the previous chapter it W2is concluded that industrial relations 
in Telecom over the last eight years at both centralised and local 
levels was, despite a significant amoimt of change, more 
consensual than it had been in the late 1970s and early 1980s. It 
appeared that the dominant reason for this was a more open and 
communicative management style and a decentralisation of 
decision making. It was also stated that the overall impression 
held by managers, supervisors and unionists was that industrial 
relations in rural communities is less problematic than it is in 
urban communities. 
It is in this context that the strategy to amalgamate the 
Narrandera and Wagga districts took place. Given the general 
level of consensus on industrial relations throughout Telecom and 
since Narrandera is a small rural community it would not be 
imreasonable to expect that the implementation of the 
amalgamation strategy would have been a smooth process. The 
events described in this chapter do not fit this expectation. 
Industrial relations at Narrandera have not been consensual and 
it appears that management rather than creating a more 
cooperative and consensual climate has helped to exacerbate 
conflict. The events at Narrandera are obviously an exception to 
the broader impression of consensual industrial relations that 
emerged fi-om the interviews discussed in the last chapter. 
In the next chapter the concept of 'managerial strategy' discussed 
in Chapter 2 will be used to attempt to explain the events at 
Narrandera. It was clearly the decision to amalgamate districts 
that led to the problems at Narrandera; the concept of 
'managerial strategy' as defined and discussed in Chapter 2 may 
help to explain why this was the case. In this respect, the next 
chapter provides an opportunity to Judge the usefulness of the 
concept of 'managerial strategy' as a way of explaining industrial 
relations activity. It will also provide an opportunity to access 
some of the theoretical claims made by the writers reviewed in 
Chapter2. 
CHAPTER 6 - THE NARRANDERA EXPERIENCE FROM THE PERSPECTIVE 
OF THE CONCEPT OF MANAGERIAL STRATEGY 
INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter 2 the concept of 'managerial strategy' as defined and 
treated in orthodox industrial relations and labour process 
literature was discussed. 
It was pointed out that the concept has been developed, amongst 
other reasons, as an attempt to address inadequacies in 
established theories. Specifically, it has been adopted by both 
orthodox and labour process writers as a way of introducing a 
dynamic element into the traditional models. 
Orthodox and labour process theories have increasingly been 
criticised for an inability to explain change and diversity in 
industrial relations arrangements within modem capitalist 
societies. Orthodox approaches concentrate on the institutions 
rather than the actual dynamics of industrial relations activity. 
This means they are ill-equipped to explain new developments in 
industrial relations: for example, the increased proactivity of 
management and a decline in the role of trade unions. The 
classical labour process theory statements of Braverman (1974), 
Edwards (1979) and Friedman (1977) are claimed to portray the 
development of the capitalist labour process in too simplistic or 
restrictive terms. More importantly, classical writers argue that in 
capitalist economies the labour process would develop in certain 
inevitable ways^^. The diverse and complex reality of capitalist 
development is not in accord with this and the classic statements, 
as a result, are seen as inadequate. 
Strategies developed by managers, it is argued, can account for 
diversity and 'managerial strategy', therefore, may help to 
increase the explanatory power of traditional approaches. As 
identified in Chapter 2, the reason the concept can account for 
diversity is that it allows recognition of the ability all managers 
have to make choices and that these choices influence activity. 
Managers are not trapped within an environmentally determined 
path. They can choose a course of action that means they become 
more industrially proactive or they can choose to upgrade skills 
associated with a particular type of production process. Thus, it 
is the choices made by management which are being claimed as 
the explanations for diversity and change in the labour process 
and industrial relations. 
In Chapter 2, 'Managerial strategy' was tentatively defined as a 
term that referred to any intentional course of action 
undertaken by any managerial group that is aimed at 
achieving certain preconceived goal/s. This definition seeks to 
reduce the ambiguities that have been associated with the 
concept. It also seeks to incorporate 'intentionality', and 'a course 
of action aimed at achieving a preconceived goal' as defining 
characteristics of 'managerial strategy'. 
^^ As stated in Chapter 2, Bravennan argued that the trend was toward an increasing degradation of skilled woric 
Edwards claimed that the capitalist labour process inevitably progressed through discrete stages. Freidman classified 
labour process control strategies into just two types: Direct Control and Responsible Autonomy. 
^^ Hiat is, a series of decisions or choices aimed at adiieving a certain preconceived goal. Managerial strategy is, 
therefore, not meant to embrace one-off dav to day decisions but longer term courses of aaion. 
In adopting this definition, a stance on several conceptual 
debates was taken. The notion of intentionality was claimed to be 
vital because without it the idea of 'choice' becomes irrelevant. 
However, managerial strategies need not be planned in detail or 
perfectly coherent. In addition, for a course of action to be 
deemed a 'managerial strategy' it need not be fiilly implemented 
or deliver results exactly as they were intended. Further, it was 
claimed that management is not a homogeneous group. 
Consequently, 'managerial strategy' may refer to a course of 
action devised by one group of managers within an organisation 
and may, as a result, conflict with the interests of other groups. 
It was also claimed the adoption of 'managerial strategy' does not 
imply a descent into extreme volimtarism. Managerial strategies 
are constrained by a potentially large variety of external factors. 
These constraints limit, but do not determine, the choices that 
managers can make. Therefore strategies can create diversity but 
only within certain boimds. With regard to public sector 
organisations, the political context within which public sector 
managers operate was identified as an important influence on the 
character of their strategies. Overseas literature suggests that the 
present orientation of this 'political contingency' is toward an 
emphasis upon 'commercialism'. Commercialism, it is argued, is 
often accompanied by a more aggressive, imcompromising 
strategy toward industrial relations. 
One other issue discussed in Chapter 2 was the relationship 
between managerial strategies and industrial relations. Questions 
were raised about the impact of managerial strategies upon 
industrial relations and the extent to which strategy formulation 
takes industrial relations issues into account. Writers appear to 
argue that management strategies can influence industrial 
relations. However, there is a considerable amount of debate over 
the extent to which industrial relations issues are considered in 
strategy formulation. The conclusion drawn was that the 
relationship varies with the situation and is not open to 
theoretical generalisations. The extent to which industrial 
relations affects strategy formulation is, therefore, a matter for 
empirical investigation. 
In this chapter the events described in the last chapter will be 
examined from the perspective offered by the concept of 
'managerial strategy' as defined above. The discussion will serve 
three purposes. First, it will provide an explanation of the 
developments at Narrandera associated with the amalgamation 
strategy. Second, it will enable further insights into the concept of 
'managerial strategy' and, thus, address some of the debates 
discussed in Chapter 2. Third, following on from one and two, it 
will enable a judgement to be made in this chapter about the 
power of the concept as a way of explaining industrial relations; 
and a Judgement in the next chapter of its power to address the 
inadequacies of orthodox industrial relations and classical labour 
process theories. 
PLANNING, INTENHONALITY AND CO-HERENCE 
'Managerial strategy' as defined in this thesis clearly directs 
attention to the actual strategy formulation process. This is the 
stage at which management makes choices about what to do and 
how to do it. It is, therefore, a potential source of explanations for 
industrial relations activity that occurs as a result of the strategy. 
In this section the strategy formulation process will be discussed; 
the role of different management groups described; the influences 
on the formulation process outlined; and the effect of the 
formulation stage considered. 
An investigation of the actual formulation of the amalgamation 
strategy provides several significant insights. These insights help 
to explain the events at Narrandera and the incomplete 
implementation of the strategy. In addition, they also raise issues 
that may have general applicability to a fuller understanding of 
the 'managerial strategy' concept. 
As is clear firom the description in the last chapter, the 
amalgamation of the Wagga and Narrandera districts was part of 
an intentional strategy on the part of regional management. 
Amalgamation was not an ad-hoc decision or a direct result of 
external factors. Rather, the strategy was worked out in some 
detail by management before its implementation. 
As is also clear firom the previous chapter, the formulation 
process was spread across different levels of management. That 
is, authorship of the strategy was not solely in the hands of 
managers at Bnrwood. Managers at the district level were also 
involved in the actual formulation of the course of action. This 
distribution of authorship was intentional. Its rationale was 
explained by regional management as related to a need to ensure 
that district level management was made accoimtable and 
responsible for the amalgamation processes. That is, it was seen 
as important to ensure that the strategy was not imposed on 
lower level managers. The amalgamation process, it was inferred, 
would be far more likely to succeed if district level management 
was involved in the development of the strategy. The approach 
was also in accord with the overall trend to decentralise decision 
making processes throughout the organisation. 
Because of this policy, as stated in the last chapter, corporate 
and divisional management did not play a part in the formulation 
of the amalgamation strategy. They simply put pressure on 
regional management to devise ways of streamlining fimctions 
and activity. Regional management was given the discretion and 
responsibility for formulating a strategy that would achieve this. 
They chose amalgamation and followed corporate and divisional 
management's lead by devolving to district management the 
discretion and responsibility for formulating some parts of the 
amalgamation strategy. 
Looking at the roles of regional and district managers in more 
detail, the explicitly stated role of Burwood management was 
identified in interviews as the development of a broad strategy 
framework. First, Burwood management decided that the goal of 
increasing efficiency could best be achieved by a strategy that was 
based on an amalgamation of districts. Second, they took primary 
responsibility for deciding which districts should be 
amalgamated. Third, they negotiated and attained an in-principle 
agreement from the imions for implementation of the 
amalgamation strategy. 
In interviews management at the regional level stated that the 
finer detail of the amalgamation strategy was formally left to the 
discretion of district level management. Thus, as was discussed in 
the last chapter, the role of district level management in the 
formulation of the strategy involved the detailed development of a 
way to implement the strategy. 
In this respect, in the Wagga Wagga-Narrandera amalgamation 
the role of the district manager was identified as the 
determination of where the head offices of the new district would 
be; what management positions were to be retained; and who was 
to be appointed to these positions. In addition, district 
management was responsible for formulating those aspects of the 
strategy aimed at achieving a rationalisation of clerical staff. In 
the case of the Wagga Wagga district this involved the transfer of 
the administration section of the Narrandera office to Wagga. 
The actual involvement of different management groups was not 
as clear cut as the above suggests. While regional level 
management had primary responsibility to determine which 
districts were to be amalgamated, they incorporated the district 
level managers in the decision making process. District managers 
became involved in this aspect of the process through their 
membership of the teams set up at the regional board meetings. 
The teams recommendations on district boundaries were used by 
regional management to aid their considerations. 
In addition, while district managers were formally responsible for 
the detailed aspects of the strategy development, interviews 
revealed that they were not given complete freedom. The decisions 
they took were based on consultation with Burwood management. 
This was particularly the case with the decisions about which 
positions to retain. Interviews revealed that this was worked out 
by the new district managers in consultation with Burwood 
managers. District management was given final responsibility for 
these decisions but was expected to discuss their decisions with 
regional management. 
It was also strongly suggested in several interviews that district 
management's discretion was constrained by informal pressure 
from Burwood managers who favoured certain results. For 
example, one regional manager stated that the decision about the 
location of the head office of the Riverina district was formally the 
responsibility of whoever was the successful applicant for the 
district manager Job. Narrandera, he argued, could, therefore, 
have been the district head office if the new manager chose. 
Quoting him: 
We didn't say where the manager should be located. He could be 
located at Narrandera, he could be located at Wagga Wagga or 
even down in Albwy. Because what he was doing was controlling 
a group of supervisors or managers within that geographic area. So 
we deliberately didn't say where the managefs office was going to 
be. 
The final location, he argued, was dependent upon who filled the 
district manager job and this position had been advertised 
outside the organisation and throughout Telecom. It Just so 
happened that the old Wagga Wagga district manager was 
successful and he had chosen Wagga Wagga as the head-office. 
However, interviews with the Wagga Wagga district manager 
revealed, as stated in the last chapter, that he had been a very 
reluctant applicant for the position. He had decided not to apply 
but was put under considerable pressure from regional level 
management to change his mind. This suggests that regional 
managers had a strong, if indirect, role in establishing Wagga 
Wagga as the head office. This conclusion is backed up by 
regional management's explicitly stated preference for Wagga 
Wagga as the most appropriate location. When asked what would 
have happened if the new manager didn't have a preference the 
same regional manager stated: 
I think we would have gone through the recommendations of the 
(working party) report and worked out where the staff expertise 
was, the employment pool and the geographical location. What 
people do they need to work with, and which people can they best 
do with working remote. And if you assessed all that, you hod to 
come up with the fact that Wagga was a logical hose because Hfs in 
the middle of the area^also, probably, you had more senior people 
with expertise located in that one area. 
Overall therefore, the strategy formulation process was not vested 
in Just one group of managers at a particular level within the 
organisation. It spanned levels and groups: different managers 
had different roles in the process and these were intertwined and 
interconnected. 
In formulating the strategy a range of considerations were taken 
into account. As previously stated, the primary aim of the 
strategy was to increase the efficiency of NSW Country South 
West. As a result, the most important consideration was the 
impact the strategy would have upon the efficiency of the Region. 
To be a success the strategy had to reduce costs and increase 
productivity. 
Other issues were not totally disregarded. In this respect, the 
impact the strategy would have upon the rural communities 
concerned was not ignored. Regional management acknowledged 
that this was an issue that they had to consider because of 
previous commitments Telecom management had made to rural 
councils such as the Narrandera Shire. The guarantee of 
continuing community presence had evidently been a long 
standing one throughout rural regions and was, therefore, a 
difficult issue to address. As stated in the previous chapter, in 
order to take community perspectives into account, local councils 
were included in talks at the regional level and guarantees once 
again given about 'a continuing presence' 
Regional level management indicated that the effect the strategy 
would have upon staff was also a very important consideration. It 
was a factor that they had to weigh up in their deliberations 
about whether to seek amalgamations. The strategy would involve 
staff relocations and in some cases retrenchments, which they 
had to incorporate into the decision making process. 
In the final analysis, however, the efficiency considerations were 
seen by regional and district management as the primaiy issue 
and, therefore, had to over-ride concerns about the impact of 
amalgamations on staff and communities. In this regard, the 
following quote firom a regional level manager sums up well the 
way in which the above considerations were taken into account: 
„they've been concerned down in Narrandera that they would lose 
their district status for a long, long time. We go back ten years. No 
one would tackle it because of the community pressures. We had to 
ask ourselves whether we could Just continue that operation, 
whether we scale it down or whether we close it altogether. So I 
suppose our aim was to minimise the amount of overhead 
component and with that, aU the hidden positions that seem to float 
around there when you have an administration. Of course, the 
Though, as stated in the previous chapter, what constituted 'a continuing presence' was left un-defined. 
negative side to that was ifs a town that is not growing and, 
therefore, we would be a significant component of that. So there 
would be an impact on the community. Where do the people go? 
There is a staff impact as well as a community impact So aR those 
you weigh up. But, at the end of the day you still have to move 
ahead with your organisation. 
Concerns about the impact of the strategy upon staff led to a 
significant amount of consideration being given to industrial 
relations during the strategy formulation stage. Interviews of 
managers at regional and district levels revealed that an analysis 
of the industrial relations implications of amalgamations was an 
important aspect of the initial planning processes at both levels. 
At the regional level strategy formulation incorporated industrial 
relations issues in two ways. First, industrial relations 
practitioners were closely involved in the formulation process and 
they were involved in the actual development of tactics aimed at 
facilitating the implementation of amalgamations. Thus, they 
established the necessity for there to be consultation with the 
u n i o n s and negotiated the in-principle agreement which 
district level management could follow. 
Second, the in-principle agreement was an outcome of 
negotiations between management and imions on the broad 
details of the amalgamation strategy. Thus, to an extent, unions 
were involved at the regional level in strategy formialation. Clearly, 
19 In line with long standing agreements within Telecom. 
the unions were not involved in the actual decision to 
amalgamate districts. Nevertheless, they were involved in the 
development of the Implementation aspects of the strategy 
formulation as well formulation of those aspects of the strategy 
concerned with the treatment of staff. In this respect, the regional 
human resources manager stated that the negotiations covered: 
the actual organisational charts and the organisational structures. 
How it was going to be done on the technical side, how the 
estimating and office junctions were going to be carried out and 
how the lines of reporting for the staff were going to change. We 
dealt with staff concems-indtuidual placement- what was going to 
happen to those people who were going to be affected by this 
change. 
and 
..we spent time talking to the associations informally, each of the 
three unions. We sounded out their reactions before we wrote any 
letters. There was a lot of meetings and a lot of work done behind 
the scenes before we got the first paperwork done. 
At the district level unions were not involved in the actual 
formulation of strategies, but district management did develop 
strategies that were aimed to address the likely industrial 
relations Impact of the amalgamation. In the Wagga Wagga -
Narrandera amalgamation, district management formulated an 
approach towards the rationalisation of administration staff that 
addressed industrial relations issues by providing for working 
parties and consultative arrangements. In addition, because of 
the industrial relations ramifications, they decided not to 
rationalise the administration function at Narrandera in one 
quick move. Rather, they decided to: 
..tolerate a certain amount of outposting at Narrandera in order not 
to upset individuals too much there. We tried not to do it aU in one 
hit where you would create a lot of turmoil for the people over there. 
(Administration Manager, Wagga Wagga) 
Thus in simmiaiy, the dominant consideration in the strategy 
formulation process was efficiency. This was above community 
and employee concerns. However, managers at both the regional 
and district level did consider and plan for the industrial relations 
implications of the amalgamation strategy. 
It can be argued that the strategy formulation stage of the Wagga 
Wagga - Narrandera amalgamation had a detrimental effect upon 
the outcomes of the strategy. The fact that the whole strategy was 
not formulated by just one group of managers but divided 
between two different groups at different levels can be seen as a 
major factor in this regard. In addition, the primacy of efficiency 
issues can also be seen as creating problems. 
As indicated earlier, regional management devolved some of the 
responsibility for formulation of the strategy because it was seen 
as a way to facilitate the process. However, in the Narrandera -
Wagga Wagga amalgamation the involvement of the two levels 
resulted in an inconsistency between the decisions and actions 
imdertaken at the regional level and those at the district level. 
The most important inconsistency in this regard related to the 
timing of the amalgamation process. 
As stated in the previous chapter, regional management handed 
over the responsibility for the detailed aspects of the strategy to 
district management on the basis that the total amalgamation 
would be completed within three months. According to the 
regional human resources manager, this was a realistic period 
because all the hard work had been done at the regional level in 
establishing the in-principle agreement. In other words, all the 
districts had to do was develop the implementation strategy and 
smooth over the wounds. Fast action by the district levels was, 
from the regional perspective, vital in order to ensure the 
agreement remained current and implementation, therefore, 
achievable. According to the regional himian resources manager, 
all staff throughout the region were informed of the agreement 
and, thus, expected the process to progress quickly. 
This was not the perspective adopted by district management. As 
mentioned above, in order not to upset anyone, management at 
the district level formulated an approach that was based on a 
gradual implementation of the amalgamation process. Partly as a 
result of this, the three month limit was passed and, in fact, even 
after 12 months no real progress had been made. 
According to the regional human resources manager, this delay 
meant that the in-principle agreement became basically 
irrelevant. The initiative that it had created was lost. Quoting 
him: 
CThe Riverina Murray district) had staff that were conscious of the 
fact that decisions had been made and were, thus, in that frame of 
wind. We didn't capitalise on it. We let them slip back into that 
mode of feeling like: "Oh well maybe nothing wiR change". And 
then we hit them 15 months later and we ended up with the same 
problem that we had when we first determined it. We had to go 
through the process again. Them and us. So I think, by not moving, 
I think it was poorly handled. 
Further, according to the regional human resources manager, the 
delays also created problems because: 
Its a pairifid way to get the process done and doesn't do anyone 
any good, particularly the staff. You're better off walking in, like 
we've done this time with Area Manager, make a decision "bang": 
Ilfs there. Do it. I have a feeling that it would have been far better 
for the people because a lot of people lock themselves into 
positions. Thinking that they would wiru Or that they'll give it their 
best shot. And I think they lost focus on a lot of the work that we 
needed to do for the business, to serve the customers. 
Analysis of interviews of Narrandera staff reveals that the regional 
human resources manager was correct in claiming that the delay 
built into the strategy did cause an adverse reaction from the 
staff. As pointed out in the last chapter the morale and attitude of 
Narrandera office staff were undermined by the drawn out nature 
of the process. The Narrandera people interviewed stated quite 
firmly that they would have preferred a qxiick decision and fast 
implementation. As one person put it: 
If I was the management, I would've been more decisive than what 
they have been. We have been living and working in a situation for 
two years where we know this is going on and will happen. That to 
me is ridiculous. Under the situation that we are working under, 
you cant make plans for the future because you don't know when 
you are going or if you are going: if you are married with a couple 
of kids, trying to work out their future, where they are going to be 
sent to school 
Thus, it can be argued that the conflicts between the strategy 
formulation stage at the regional level and that at the district level 
was one of the causes of the industrial relations problems. Wagga 
Wagga management may have thought that a gradual 
implementation would ease industrial relations problems but 
their approach actually created problems. 
The dominance of efficiency as a consideration in the 
development of the strategy also created major problems for the 
progress of the amalgamation strategy and was another cause of 
industrial relations problems. Telecom management at all levels 
perceived that to meet the challenges of deregulation they had to 
make the organisation more efficient. In this respect, therefore, 
the amalgamation strategy inevitably had to have efficiency as the 
prime objective. However, this consideration was so overwhelming 
that other issues were under-emphasised. The result was action 
on the part of staff and the Narrandera commimity which 
contributed to the failure of the amalgamation strategy. 
The reaction of the staff and community had its greatest effect on 
the implementation of the overall strategy and will, therefore, be 
discussed in more detail in the next section. Nevertheless, it is 
useful to mention at this stage that had management given as 
much attention to staff and commimity considerations as they 
did to efficiency they may have had more success in implementing 
the changes. Regional level management did attempt to address 
the community issues by holding discussions with coimcils. 
However, while these discussions resulted in the "continuing 
presence" commitment, regional management did not move away 
from a line that stressed the primacy of efficiency. This hard line 
could do nothing but create a negative reaction from country 
communities and is summarised well by one regional manager as 
follows: 
Well our executive general manager put it on the line pretty clearly: 
in reply to one commimtty's claim that "We need Telecom in this 
town because we are a dying town and we need you to keep the 
community going" he said "But that is why I am puRing out, 
because you are a dying town If you want me to stay, then you 
have to grow your town, because, otherwise, we don't have a 
reason to be here. If the town grows, we would no doubt bring 
more people back". 
This argument clearly makes economic sense for Telecom as a 
corporation but it places townships in a "Catch 22" situation that 
they must react against. Ftom the perspective of townships the 
employment generated by organisations such as Telecom keeps 
them viable; without it growth becomes exceedingly difficult. 
At Narrandera this problem was exacerbated by district 
management's decision to shift all the Narrandera administration 
functions to Wagga Wagga. They saw this as the most efficient 
course of action and their decision was backed up by regional 
level management^O. This approach was not necessarily followed 
in some other regions within the Country Division. Management 
in other regions also decided to amalgamate districts, but in some 
of these districts, administration functions were evidently shared 
between pre-existing district offices. However, Wagga Wagga 
management rejected such an approach because they saw it as 
less than ideal in efficiency terms. Considerations such as the 
likely reaction of staff and the community were not seen as 
important enough reasons to warrant a strategy that left some 
administration functions in Narrandera. This was an unfortunate 
decision. Most office staff at Narrandera recognised that 
efficiencies were necessary but they strongly stated that they were 
not convinced that all functions had to be transferred to Wagga 
Wagga. As one person put it: 
^ ^ fact, this appears to be an example of another area where regional management put pressure on district 
management to take a particular approadi. Most of the districts within the South-West Region wait this way, but it was 
never an explicit regional level policy. 
I am not against them trying to rationalise, that is understandable 
and you can accept that. But what they have done in other districts 
in Victoria and up in North NSW, they have tackled the problem by 
putting all Personnel in one office and aR Finance in another office. 
So you have stiR got one Finance and one Personnel and you are 
not running two of each in two separate offices. There is no reason 
why they can't do that in the Riverina Murray, If they are genuine 
about trying to keep this office open, it seems like an ideal 
situation. 
As the above quote intimates, the insistence on district 
management's part to move the whole administration function to 
Wagga Wagga was interpreted by staff, and the community, as 
meaning that the whole Narrandera office would be closed. Given 
senior management's guarantee of a "continuing presence" Wagga 
management's stance undermined the trust staff and the 
community had in Telecom management. This impeded the 
progress of the strategy and exacerbated the industrial relations 
problems. 
The above describes the ways that a concentration on the 
formulation of managerial strategy can shed light on events. It 
also allows some insights to be made about the concept of 
'managerial strategy' itself. The experience at Telecom clearly 
supports the claim that strategies are intentional and developed 
with some degree of coherence and rationality. However, it 
indicates that a given managerial strategy should not be seen as 
necessarily having its origins in the decisions of one group of 
managers. 
As argued in Chapter 2, management is not necessarily 
homogeneous. It may be composed of different groups who may 
develop different strategies. As a result, studies of managerial 
strategies must allow for the fact that a strategy developed by one 
group of managers may be affected by the activities of other 
management groups. In addition, the experience at Telecom 
reveals that different groups with different interests may be 
involved in the formulation of a single strategy. As a result, it is 
important to recognise that the coherence of a particular strategy 
can be influenced by the interaction between different managerial 
groups. One group's input into the formulation of a strategy may 
have their intentions undermined by the input of other 
managerial groups. As such, it is likely that strategy formulation 
processes are highly political activities involving negotiations 
between different and perhaps competing groups of managers. 
The fact that regional management informally sought to apply 
pressure on Wagga management on a number of issue exemplifies 
this idea. 
The political character of strategy formulation at Telecom was 
also heightened by the involvement of trade unions in the actual 
formulation of the strategy. This serves to highlight the 
importance of considering the role of parties other than 
management in the formulation of management strategies. 
Perhaps more importantly though, it backs up further the insight 
that strategy formulation is not a simple process involving 
managers as one group deciding what to do and how to do it. 
Rather, it is a dynamic process that in itself can provide major 
explanations for industrial relations and other activity. 
Discussions of the concept of 'managerial strategy' need, 
therefore, to highlight the formulation process and how it can be 
a source of dynamism in industrial relations. 
IMPLEMEOTATION 
'Managerial strategy' as defined in this thesis also directs 
attention to the implementation of strategies. As stated in 
Chapter 2, a variety of factors can have an effect on whether a 
strategy is implemented as planned. This section focuses 
attention on the implementation of the amalgamation strategy 
and in doing so provides an insight into several of the issues 
mentioned in Chapter 2. As such, it sheds further light on the 
concept of 'managerial strategy'. In addition, it helps to tease out 
further explanations for the failure of the strategy as well as for 
the industrial relations problems that were created. 
As stated earlier, regional management devolved responsibility for 
implementation of the amalgamation strategy to district 
management. Interviews revealed that five factors had an impact 
on district management's efforts to implement the strategy and 
upon industrial relations activity associated with it: employee 
reaction, management style, community reaction, other 
management strategies and activities; and broader industrial 
relations developments. 
The reaction of Narrandera staff was described in the last chapter 
and has been discussed further in this chapter. Employees were 
not supportive of the amalgamation moves and resisted them with 
industrial action, bans and non-cooperation. In this regard, the 
staff working party recommendations which suggested that no 
rationalisation of administration functions take place is an 
example of this resistance. 
As discussed above, the resistance and industrial action of the 
Narrandera staff were partiy due to the details of the strategy 
itself. In addition, it can be argued that the situation was 
exacerbated by the style adopted by Wagga Wagga management 
when they were trying to implement the strategy. 
In Chapter 4 it was argued that the management strategies 
throughout Telecom had become more consensual and open. 
Unionists and managers all argued that a far more consultative 
approach had been adopted by management and this was having 
a beneficial effect on industrial relations. It was also claimed by 
Wagga Wagga management and Wagga Wagga based employees 
and unionists that managers in the Wagga Wagga district had 
adopted a far more consensual style. Industrial relations was 
claimed to be improving as a result. 
Despite this, it is apparent from interviews of managers and staff 
that this consensual style was not adopted in relation to the 
Narrandera - Wagga Wagga amalgamation. Wagga Wagga 
management adopted a very aggressive and imcompromising 
style that, because of the adverse elQfect it had on industrial 
relations, made implementation of the strategy problematic. 
According to one Narrandera manager, this aggression was 
reflected in statements Wagga Wagga management made about 
the future of the Narrandera office: 
They were very outspoken in saying we are going to take you over 
and you mob wUl Jose your Jobs. They came over very heavy. It 
wasn't very diplomatic. I tend to think if it had been more 
diplomathcaRy handled it wouM have been a different baR game. 
For Narrandera staff the aggressive approach appears to have 
been exemplified by the actions of management over the non-
renewal of the part-time employee's contracts. Evidently little 
consultation took place over the decision. Instead, it was 
presented as a foregone conclusion. As one staff member put it: 
..we were asked for a series of statistics, which I don't think 
Wagga really took into consideration, and then they Just lobbed in 
one day; pulled everybody in, including the Jive people that were 
going to be dismissed, and said that is it. So there was very little 
consultation with us as to how and why Jive positions were going 
to be lost 
The regional human resources manager agreed with this 
perception. The Wagga Wagga style, he said, was unhelpfully 
aggressive. He argued that one of the main reasons industrial 
problems emerged and the implementation delayed was that 
district level management did not deal with the people very 
sjmipathetically. The dominant reason for this, he claimed, was 
that Wagga Wagga management saw the whole exercise as a 
victory for their team over Narrandera management. He argued, 
that while the district manager made conciliatory comments 
aimed at drawing the district together into one team, his and his 
management team's actions belied this. Rather than being 
conciliatory, they were blatantly euphoric about their victory. 
Even Wagga Wagga managers themselves indicated that they had 
adopted an aggressive strategy and saw the amalgamation in 
win/lose terms. According to one Wagga Wagga manager, this 
attitude was a result of a lack of support from the regional office 
on a range of issues^l and intransigence on the part of 
Narrandera staff. He stated that he and other Wagga managers 
were seen as being 'hot heads', arrogant and disaster merchants. 
He admitted that they had, indeed, been very aggressive but: 
We weren't getting support from the region, we were on our own. 
We developed a mutual bond, bugger the region we wiR do it our 
way. There was a lot of frxistrotion that nothing was getting done. 
And that made you want to win, to prove something to yourself. 
That seemed to affect our attitudes to industrial relations. 
^^In particular, Wagga management thought that they had been abandoned by the regional office in a dispute over a 
depot closure in Albury-Wodonga. 
The reaction of the Narrandera community has already been 
mentioned as an important factor in the formulation and progress 
of the strategy. As was discussed in the previous chapter, 
Narrandera is a declining town. Given this, the amalgamation 
strategy was inevitably seen as a substantial threat to the 
continuing viability of the community. The Narrandera Shire 
Council, the local newspaper and many people from the town 
became closely involved in the whole issue and took action which 
helped to slow implementation down. 
Narrandera council's major initiative took place in May 1987, 
following rumours that Telecom was considering a relocation of 
functions to Wagga Wagga. The Council in an attempt to ensure a 
continuing presence offered to build a new set of offices for the 
organisation valued at around 1.5 million dollars. In making the 
offer the council stated that it was concerned that the poor office 
accommodation occupied by the company may lead to a 
relocation: 
Loss of the Telecom office and its employees would be a big blow to 
Narrandera and the cowicil was adamant that it would take every 
possible step to stop this occurring. (Narrandera Argus, 
12/5/87,pl) 
In Jime 1987 Telecom advised the council that it would not 
accept the offer because it was about to start a major 
restructuring of the organisation as a result of the May 1987 
economic statement. 
In response to this, in July 1987 the council organised a meeting 
with the managing director of Telecom to discuss the future of 
Telecom's Narrandera operations. The council was advised that 
though no assurances could be given over the long term, there 
were no plans to restructure or downgrade the Narrandera office. 
In fact, the managing director advised the council that the 
company would be boosting the quality of the office 
accommodation and introducing new technology. The managing 
director stated that the company would continue to monitor 
performance throughout its operations but: 
In doing so, Telecom is cdways conscious of its duty and 
responsibility to the community and customers it accrues and to its 
staff, (M.Ward, Managing Director Telecom Australia, quoted in 
The Narrandera Argus, July 30, 1987,pl) 
Given this assurance the announcement in 1988 of the 
amalgamation of districts and associated rumours that the 
Narrandera office would be closed drew a strong response from 
the Council. The Shire President claimed that the proposals 
contradicted the managing director's assurances and stated that: 
The council and community are outraged at yet another instance of 
centralising administration at the cost of vrferior service to country 
regions. It is another instance of the 'big is best mentality. The 
council intends to pursue this matter to the highest levels of 
Telecom and Government administration, (The Narrandera Argus, 
8/11/88 pi) 
The coxmcil's response involved a meeting at Narrandera with the 
Regional General Manager of Telecom and a deputation to 
Canberra to meet the Executive General Manager of the Coimtiy 
Division. The Regional General Manager evidently advised the 
council that depending on the location of the new district head 
office some transfers may occur, but Telecom would not close 
down the Narrandera ofRce. At the meeting with the Executive 
General Manager the council argued against the amalgamation 
and was told that their argument would be given serious 
consideration (The Narrandera Argus, 22/12/88). 
Following the amalgamation decision and the appointment of the 
district manager, the council kept up its pressure. Just prior to 
the announcement that Wagga Wagga would be the district head 
office, the council offered to provide the new district manager with 
a house if he would locate the offices at Narrandera. After the 
annoimcement, the council continued to seek meetings with the 
successive district managers, each time seeking assurances that 
the company would retain a presence in the town. 
The council clearly became deeply embroiled in the whole 
amalgamation process. However, perhaps the most consistently 
vocal voice in the community was the editor of the local 
newspaper. The Narrandera Argus. He took a very close interest 
in developments at Telecom reporting anj^thing, including 
rumours, about the company's future. In editorials a consistently 
suspicious and hostile line toward Telecom management was 
adopted. For example, on February 8, 1990 the editor argued 
that: 
Telecom should come clean about its intentions for its JUture 
presence in Narrandera^ 
It seems to me that despite the public proclamations from 
managerial levels that there is every intention of maintaining a 
"substantial presence" in the town, actions so Jar, taken with a 
minimum of exposure and, indeed, more than a degree of 
smokescreening, suggest otherwise (The Narrandera Argus, 
8/2/90,p2). 
Six months later, following the non-renewal of the part time 
contracts, the normally conservative editor became almost a 
political radical when arguing that: 
The human face of Telecom, as with so many government 
organisations which are supposed to provide a public service, is 
being sacrificed on the alter of cost-benefit analysis as a sop to the 
deity of profitability. 
No longer is any heed paid by organisational decision makers to 
the social costs of their decisions. The fact that the lives of people 
are dislocated..are of no consequence to managements whose only 
goal is to show more and more profit year after year (The 
Narrandera Argus, 6/8/90, p2). 
Pressure from the council and the newspaper was supported by 
community groups. One such group was the Concerned Citizens 
of Narrandera Action Committee which was made up of 
townspeople, representatives of senior citizen's groups and 
employees of Telecom, the Department of Main Roads, the State 
Rail Authority, teachers and hospital staff. The Action Committee 
organised resistance to any proposal that threatened employment 
in the town and in the case of Telecom organised a "mass protest 
rally" when the Regional General Manager visited the township in 
November 1988. At that rally the Regional General Manager 
stated to the townspeople that Telecom would have a continuing 
presence at Narrandera (The Narrandera Argus 8/11 /88). 
Another group calling itself the Telecommunications Action Group 
added support to the Action Committee's efforts by attempting to 
keep the council and the local community informed about 
developments in the telecommimications industry. For example, 
when Senator E)vans released the May 88 statement on 
telecommunications, the Group sought to impress on the 
Narrandera community that the proposals outlined by the 
statement would lead to a reduction in Jobs in the Narrandera 
community and a reduction in the quality of service to rural 
towns. 
While the activities of the Shire Council, the editor of the Argus 
and the community groups, did not achieve v̂ ĥat was hoped for 
them, according to regional and district management the groups 
did have an affect on implementation of the amalgamation 
strategy and upon industrial relations. 
It was claimed that the community pressure had three effects. 
First, the local council initiatives and deputations were argued by 
local managers to have raised the political visibility of the 
amalgamation; thus forcing the company to tread carefully so as 
to avoid problems with state and federal politicians. Second, 
according to one of the district managers, the attitudes and 
support given by the community hardened the views of office staff 
and, thus, worsened the industrial relations consequences. It was 
argued that many staff had greater allegiance to the town than 
they did to Telecom. In this respect, the district human resource 
manager suggested that community pressure was used to ensure 
that employees who may have been considering a move to Wagga 
remained resistant: 
A lot of people out there are related, as a result peer pressure was 
applied. You know: "I got you this Job, now what is Aunt Jessie 
going to think7' 
Third, according to the first district manager, it became difficult 
to visit the town without having to spend a considerable amount 
of time talking to the council and the Narrandera Argus. This, he 
argued firustrated the whole process. Quoting him: 
It drove me crazy, it got to the stage where I was depressed to go to 
Narrandera. The moment I would walk into the (Narrandera) office 
the telephone would ring and it would be the local newspaper or 
the counciL You would make a tour of depots and you would have 
a reporter following you askir^g "Are you out here to close it!'. Every 
step was done in lights., and it made it hard, bloody hard. It 
frustrated me, I Just couldn't handle it. 
Another factor identified as affecting activity at Narrandera was 
other managerial strategies and actions. It was frequently claimed 
that the implementation of an amalgamated district was impeded 
by other strategies and actions originating from higher levels of 
the organisation. From the perspective of district management, 
they were being hit by a continuous stream of strategies and 
actions that, while consistently aimed at increasing efficiency, ran 
over each other and, thus, stalled the whole process. As the 
district human resources manager put it: 
..while you have a strategy worked out, you believe it is a good 
strategy, something may come in over the top which makes you 
either have to change it or prevents you from doing the first step 
until you have done the second step or something Uke that..I think 
its a problem in that the organisation hasn't reaUy allowed time for 
settlement of some of the current strategies and negotiations that 
have already been commenced. They're continually adjusting the 
level of the playing field, they're changing the rules. 
District management also argued that the plethora of strategies 
and changes adversely affected industrial relations. Because the 
strategies were all primarily aimed at rationalising staff numbers, 
they were not seen as discrete initiatives by Narrandera staff but 
part of an overall attempt to close Narrandera down. 
A union delegate interviewed took this issue further arguing that 
the continual changes created by the strategies meant that 
district managers were made out to be liars. He argued that 
management at district and regional levels originally gave 
guarantees about the Narrandera office not being closed or 
redundancies occurring as a result of the amalgamation. 
However, as discussed in the last chapter, other strategies 
originating from higher management levels did result in 
redundancies. These strategies, therefore, contradicted the 
guarantees given by local management and the promises made by 
senior management. Therefore they contributed to the lack of 
trust employees had in management. 
In this regard, the rationalisation of the clerical services areas 
described in the last chapter is a clear example of how strategies 
formulated at higher levels in the organisation affected the 
amalgamation process. As discussed in Chapter 5, the district 
manager attempted to use this new strategy as a way of speeding 
up the rationalisation of the administration section at 
Narraindera. Whether this was a wise move cam be debated. 
According to the district himian resources manager, the union 
and Narrandera delegates, while agreeing to discuss the 
administration issue, refused to commence negotiations on the 
issue until negotiations at the national level on clerical services 
were resolved. Thus, a district initiative became tied up with 
broader national strategies and was delayed as a result. As also 
described in the last chapter, the whole amalgamation strategy 
was finally overtaken or superseded in April 1991 by another 
strategy: the divisional level area manager strategy. 
One final factor that had an impact upon the amalgamation 
strategy and consequent industrial relations activity at the 
district level was the impact of industrial relations initiatives at 
the national level. As discussed in Chapter 4, a significant 
number of efficiency initiatives were introduced into Telecom 
through the REP and award restructuring process. Many of these 
had an effect upon industrial relations in the Riverina district and 
upon the progress of the district amalgamation. According to the 
regional human resources manager, Narrandera staff tended to be 
very wary of such initiatives seeing them as real threats to the 
ongoing future of their Jobs and the Narrandera office. The 
regional human resources manager also argued that the 
amalgamation strategy had an adverse effect on the success of 
award restructuring initiatives. Every time management wanted 
to bring something in, he argued, it became a battle: the 
Narrandera staff always had the amalgamation in the back of 
their minds. Quoting him: 
The techniccd grades restructure, the lines restructure and clerical 
integration were all outcomes of award restructuring principles. 
They had nothing to do with the district ojrujdgojrmtion hut each 
time you put in something that attacks or reduces the staff 
component it is seen as aR tied in. They have a siege mentality and 
I think the staff in Narrandera have difficulty in drawing a 
differential between the actions. 
The best example of this negative interaction between award 
restructuring initiatives and the amalgamation strategy was the 
interaction between amalgamation and the clerical integration 
agreement. As described in Chapter 4, the clerical integration 
agreement resulted in the restructuring of over fifty classifications 
into one single structure containing six levels. It also involved 
undertakings to redesign Jobs and work organisation. 
The changes were to be worked out and implemented by Joint 
working parties at the local branch or section levels. The process 
involved groups of clerical employees working out the way the 
new structure would be implemented and the ways in which Jobs 
could be redesigned. The deliberations and decisions of the 
employees were to be overseen by a management steering 
committee who would discuss the proposals and endorse them 
when they were satisfied appropriate efficiencies had been 
achieved. From there the agreed proposals were to be sent to a 
national level integration committee. This was made up of union 
and management representatives who would endorse the 
agreements or send them back down to the local level for further 
discussions. Any disputes during the process were to be dealt 
With through state integration dispute committees. 
The Narrandera clerical integration exercise was drawn out and 
unsuccessful. It was one of the last to take place in the country 
and it compared very poorly with the Wagga Wagga exercise 
which was one of the first successfully completed. The 
Narrandera and Wagga Wagga integration exercises were started 
at the same time but the Wagga Wagga agreement was completed 
and set in place a full twelve months before Narrandera's. In this 
regard, the Wagga Wagga integration agreement had a very 
smooth path being quickly processed at the district level and 
approved without controversy by the national integration 
conmiittee. The Narrandera integration exercise, on the other 
hand, while evidently processed quickly at the Narrandera district 
level, was knocked back by the national corrmiittee. Drawn out 
negotiations then took place between Wagga Wagga management 
and clerical staff at the Narrandera office. These discussions did 
not initially lead to an agreement and the issue was referred to 
the state integration disputes committee. Negotiations at this level 
led to a stalemate and it was handed back to district level where 
an agreement was finally endorsed by the district manager (the 
new permeant manager). 
Interviews with managers and employees at Narrandera and 
Wagga Wagga revealed that there were several reasons for the 
drawn out exercise at Narrandera, all predominantly as a result of 
the amalgamation. First, it was argued that the process was 
hindered by management changes associated with the 
amalgamation. That is, soon after the integration exercise began, 
the rationalisation of management positions at Narrandera took 
place. This meant that managers on the Narrandera steering 
committee were replaced by Wagga Wagga management. This 
slowed the whole process down as new priorities and 
considerations were introduced by new committee members. 
Further, the problems were exacerbated by the changes in the 
District Manager position. The two replacement managers had to 
familiarise themselves with the developments and each 
introduced their ideas into the process. 
Second, because the amalgamation issue had been around for a 
considerable period of time, it had a negative effect on the 
attitudes and conviction of Narrandera management to the 
integration process. According to Wagga Wagga management and 
clerical staff at Narrandera, Narrandera management did not 
really help the process by critically examining the efficiencies 
worked out by the staff: their attentions were focussed elsewhere. 
This, it was implied, was a major reason why the initial 
agreement was rejected by the national integration committee. 
Third, according to the Narrandera clerical staff, the process was 
slowed down by Wagga Wagga management who in their view 
kept coming back with new changes. Quoting the union delegate 
at Narrandera: 
We got mucked around by Wagga Wagga so much. They would 
come over and say "well if you reword this job and transfer some of 
these duties over to this position then it will be alright'. We would 
do as they say and then send it over there again and that was 
alright but then they would want something else to be changed. 
This sort of caper went on for over a year, 
Wagga Wagga management argued, on the other hand, that they 
had to keep requesting changes because the Narrandera staff 
were not coming up with realistic options. According to the 
managers, Narrandera staff were more concerned with 
strengthening their position against the amalgamation than with 
achieving efficiencies. 
The amalgamation strategy clearly affected the integration 
exercise. In addition, interviews revealed that the problems with 
integration in turn had a negative affect on the amalgamation 
strategy. Management at Wagga Wagga argued that the 
integration process added a real complication to their attempts to 
implement an amalgamated district structure. The district himian 
resources manager argued, for example, that under the 
integration package a certain nimiber of positions within the 
Narrandera office were agreed to. However, the amalgamation of 
districts called for a reduction in the number of positions. Wagga 
Wagga management's attempts to achieve these reductions were 
seen by the Narrandera staff as a breach of the integration 
agreement and, thus, were resisted. 
In addition, the drawn out nature of the integration process was 
interpreted by the Narrandera staff as evidence that management 
wanted to close the Narrandera office down and this hardened 
their attitudes to amalgamation. On the other hand, when the 
integration package was finally approved by the district manager, 
Narrandera staff interpreted it as further evidence of 
management's intention to close the Narrandera office: 
One of the impressions that I had coming back from the state 
committee was that there was a hidden agenda^ We heard 
rumours. The only reason we got tt approved was because they 
wanted to close the Narrandera Office, We got the impression that 
it got to the stage where management was saying, "look it doesn't 
matter what they present. Just pass it through because everything 
is going to change anyway. It wont matter a damn". 
As described earlier, the Narrandera staff came to distrust any 
management action and, thus, treated any initiative suspiciously. 
Industrial relations suffered as a consequence and any changes 
proposed for the office were resisted. 
Investigating the implementation of the amalgamation strategy, as 
the above demonstrates, obviously helps to shed light on the 
events at Narrandera. Implementation was impeded significantly 
by a range of factors. In fact, to an extent, the whole strategy was 
left incomplete because of the influence of such factors. Further, 
it is clear that the strategy plus the other factors described above 
helped to generate the industrial relations problems at the 
Narrandera office. 
In addition, the events help to shed further light on the concept of 
'managerial strategy'. 
In Chapter 2 it was stated that some treatments of managerial 
strategy within the literature tend to collapse strategy intentions 
and outcomes. That is, it is automatically assumed that a 
strategy once formulated will be successful or, alternatively, that 
all outcomes are intended and planned by management. It was 
also pointed out in Chapter 2 that this assimiption has been 
heavily criticised in more recent literature. The events at 
Narrandera support firmly the argument that an improblematic 
link between final implementation and management intentions 
cannot be assimied. Regional management intended that the 
amalgamation strategy be implemented quickly; yet this did not 
occur. The strategy created real industrial relations problems and 
the amalgamation was eventually superseded by events; these 
outcomes were not planned for. Management strategies are not 
somehow invincible or irrepressible forces. They are plans of 
action that like so many human endeavours can become unstuck. 
The Narrandera experience suggests that the implementation of 
managerial strategies can be impeded by a potentially large 
variety of factors. These factors may be derived firom influences 
outside the organisation, such as local social and economic 
conditions or, as with case of Narrandera, decisions of outside 
bodies such as industrial relations tribunals. They may also be 
generated firom within the organisation. The Narrandera 
experience suggests that a given strategy may be adversely 
affected by other strategies within an organisation, some of which 
may have originated from the same management group or, 
alternatively, from levels higher or lower in the organisation. In 
this respect, it cannot be assumed that organisations are some 
sort of consensual whole There are clear fractures between 
different groups of people within a given organisation. At Telecom 
there were clearly differences between the goals and attitudes of 
different levels of management and between management and 
clerical employees. These differences, quite obviously, can impede 
and perhaps halt the progress of a given managerial strategy. It 
cannot be assumed that the strategies developed by one group of 
managers will be automatically accepted by the people it affects. 
Regardless of whether they are managers or award covered 
employees, they may resist and this resistance may be very 
effective. 
It is also clear from the Narrandera experience that factors 
influencing the implementation of a given strategy are not isolated 
from each other. They interact and in doing so may compoimd 
problems. Thus, in the Narrandera case the pressure exerted by 
the local council had a direct influence on the implementation of 
the strategy. In addition, the commimity response had an indirect 
effect through the local pressure put upon Narrandera employees, 
which increased their willingness to resist^S. Further, the various 
influences on a given strategy are not unaffected by the strategy 
itself. Clearly they are not exogenous determinants. The 
^ The umtarist perspective of industrial relations is clearly not supported by the Narrandera experience. Poor 
communications may have been a contributing factor but clearly there were fundamental conflicts of interest between 
different levels of management and the Narrandera clerical employees. 
It is likely that the employees reactions also had an affect on the community. If all the Narrandera employees 
embraced the amalgamation the communities response would have been different 
amalgamation strategy was affected by award restructuring 
initiatives but the strategy itself had real impacts on the success 
of award restructuring as well. 
Finally, it was pointed out in Chapter 2 that some writers portray 
the problematic link between strategy intention and 
implementation as cause to Jettison the concept of 'managerial 
strategy*. However, while the Narrandera experience indicates 
that the implementation process is exceedingly complex, it has 
clearly shown that a strategy did exist and attempts were made to 
implement it. As Batstone, et al. (1984) claim, the solution to the 
difficulty of pinning a strategy down is not to reject the concept 
but to engage in detailed empirical research. 
POLITICAL CONTINGENCY 
As discussed in the beginning of this chapter, the concept of 
'managerial strategy' also highlights the importance of broad 
contextual factors that constrain the formulation and 
implementation processes. These broad constraints it was argued 
mean that managers don't have complete free choice when 
deciding what sort of strategy to adopt. 
In Chapter 2 it was argued that in private sector organisations 
the major constraints are associated with the imperatives of 
capitalism. For example, the necessity to compete and make an 
adequate return on capital investment. In public sector 
organisations it was argued the direction of strategy is 
predominantly shaped by the policies and agenda of governments. 
Batstone et al.(1984) argue that while the character of this 
'political contingency' may vaiy, it is becoming increasingly 
concerned with the pursuit of commercialism. 
Investigating the character of the political contingency operating 
at Telecom helps to explain further the Narrandera experience 
and the Narrandera experience helps to shed light on the notion 
of political contingency in considerations of managerial strategy. 
As described in Chapter 3, the character of the political 
contingency affecting Telecom is clearly concerned with 
commercialism and the opening up of the telecommunications 
market to competition. All the Labor Government's initiatives: the 
GBE guidelines; the 1988 May Economic Statement; the 
establishment of a private sector competitor; and the loss of the 
first phone monopoly, have been concerned with putting Telecom 
on a more commercial footing. 
It is equally clear that the Government's drive for efficiency has 
had a considerable effect on the broad strategic approach adopted 
by Telecom management. As discussed in Chapter 4, the broad 
character of industrial relations and the specifics of many 
agreements were influenced by Telecom management's desire to 
become more efficient. In addition, as mentioned in Chapter 5 the 
decision to divisionalise was driven by senior management's 
desire to meet the challenges of deregulation by becoming more 
efficient. In this respect, the importance of the Government's 
imperative was summed up succinctly by one manager who said 
in response to a question about the role of the Government: 
It is huge, Wee Telecom would not go out and bring in a competitor. 
In this light, it is obvious that the amalgamation strategy was 
formulated by regional and district management as another 
means of meeting the political contingency imposed by the Labor 
Government. This was verified in interviews with all levels of 
management. They all stated that in order to compete Telecom 
had to become far more ef&cient in all aspects of its operations. 
Because of this, the Country Division and all country branches 
had to begin paying for themselves. The rationalisation of 
management positions and overheads, it was consistently argued, 
was fundamental to this goal. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, much of the overseas literature 
suggests that the drive for efficiency by governments has been 
associated with an increase in industrial disputation and the 
adoption of a far more aggressive approach to industrial relations 
on the part of management. According to Batstone et al. (1984) 
however, there is no necessary link between commercialism and 
aggressive industrial relations strategies. Rather, the aggression 
was another contingency imposed on public sector organisations 
by governments. This argument is supported by the push for 
commercialism at Telecom. As discussed in Chapter 4, the 
management strategies adopted by Telecom in recent years have 
been underpinned by a more conciliatory approach than 
previously existed. Commercialism has not been aggressively 
pursued rather a consensus based approach has generally been 
adopted. 
In this respect, as discussed in Chapter 3 the Labor 
Government's consensual attitude towards the union movement 
and industrial relations has undoubtedly been another important 
contingency. This idea was verified in a number of interviews with 
managers and union delegates who argued that the changes 
occurring in Telecom were to an extent only possible because a 
Labor Government was in power. Quoting one manager: 
The Govemment has had a huge impact, because I can tell you that 
industriaRy the Liberals would never have been able to do it. If the 
Liberals had tried to do a quarter of the thirds that the Labor 
Govemment has done, Telecom would have been on strike. There 
would have been no way that a competitor would have got in. We 
Just wouldn't have connected him, it Just wouldn't have happened. 
However, the industrial relations consequences of the Narrandera 
amalgamation strategy suggest that the consensus approach 
adopted by the Labor Govemment was not a contingency that 
eliminated totally other attitudes and styles. The Narrandera 
experience was, despite broader trends, one of conflictual 
industrial relations and an aggressive style on the part of Wagga 
Wagga management. 
In fact, it can be argued that at Naixandera the Government's 
deregulation agenda was a major factor in the disputes. It clearly 
meant that management was unable to consider seriously issues 
other than efficiency, such as town viability or employee 
hardship. Further, interviews of clerical staff suggest that at least 
at Narrandera, while the general push for efficiency was seen as 
Justified, people were openly hostile to deregulation. As one 
Narrandera clerk put it: 
With this deregulation anyway, who is the person up there saying 
that the way that private companies are run is the best way. I 
mean a Jot of private companies get in a mess and go broke. What 
is to say that their way of doing it is better than Telecom when it 
was semi-govemmsnt. 
From the above it can be concluded that a given government's 
policy stance and initiatives must be an important consideration 
in any study of managerial strategy in the public sector. However, 
it can also be concluded that it should not be assumed that 
political contingencies are an irrepressible determinant upon the 
character and dynamics of a given managerial strategy. They are 
an important influence upon the formulation and implementation 
of managerial strategies but they do not totally prescribe 
managers decisions and actions. 
SUMBIATION: MANAGERIAL STRATEGY, INDUSTRIAL RELATION AND 
STRATEGIC CHOICE. 
It is clear that an examination of the events at Narrandera 
through the prism of 'managerial strategy' does allow the 
development of useful explanations. Additionally, by using the 
concept of 'managerial strategy' to explain the Narrandera 
experience it has also been possible to develop insights into the 
concept itself. 
The theoretical and conceptual questions discussed in Chapter 2 
raised a number of questions that can only be answered through 
empirical research. Clearly a case study of one organisation 
cannot be used to make massive generalisation about managerial 
strategy and industrial relations. However, the Narrandera case 
does provide insights into theory which can be tested for 
applicability in other studies. 
As stated earlier, the Narrandera experience suggests that the 
concept of managerial strategies can imply intentionality, 
coherence and rationality. The Narrandera experience has 
highlighted the importance of the strategy formulation stage as a 
vital source of explanations for industrial relations activity and for 
the progress of a strategy itself. In addition, the events at 
Narrandera provide evidence that, at least at the regional level, 
industrial relations can be an important consideration in strategy 
formulation. In this regard, the regional human resources 
manager stated that the formulation of most managerial 
strategies in Telecom involved a consideration of industrial 
relations. 
The Narrandera experience also backs up the claim that the 
implementation of a given strategy is far from simple. Intention 
does not equal outcome: a host of factors can and will interfere. 
In this respect, it is also clear that managerial strategies and the 
factors which influence them cannot be siommed up by a 
simplistic input-output model. The factors that act upon a 
strategy are not exogenous variables: they affect the strategy and 
are in turn affected themselves. The relationship between a given 
managerial strategy and the factors that influence it are 
interactive as is the relationship between the factors themselves. 
The Narrandera experience strongly supports the contention that 
management should not be treated as a homogeneous group. 
Much emphasis in industrial relations literature and commentary 
focuses on the schisms that may exist between workers along 
union and trade lines. But it is equally important to focus on 
divisions in management. Different managers and different 
groups of managers may have conflicting attitudes, objectives and 
ways of doing things. Organisations, therefore, are not pluralist 
just because the goals of management and workers may conflict, 
but also because they are made up of a variety of competing 
groups. In this sense, it clear that organisations are political 
arenas not unitarist teams. 
The schisms which exist between different groups of managers 
have an obvious effect on the concept of 'managerial strategy'. 
Formulation processes may be complicated and undermined by 
the involvement of different management groups whose 
approaches and objectives differ. Implementation of a particular 
strategy may be frustrated or stopped by the actions of a 
particular group. Further, the strategy may be superseded or 
adversely affected by other managerial strategies formulated by 
other management groups within the organisation. Because of 
this, it is likely the managerial strategies themselves may serve 
the political purposes of one group of managers with relation to 
the activities of other management groups. In industrial relations 
terms managerial strategies cannot be seen as simply aimed at 
influencing the activities of non-managerial employees or trade 
unions. Studies of managerial strategy must be careful to tease 
out the managerial allegiances that exist and which group's 
interests a particular managerial strategy serves and which 
managers does it adversely affect. 
Finally, all the complications revealed by the Narrandera 
amalgamation do not mean that 'managerial strategy' is a concept 
that cannot be operationalised or studied. Case study research 
allows the complications to be investigated and the progress of a 
strategy to be followed. Strategies may be adjusted impeded or 
made redundant in the course of being implemented, but this 
does not mean they do not exist. 
The efficacy of any particular theoretical approach must to a large 
extent be judged in terms of how well it enables activity to 
explained. In this respect, the analysis in this chapter has shown 
that the concept does allow events to be explained. 
From the perspective of a 'managerial strategy' approach it is 
clear that no single cause led to the industrial relation problems 
and the delays and ultimate failure of the amalgamation strategy. 
Rather, a combination of factors at the strategy formulation and 
implementation stages impeded progress. In this respect, 
however, it would appear that the dominant reasons were related 
to the decisions and actions of Telecom management and the 
reactions of Narrandera staff. 
One of the fundamental purposes of the 'managerial strategy' 
concept was to provide for the notion of choice in labour process 
and orthodox industrial relations theories. That is, allowing 
managers to make choices it was argued may help to explain 
diversity in industrial relations. Using the concept of 'managerial 
strategy' to explain events at Narrandera did highlight this aspect. 
It is clear that regional management within Telecom chose 
amalgamation as one way of meeting the pressure for increased 
efficiency. Amalgamation was not forced upon them by some sort 
of external determinant. Corporate and divisional level pressure 
and a political contingency did exist which constrained them to 
formulate strategies aimed at increasing efficiency and 
productivity. Obviously, it would have been very difficult for them 
to develop strategies aimed at equity or employment generation 
rather than cost cutting. Nevertheless, it was regional 
management's choice to pursue change through amalgamation 
and to devolve responsibility for some details of formulation and 
implementation to Wagga Wagga management. It is obvious that 
this choice had profound effects on industrial relations and the 
success of amalgamation itself. Further, it was Wagga Wagga 
management who chose, when implementing the strategy, to 
adopt an aggressive style that was clearly not aimed at healing 
the wounds; they, in fact, exacerbated the problems. Their Job 
was obviously hampered by decisions and strategies developed by 
management at other levels in the organisation. In particular, 
their promises to staff were continually undermined by new 
initiatives and agendas developed at higher levels in the 
organisation. But it does appear that they felt they had won a big 
victory in securing the district head of&ce at Wagga Wagga and 
were a little less than humble. In addition, Wagga Wagga 
management chose to introduce the amalgamation slowly. Their 
reason for doing this was related to a belief that such an 
approach would facilitate implementation. This choice clearly 
back j&red because it conflicted with decisions and choices made 
at the regional level. Regional level management chose an 
amalgamation strategy on the assumption that it would be 
implemented quickly; district management imdermined this by 
formulating a different time scale. 
If regional and district management had formulated a different 
approach, different outcomes might have resulted. A strategy 
could have been chosen that did not Involve amalgamation or that 
did not lead to the rationalisation of all Narrandera management 
positions and the transfer of administration functions. In other 
words, if management had chosen not to wind down the 
Narrandera office, events would have developed in a very different 
way. 
Thus, it is clear that management strategy does allow for choice 
and that the notion of choice does allow dynamic explanations of 
activity. Attempts at explaining the events at Narrandera which 
do not allow a conscious role for management would be 
inadequate. They would miss the fact that it was the decisions 
and choices of individual managers, not the influence of 
irresistible forces, which explains the failure of the amalgamation 
strategy and the industrial relations activity. 
It is also clear, however, from the events described in this and 
earlier chapters that the actions of Narrandera staff provide 
another very important explanation of events. 
The Narrandera clerical staff saw all aspects of the amalgamation, 
from the rationalisation of management positions to the transfer 
of administration functions, as part of an overall threat to their 
Jobs and to their lifestyle in Narrandera. As a result, they were 
unwilling to accept it and strongly resisted as a result. 
Many other factors had their dominant effect upon the 
amalgamation strategy through the reactions of the Narrandera 
Staff. Thus, the strategy of delay chosen by Wagga Wagga 
management was agonising for the staff in Narrandera, leaving 
them uncertain and fmstrated. The perceived arrogance of Wagga 
Wagga management angered them and made them feel bitter. 
Other managerial strategies led them to distrust local 
management and reinforced their belief that Telecom 
management was intent on closing the Narrandera office down. 
And all these feelings were reinforced by a community that could 
not afford to lose any more Jobs. 
The Narrandera staff reacted with industrial disputation and 
hostility, which clearly had a negative impact on the 
amalgamation process. Therefore it can be argued that to a large 
extent the amalgamation strategy founded because of the impact 
it had upon industrial relations in the Narrandera office. As 
stated earlier, industrial relations in Telecom generally had been 
far more consensual in the last ten years. In addition, in rural 
areas such as Narrandera, staff had traditionally been 
industrially conservative and non-militant. The way the 
Narrandera staff reacted to the amalgamation strategy created an 
exception to this general development. 
Given the above it is clear that an explanation of events from a 
'managerial strategy' perspective allows an imderstanding to be 
developed which includes the ways a variety of groups may 
influence a given strategy's progression. However, the role that 
other groups play raises an important weakness of a purely 
'managerial strategy' approach to explaining events. A 
concentration solely on managerial strategy inevitably underplays 
the strategies that other groups may have formulated and acted 
upon. For example, in many respects staff at Narrandera have 
been portrayed as simply reacting in a spontaneous way to 
management's actions rather than as proactively developing a 
strategic response. An examination of activities from the 
perspective of strategies developed by employees may have 
provided further insights into the choices and decisions they 
made. 
Further, the strategic decisions and choices of the Public Service 
Union, which the Narrandera employees belong to, are not 
specifically the subject of a 'managerial strategy' perspective. 
Union officials restricted their role to discussions at the regional 
level. Perhaps as a consequence, the employees at Narrandera felt 
let down by their union who they saw as siding with 
management. An investigation of events at Narrandera from a 
union strategy perspective may have revealed why the union did 
not become involved at the local level (as may a more in depth 
study of the Narrandera employee's strategies). 
In this regard, the union's non-involvement may have been 
related to higher level union strategies. As suggested by AIRC 
decisions, the PSU's policy was to accept the inevitability of 
deregulation and the push for commercialisation. Further, while 
accepting the inevitability of staff rationalisations, the PSU did 
develop strategies to ameliorate as far as possible the detrimental 
effect of the deregulation process (for example securing agreement 
from management for the establishment of working parties and 
voluntary rather than compulsory redundancies ). In developing 
these strategies, however, perhaps the union decided to 
concentrate all its resources on the establishment of in-principle 
agreements with management at the regional, divisional and 
corporate levels rather than dealing with specific developments in 
particular offices such as Narrandera. 
In addition to imderplaying staff and union strategies, a focus on 
managerial strategies can also be argued to have meant that the 
strategies of the Narrandera community were underplayed. As 
with the employees, the community was portrayed as being 
simply reactive. This may not have been the case, other 
perspectives on the events may have emerged if the actions of 
these groups were investigated from something other than a 
purely 'managerial strategy' perspective. 
Clearly an examination of events from these other perspectives is 
beyond the objectives of this thesis. But the above serves to 
highlight that, while the concept of 'managerial strategy' does 
allow the formulation of dynamic explanations of activity, it is not 
a total answer. 
A concentration on management strategy does give management 
groups an active role role. As such, it highlights the fact that the 
character and nature of industrial relations activity is not solely 
determined by factors outside the control of managers; that 
managers actually play an important part in influencing 
industrial relations activity. The approach also avoids extreme 
voluntarism by portraying manager's choices and strategies as 
constrained by contextual factors. However, in highlighting the 
role of management, the approach plays down the fact that the 
strategies of other groups may also shape activity. In this respect, 
a 'managerial strategy' perspective tends to portray the actions of 
groups other than management as simply reactive and, therefore, 
dependent on management's choices and decisions. 
This is an unappealing assumption. It is at least intuitively 
obvious that management does not have a monopoly on decision 
making and strategy formation. If it is excessively determinist to 
assume that management do not influence activity and are slaves 
to external forces, then an assumption that other groups of 
people cannot make strategic choices is also excessively 
determinist. In other words, the introduction of the notion of 
choice into industrial relations explanations should not be 
confined to one group. The concept of 'managerial strategy' helps 
to redress the problems of labour process and orthodox theory, 
but so would the concept of strategy applied to other groups as 
well. 
In this respect, perhaps an ideal, if exhaustive, approach to 
explaining activity is to investigate and describe the strategic 
choices made by all groups involved in a given set of events. Such 
an approach would establish the extent to which different groups 
were able to influence activity through their strategic decisions. It 
would also allow the identification of constraints that act upon 
the choices of one or more of the groups. As a result, the 
approach may reveal that certain groups at particular periods of 
time have a greater or lesser ability to influence events depending 
on their power and situation. It may also reveal that certain 
groups have a long term advantage based on their location in the 
production process or their control over the means of production. 
Further, other groups may be shown to have little or no ability to 
influence events through strategic choices because of their 
location or lack of control. Overall, therefore, the approach would 
allow an extremely comprehensive picture to be built up that 
would be even more effective as an explanation of industrial 
relations diversity than a concentration on managerial strategy-
alone. 
CHAPTER 7 - CONCLUSION AND ISSUES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The main concern in this thesis has been with the concept of 
'managerial strategy' and its usefulness as an explanation of 
industrial relations activity in the Riverina Region of Telecom 
Australia. As demonstrated in the last chapter, the concept can 
be successfully used to shed light on industrial relations. It allows 
explanations to be developed that draw on the choices and 
actions of managers and managerial groups. As a result, it 
introduces a dynamic element into explanations of industrial 
relations activity. 
Based on the experience at Narrandera, it can be argued that the 
concept of 'managerial strategy' provides a corrective to the static 
orientation of orthodox industrial relations theory and the one 
directional nature of some labour process approaches. 
With regard to the orthodox approaches, 'managerial strategy' 
focuses attention on the actions and decisions of managers, not 
Just the institutions of industrial relations. The managers at 
Telecom were constrained by the institutions that they had to 
work with and within as well as by external forces such as the 
Australian and world economy. However, their actions were not 
completely determined: they made choices that had a profound 
impact on events. The adoption of a purely orthodox approach 
concentrating on the relationships between institutions and the 
environmental factors would have overlooked the role played by 
managerial action. It is imlikely that a concentration on 
institutions would have adequately addressed the role played by 
individual Telecom managers at Wagga Wagga. An investigation of 
events using an orthodox approach would have obscured the 
impact that competition between different managerial groups 
played in the failure of the amalgamation strategy. That is, the 
competing goals and conflicting actions and decisions of regional 
and district management groups. 
It was the strategies of managers in Telecom that to a significant 
extent explains the developments, changes and industrial 
relations activity which took place in Narrandera. Therefore any 
approach that enables a focus on these strategies to be 
incorporated in orthodox explanations is an improvement. The 
concept of 'managerial strategy' clearly results in a very strong 
concentration upon management activity and choice. Its adoption 
or integration into orthodox explanations, therefore, has the 
capacity to supply a needed dynamism to the overly static 
institutional focus. 
This thesis has not been specifically concerned with the structure 
or dynamics of the labour process at Telecom Narrandera. 
Nevertheless, it shows that activity does not take place rigidly in 
accordance with a set of immutable laws. Managerial strategies 
and the character of industrial relations activity cannot be simply 
assimied to fit some kind of inevitable pattern. Telecom 
managment were and are severely constrained by the capitalist 
context within which they operate. The deregulation of the 
telecommunications industry and the opening up of Telecom to 
competition meant that management had to seek ways of 
rationalising operations in order to survive. In labour process 
terms, they had to devise means of creating surplus value in an 
increasingly difficult context. Yet they obviously had a significant 
amount of freedom when it came to devising and implementing 
strategies to meet this challenge. They did not follow a clear and 
predictable path that was somehow determined by the logic of the 
economic system. As stated before, Telecom regional management 
chose to pursue a broad amalgamation strategy and Wagga 
Wagga district management chose to operationalise the strategy 
in a particular way. They could have chosen to cut costs or 
rationalise operations in other ways. An amalgamation strategy 
was not an inevitable development dictated by immutable 
economic forces: Narrandera office's decline was not an automatic 
result of impersonal forces. 
Approaches such as Braverman's version of labour process theory 
do not adequately allow for this unpredictability in the strategies 
and actions of management. It is, therefore, not surprising that 
they have faüed to predict or adequately explain the diversity that 
has developed in the organisation of work in modem capitalist 
societies. It is even less surprising when it is realised that 
management is not homogeneous but a collection of groups who, 
while perhaps forming a loose alliance, may, nevertheless, hold 
conflicting goals and engage in contradictory activities. 
This does not mean that labour process approaches are 
irreversibly flawed. As with the orthodox approach, the inclusion 
of the concept of 'managerial strategy' into labour process theory 
can be used to account for a large amount of diversity. An 
investigation of managerial strategy focuses attention on the 
action and choices made by managers and highlights instances 
where different managerial groups may engage in conflictual 
behaviour. These choices, actions and conflicts can be used to 
provide an important explanation of how different labour 
processes may develop in modem economies. Management as a 
whole may face very strong pressures to continually devise new 
ways of creating surplus value, but different management groups 
may choose and seek to implement very different strategies in an 
attempt to meet this pressure. These different strategies are likely 
to have different results; they may conflict with each other and 
they may or may not be successfully implemented as intended. 
The consequence of this is that the structure and character of the 
capitalist labour process in different organisations must vary. It 
must, as a result, be somewhat unpredictable. But despite this, it 
can be understood and an examination of managerial strategies 
can help in this respect. 
The usefulness of the orthodox and labour process approaches is 
improved substantially by the inclusion of the concept of 
'managerial strategy' because, as stated before, the concept 
provides for choice. The theories become less determinist and, 
therefore, more powerful. Further, because 'managerial strategy', 
as defined in this thesis, is not portrayed as totally unrestrained. 
the theories do not become excessively voluntarist. Manager's 
choices are constrained by a variety of social, economic and 
political factors; they cannot simply choose to do whatever they 
like. Nevertheless, it should be clear that both approaches could 
be improved further by, in addition to investigating the strategies 
of managers, concentrating on the choices and strategies of other 
groups in industrial relations. Thus, the strategies and choices of 
employees, their unions and even local community groups, could 
be incorporated in orthodox theory as another source of change 
and in labour process approaches as another explanation of 
diversity. The inclusion of strategies developed by other groups 
would highlight further the important role played by 'choice' in 
structuring industrial relations activity. Management may have 
more economic power in many circumstances and, thus, may be 
more able to implement its choices and strategies but other 
groups are not powerless. As demonstrated in this thesis, they 
can influence activity by their actions. A consideration of their 
strategies must be incorporated into the orthodox and labour 
process approaches if the intention is to increase the explanatory 
power of these perspectives. 
While an examination of the usefulness of the concept of 
'managerial strategy' has been the main concern of this thesis, 
the events at Telecom Narrandera have raised a number of other 
issues that could be constructively investigated further. 
It was argued in chapters 3 and 4 that the character of the 
industrial relations climate within Telecom was far more 
consensual in the mid 1980s than it had been in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s. This argimient was based on an examination of 
decisions brought down by the Australian Industrial Relations 
Commission and an analysis of interviews of managers, workers 
and union delegates in Burwood, Wollongong and Wagga Wagga. 
The Commission decisions revealed that senior management and 
the major unions had successfully negotiated a significant 
nimiber of changes that would contribute positively to the 
organisation's efficiency and the working life of employees. The 
great majority of people interviewed argued that industrial 
relations within the organisation had improved considerably. It 
was claimed by nearly all interviewees that the reason for this 
improvement was related in large measure to a change in the 
strategy of management toward industrial relations. In the late 
1970s and early 1980s management had developed strategies 
underpinned by centralised decision making and an autocratic 
management style. In the mid 1980s management strategies 
changed. In accord with the Labor Government's industrial 
relations orientation and in line with emerging participative 
management approaches, such as Total Quality Management, 
strategies based on a decentralisation of decision making power 
and a willingness to consult with employees and unions emerged. 
In this context, the experience at Narrandera is an exception: 
industrial relations were not becoming more consensual, rather 
the relationship between managers and employers was 
deteriorating. 
As described earlier, regional management decided to pass on the 
responsibility for detailed formulation and implementation of the 
amalgamation strategy to Wagga Wagga management. Wagga 
Wagga management was given the discretion to determine what 
implications the amalgamation would have upon staf&ng and how 
best to put the strategy into place. Regional management's 
decision to devolve responsibility was in accord with the 
organisation wide emphasis upon decentralising decision making, 
but rather than increase managerial effectiveness it, clearly, 
created major industrial relations problems. The Narrandera 
experience, therefore, raises questions about the efficacy of 
decentralised decision making. Theory may suggest that 
decentralisation means more effective decision making but clearly 
this cannot be assumed. 
Further, unlike the national trend, Wagga Wagga management's 
strategies were not consultative. They adopted an aggressive 
approach which was a major cause of disputation. In this respect, 
it can be claimed that the events at Narrandera help to verify a 
link between more consultative management strategies and 
improved industrial relations. Management throughout the 
organisation adopted more open strategies and industrial 
relations within the organisation improved. But with the 
Narrandera amalgamation, Wagga Wagga management chose to 
become aggressive and industrial relations worsened. 
If Wagga Wagga management had adopted a less aggressive 
stance, then the Narrandera staff may not have reacted so 
strongly. However, other factors played an important role. 
Amongst these factors was the fact that the Narrandera staff saw 
the amalgamation as a threat to their jobs and the local 
community saw it as a threat to their town. It is questionable 
whether, given this circumstance, a more consultative approach 
on the part of Wagga Wagga management would have completely 
averted industrial action. 
This raises questions about the ability of consultative 
management strategies in general to substantially improve 
industrial relations and aid the implementation of change in 
organisations when Jobs are at risk. 
The Labor Government's approach to micro-economic reform is 
underpinned by the belief that the changes required in the 
Australian economy can be best introduced via consultation 
between management, unions and employees (Willis 1988). This 
belief also underpins new managerial approaches such as Total 
Quality Management. In this respect, it does appear that Telecom 
management in consultation with unions were able to introduce 
significant changes via the REP and SEP processes without 
widespread industrial conflict. 
However, the strong reaction by Narrandera staff to what they 
saw as a threat to their Jobs raises questions about how far 
consultation can really go. Where managerial strategies threaten 
worker's employment, perhaps no amount of consultation can 
avoid some degree of industrial disputation. 
This assertion is backed up by developments in Telecom since 
those described in this thesis. In the last year it appears that 
industrial relations in the organisation has worsened. Several 
major disputes have occurred that stem from staff cut 
announcements and disputes over the nimiber of employees to be 
retrenched and the redundancy packages ofiFered. For example, in 
March 1992 Telecom announced plans to close all but nine 
customer services offices throughout Australia. This immediately 
led to strike action and eventually an agreement by management 
to reduce the number of ofi&ces to be closed. Despite this 
agreement, in June 1992, Telecom re-announced its intention to 
close the original nimiber of offices and indicated that 
approximately 4000 Jobs would be shed. This led to the 
imposition of nation-wide bans and eventually an order from the 
Industrial Relations Commission which required Telecom to 
comply with the March 1992 agreement (The Narrandera Argus, 
2/4/92, 10/6/92 & 12/6/92). 
The implication that may be drawn from this is that consultation 
may not be the universal panacea which some of its more zealous 
advocates seem to believe. This issue needs further examination, 
but it does appear that if managers and governments, equate 
increases in efficiency with reductions in employment then they 
should not be surprised that consultation will fail to deliver 
change without conffict. 
The disputation at Narrandera also throws into question the 
impression that many people have about industrial relations in 
rural communities. In Chapter 4 it was revealed that there was a 
strong perception amongst Telecom employees that industrial 
relations in rural communities was more consensual than in 
urban areas. The events at Narrandera clearly indicate that this is 
not necessarily the case. As described in Chapter 5 and 6, 
Narrandera employees were veiy outspoken and hostile. They 
continually criticised their own imion for not being militant 
enough and often gave the impression that imion leaders were on 
the side of the bosses. 
Nevertheless, the Narrandera experience does not necessarily 
prove the claim wrong. Perhaps in less extreme times industrial 
relations in Narrandera is less problematic than in places such as 
WoUongong. In addition, perhaps industrial relations in rural 
areas generally is more consensual than that which exits in 
industrialised and urban centres. This is an issue that requires 
far more empirical research. 
The reasons put forward for the difference between rural and 
urban industrial relations included the claim that people in rural 
commimities tend to be trapped in a fairly weak labour market; 
that the quality of life in rural commimities is far better than that 
which exists in the city; and that rural commimities are smaller 
and far more close knit than urban communities. These 
arguments may be correct; once again further research needs to 
be undertaken. But to an extent it can be argued that, given what 
happened in Narrandera, they are factors that may actually lead 
to an Increase in the potential for disputation. 
The employees at Narrandera are trapped in a veiy weak labour 
market. Their prospects for employment within the town are 
extremely limited and may never improve. As stated in Chapter 
5, Narrandera is in decline: its largest remaining employers are 
government organisations and these are progressively pulling out. 
If people lose their Jobs in Narrandera, most are forced to seek 
employment in a larger centres such as Wagga Wagga. 
This bleak situation did not lead to industrial passivity on the 
part of the people at Telecom Narrandera. On the contrary, it 
clearly spurred them to action. They did not go to groimd in the 
hope that compliant behaviour would save their Jobs. Rather, the 
threat they perceived to their livelihood and to their quality of life 
appeared to make them more aggressive. Their hope seemed to be 
that through industrial action and other means they would 
somehow gain a stay of execution if not a complete reversal of 
management's strategy. 
In addition, it was apparent that the size of Narrandera rather 
than leading to employees avoiding disputation because of a fear 
of social rebuke also contributed to their militancy. In large 
commimities the threat to the relatively small nimiber of jobs 
involved would probably cause only a minor reaction from local 
community groups but in a place the size of Narrandera any loss 
of Jobs is a major blow. As described, the local Narrandera 
community got behind the employees. The local council and the 
editor of the Narrandera Argus were particularly vocal because of 
the threat they saw to the viability of the Narrandera township. As 
a result, rather than being made passive by social pressure, the 
militancy of Telecom's Narrandera employees was supported by 
the town. Indeed, to an extent it appears that some employees 
were put under social pressure to react rather than accept the 
changes. 
The insight that may be gained from this is that as with the 
efficacy of consultative approaches the industrial passivity of 
people working in rural commimities does not apply to situations 
where employment is threatened. On the contrary, reductions in 
employment opportunities reveal to rural communities that 
compliance and conservative attitudes are not necessarily 
rewarded. 
The fact that the threat to employment brought a strong reaction 
from both staff and the community, focuses attention on a far 
broader issue; that of what can be called the 'industrial relations 
of redundancy'. In this respect, the Narrandera dispute clearly 
indicates that the industrial relations of redundancy is far more 
difficult for management to deal with than what are, arguably, 
more common industrial relations problems, such as disputes 
over pay and allowances. That is, disputes over job losses are of 
a different order to disputes that relate to remimeration: they 
cannot be easily resolved amicably after an appropriate period of 
negotiation. 
Retrenchments have negative effects on the local economy of any 
community. As a result, it is perhaps inevitable that disputes over 
redimdancies are more likely to draw the attention of community 
groups. As described earlier, this is particularly the case in rural 
communities where the loss of even Just a few Jobs is next to 
impossible to absorb. Management will, therefore, not only have 
to deal with employees, imions and tribunals, but they are also 
likely to have to deal with groups such as local councils and 
commimily action committees. 
Further, when the issue is mass Job losses, management is likely 
to face a very resolute workforce that will be far less willing to 
accept deals struck around the bargaining table. In addition, as 
Just pointed out, while managerial approaches that stress 
employee consultation and involvement may work weU with 
changes that do not mean Job losses, when people's employment 
is threatened consultation and involvement may be of little use. 
In other words, the threat of retrenchment, particularly in times 
of economic recession, will probably always draw a negative 
response from people who are effected by it. 
The reasons for this are relatively obvious. When discussing 
retrenchment, unions and management are not Just discussing 
shares of a pie, they are discussing whether or not some people 
will miss out all together. Further, involving employees in 
decisions about the way work is done or how employees are paid 
is clearly very different to involving them in a decision to 
eliminate their own Jobs. Unemployment is a very dire situation to 
find oneself in, especially in small rural communities where other 
employment opportunities are shrinking and where the costs of 
selling up and moving can be prohibitive^^. Most people facing 
this situation can be expected to fight, regardless of their 
propensity to take action in the past. 
In this respect, it could be argued that the whole issue of 
retrenchment is a problematic one for advocates of management 
approaches, such as TQM, that appear to be premised on the 
notion that employers and employees have common goals. That if 
they Just work together both groups will be better off in the long 
run^S. Management's continual reliance on retrenchment, 
particularly at present, must be seen as a question mark over 
these unitarist assumptions. The interests of management and 
employees may be similar in some circumstances. But 
retrenchments are a situation where there is little question that 
real differences exist between the interests of employers and 
employees. 
The threat to Narrandera created by management's amalgamation 
strategy raises one more issue that is worthy of further 
investigation. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, all the changes affecting Telecom at 
Narrandera are a part of the Labor Government's broader public 
sector reform process. Public sector reform is in turn a part of the 
Hiese costs are exaceibated in communities like Narrandera where decline can have an effect upon land and housing 
values, therefore, making it difficult for retrenched woricers to sell their homes and forcing them to accept sale prices that 
make it difficult for them to buy into urban housing markets. 
^ The growing importance of this assumption is evident in many of the new agreements strack under the enterprise 
bargaining principle. 
Government's overall micro-economic reform agenda. The 
fundamental objective of micro-economic reform is to improve the 
international competitiveness of Australian industry and 
presumably, therefore, to help protect living standards. However, 
the Narrandera experience suggests that the process may be 
having consequences which have not been explicitly considered 
by policy makers. 
Rural communities throughout Australia are in decline. This 
decline is portrayed as being the result of a continuing rural 
crises and changes in farm ownership structures and technology. 
It is resulting in high levels of imemployment in country towns 
and, as a result, a considerable amoimt of rural poverty 
(Lawrence, 1987). Yet despite this: 
..state and federal governments appear to be reluctant or unable to 
alter the forces destroying famdy-farrn agriculture and the 
economies of smaR inland towns. Facing their own fiscal problems 
in times of economic recession they appear incapable of redirecting 
economic activity from the large cities. In a period when city 
unemployment and the closure of factories in the traditional 
manufacturing areas have become political embarrassments for 
governments, regional decentralisation initiatives have been 
afforded a low priority. (Lawrence, 1987, p35) 
In fact, if developments at Narrandera are typical of developments 
in other rural conmiunities, then it may be the case that the 
micro-economic reform policies of the Labor Government are 
actually contributing to the decline in rural communities. As 
argued in the Narrandera Argus: 
The decision to centralise operations is an economic one made to 
improve the efficiency of the operations of enterprises such as 
Telecom However, it is based on the assumption that what is good 
for the company is necessarily good for the society as a whole. 
Who is to bear the social disruption that happens in both the larger 
urban areas and the rural towns? The people transferred are 
forced into much more expensive housing markets. Further 
pressure is added to the already overstretched facilities of the 
capital cities and larger urban areas. On the other hand, 
Narrandera and towns Uke it continue to lose services as the 
population base declines. 
The costs associated with this are not taken into consideration by 
the firms involved and are transferred to the community as a 
whole. It is not the Telecoms who pick up the costs. It is borne by 
the individuals and families forced to uproot their lives and move 
on. It is borne by the townsfolk of Narrandera who lose services. 
(The Narrandera Argus, 7/11/91, pi). 
Perhaps the Australian economy's competitive position is not only 
dependent upon a restructuring of industry, but also upon a 
restructuring of communities. Further, perhaps the population of 
Australia needs to become even more concentrated, than it 
already is, in urban areas in order to meet the needs of the urban 
majority. If this is the case, then the impact of the changes upon 
people either forced to move or left isolated in country towns 
needs to be considered. The Government's reform processes may 
be increasing efficiency but if it results in high levels of rural 
unemployment and poverty then it is clearly efficiency at the cost 
of equity. 
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